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ABSTRACT
The field of organizational ecology has been reduced to studies of population dynamics.
Ecology, however, is a much broader field, that includes relational, spatial, and temporal
dimensions. It allows us to combine existing theories of organizations to study their distribution
across space. I combine insights from the new institutionalism, population ecology, and
resource-dependence theory, to investigate the factors that influence the location of NGO
activities in the state of San Luis Potosí, Mexico. I conducted interviews and participant
observation in 51 rural NGOs.
The uneven distribution of NGOs in the state is not the result of their strategy to reach the
people who need them most, but a consequence of the different opportunities and constraints that
they encounter in each part of the state. San Luis Potosí is composed of four administrative
regions with contrasting natural, social, economic, and political characteristics. The population
of NGOs in each region also exhibits different characteristics, depending on the regional
potential for social conflict, the economic opportunities available to the residents, and the
openness of the political system. In the Altiplano, few NGOs exist. Their pragmatic orientation
meets the approval of state organizations. On the contrary, the Huasteca, a tropical region with a
long history of political repression and socio-economic inequality, forms a niche where many
NGOs are active. Because they are more involved in public policy debates, state agencies
mistrust them. They are actually undergoing a process of differentiation, according to their
political involvement.
As the use of the ecological model points out, spatial factors play an important role in the life
of organizations. Rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí adapt to the different social opportunities and
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constraints they encounter in different places. Space, however, is not a given, permanent
characteristic. It is socially created by actors who occupy it. NGOs are influenced by the context
they encounter at first, which is usually defined by the state, but their actions also serve to refine
the existing definitions. To include space in social investigation, we have to pay attention to how
it is constructed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
It is now common knowledge in the field of international development that, despite what
they claim, or what the public believes, Non Governmental Organizations (hereafter NGOs) do
not necessarily reach the poorest of the poor (Carroll 1992, Tendler 1982). If need is not the
primary factor guiding the choice of location for projects, then what is? Can we find patterns of
geographical location of NGOs? Do other organizations, or the structure of the environment,
affect NGO project location? The literature on NGOs usually treats project location as irrelevant,
and concentrates instead on issues related to performance. More generally, it neglects to examine
in a systematic way the impact of environmental constraints on the work of NGOs. Yet, NGOs
work locally, and taylor their projects to the specific conditions they encounter in the field. The
question of project location should be an important aspect of the study of NGOs. Using field data
on rural development NGOs in the state of San Luis Potosí, Mexico, and a redefined version of
organizational ecology, I show that this issue is a way to illuminate the structure of constraints
and opportunities that NGOs find in their environment.
NGOs have been active in Third-World countries1 since the end of World War II,
primarily as relief organizations. Yet, they only began to draw the attention of international

1

Different groups refer to the poorer countries of the world with different terms, such as less
developed, underdeveloped, developing, the South, etc. The choice of terminology is not neutral,
because each term captures a different reality. I personally choose the term Third World, which
has social, political, and economic, but not geographical, implications. Alfred Sauvy coined it in
1952 to draw a parallel between the Third Estate of the French Ancient Regime, which grouped
the majority of disenfranchised people, and the poor and oppressed countries of the modern era,
which also account for most of the world population. It emphasizes the contrast between a
minority of people or countries, who control most of the available resources, and an oppressed
majority (Rist 1996). The decline of the Second World, represented by the socialist countries,
makes the parallel less adequate than during the Cold War era, but since the situation of the
Third World still resembles that of the Third Estate, the term remains relevant.
1

development organizations in the 1970s. Since then they have since experienced exponential
growth in numbers, and their share of the global foreign aid budget (Edwards and Hulme 1996a,
Meyer 1995, Price 1994, Salomon 1994). The diversity of the nongovernmental sector reflects
differences and evolutions in the definition of foreign aid, and the concept of development.
Although they justify their actions with different, sometimes contradictory theories,
development organizations work to increase the social and economic living standards of poor
populations, in an altruistic manner. Development emphasizes a combination of agricultural
intensification (the Green Revolution), industrialization, free trade, self-reliance,
democratization, gender equality, minority rights.2 In the 1980s the United Nations organized a
commission on environment and development, later known as the Brundtland commission, as a
response to growing concerns about environmental degradation. It spread the idea that
sustainability should be included as a requirement for successful development. Aside from social
and economic criteria, development is therefore now supposed to ensure environmental
conservation, and to improve current living standards, without depleting the store of resources
available to future generations (Korten 1991).
Over the past two decades, as NGOs were becoming significant actors in international
development, research focusing on their contribution expanded. This research, however, deals
almost exclusively with NGOs’ role in development, and neglects their organizational side. To
simplify, scholars recommend that NGOs respond to environmental obstacles with internal
changes, but there is no systematic analysis of how the environment affects NGOs, other than
broad generalizations that are difficult to apply to particular cases. Instead, I suggest that we can

2

See Rist 1996 and Peet 1999 for detailed reviews of development theories.
2

articulate the interaction of environmental factors NGOs activity by using organizational theory.
Specifically, I propose to redefine organizational ecology in a way that allows us to combine
three branches of organizational theory, namely the new institutionalism, ecological analysis,
and resource dependence theory. I then apply this combination of perspectives to examine the
determinants of NGO project location, an aspect of NGO activity that involves both NGO
strategy and environmental factors.
In the development literature, the issue of NGO project location is generally not
examined in detail. NGOs are simply viewed as working where they are most needed. The only
environmental factor that should influence whether an NGO works in an area is its degree of
poverty, which is not an element of NGO organizational strategy. In fact, if NGOs acted
according to this assumption, they would jeopardize their organizational survival. I argue instead
that the determination of project location reflects institutional and environmental pressures, and
expresses NGO survival strategies.
Some of the factors that influence NGO location are outside of their control. Others may
be acknowledged and manipulated to fit organizational goals that are not restricted to altruistic
motives. For instance, NGOs may not have information about the locations where they are most
needed, so they act on other information to start implementing projects in a particular place.
What are these factors? What impact does this have on NGO’s ability to reach disenfranchised
populations? Second, assuming that NGOs achieve their goals in the communities where they
initially begin their work, they are no longer needed. Rather than disband, NGO staff members
try to move the organization to other locations, to replicate their success. Where to move thus
becomes an issue. Finally, even before a project reaches its final stage and the NGO decides to
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leave- and often even if the success of the project is debatable- the NGO faces pressures from
donors and other actors to scale-up, or increase the scope of activity (Uvin and Miller 1996).
Here again, the question of location in the choice for expansion comes to the fore.
Looking at NGOs in this fashion implies that we move away from a purely instrumental
view of NGOs as tools for development, and assume that NGOs are entities with goals of their
own. Organizational analysis offers more insights in this respect than development studies, but
several perspectives may be used to examine organizations’ relations with their environment.
Organizational analysis typically uses only one perspective to explain a phenomenon. Even
studies that set out to combine two perspectives usually end up retaining only one as more
relevant. In research that examines organizations and their environments, however, different
perspectives are not truly in competition, but rather complementary. Thus, it is advantageous to
try to integrate them, rather than to pitch one against the other in an elimination process.
Moreover, there are theoretical reasons to combine different perspectives. I argue that we need to
redefine the concept of organizational ecology in order to combine the branches of
organizational theory that study organizations and their environment. I examine the implications
of this new definition for the analysis of the determinants of NGO project location.
Different organizational perspectives apply to different aspects of the problem of NGO
location. First, at the global level and in historical perspective, the new institutionalism sheds
light on the rise of NGOs as a sector and the ideology that imbibes their practices. Second, the
concept of organizational niche, borrowed from the ecological perspective, suggests that NGO
survival and growth depend on the existence of a favorable set of conditions in their
environment: success depends on context. Finally, at the individual level, resource dependence

4

theory highlights the fact that donors and beneficiaries are resources that NGOs depend on, and
which they can actively manipulate to achieve their goals. Thus choice of location becomes part
of a survival and growth strategy for NGOs. It is not a natural phenomenon to be taken for
granted. Drawing on these theories we can approach the choice of project location as a strategy
of survival for emerging NGOs, and of growth for established ones, as part of the process of
scaling-up.
The redefinition of organizational ecology that I develop in Chapter 3 as the theoretical
foundation to examine NGOs as organizations places a heavy emphasis on the importance of the
local context, particularly in its spatial dimension. Space is typically neglected both in
sociological analyses of organizations and in development theory. It is thus not surprising that
this dimension has not been explored much in studies of NGOs. A notable exception is the work
of Anheier and Salomon (1998), which compares NGO in five different third-world countries.
They pay attention to each country’s social, economic, and political characteristics. They
conclude that the development of an NGO community can only be understood by looking at the
national context in which it is embedded. By focusing on the national context, however, they
implicitly assume that countries are homogeneous entities. Their work is useful to understand the
nonprofit sector at the global level, but not at the local level.
The influence of the local environment has been examined only for social movements.
Miller (2000) has shown that variations in the social characteristics of the population, and in the
local political structure, influenced the development and the outcome of the 1980s peace
movement in the Boston area. He pays particular attention to the scale (local, statewide, or
national) groups used to structure their action, and the scale used to analyze phenomena. Scale is
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not a given physical parameter, but a social construct that actors use to attain their goals. Thus,
he argues that space is not just another parameter to add to social analysis, but a fundamental
dimension in which human action unfolds. By considering NGOs as organizations acting in an
uneven social environment, I propose to contribute to a better understanding of the role of space
in rural development. This study combines organizational theory and insights from geography.
In order to examine the validity of this framework, I spent six months in the state of San
Luis Potosí, in central Mexico, collecting information on the NGOs that work in rural areas. The
question of project location is easier to examine in rural areas, where the characteristics of the
social and physical environment are likely to influence the result of the work of NGOs. In
Chapter 4, I explain that I chose San Luis Potosí for its geographical and cultural diversity, and
its relatively large rural population. Mexico is not a common destination for a study of NGOs,
particularly since the NGO population has only grown recently compared to other countries. San
Luis Potosí, however, is an agricultural state where rural development should be a concern for
public policy and NGOs. In addition, Mexico is undergoing a phase of democratization that
makes it a laboratory to examine the development of an NGO community.
That this study examines only one state limits its generalizability. The legal framework
that governs NGOs and the public policies that guide rural development in San Luis Potosí are
dictated by one federal entity. The structure of the Mexican government, while federal, is still
heavily centralized, so variations in political context are limited. San Luis Potosí, however, can
be divided into regions with significant ethnic and economic differences that have influenced the
development of culturally and politically distinct areas. Various regions reflect the situation in
different states of the Mexican republic, allowing for some generalization at the national level.
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Beyond this, however, results can be compared to the situation in other Latin American
countries, where the religious and political context presents certain similarities. The theoretical
framework, however, is potentially applicable to any region.
In the absence of an existing directory, I relied on snow-ball sampling to generate a
sample of rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí (see Chapter 5). I conducted face-to-face, semistructured interviews with representatives of these NGOs, using a questionnaire that focused on
the characteristics of organizational work and specific issues relating to the determination of
project location. Part of the questionnaire addressed the relations the NGOs have with each other
and other types of organizations. To complement the survey data I collected written documents
from these organizations, interviewed key informants who were knowledgeable about the NGO
sector in San Luis Potosí, as well as representative of state agencies who work with NGOs. I also
conducted participant-observation with NGOs in their professional activities.
One unexpected characteristic of the NGO population in San Luis Potosí was an
extremely low proportion of international NGOs. While this reduced the diversity of the sample,
it provided the study with a focus on Southern NGOs that sets it apart from the majority of
earlier work. The NGO literature is primarily concerned with international NGOs, or INGOs,
organizations based in Western countries that provide services to Third-World countries. INGOs
form part of a global community of organizations, discourses, and practices on international
development. Global policies are deemed more relevant for their evolution than local contexts.
Southern NGOs, however, are growing in importance for the development of their own country
and starting to set up their own networks internationally. They may even supplant INGOs as the
primary implementers of development projects. Hence, they deserve more attention from
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researchers. They are also more likely to pay attention to, and be affected by, the local context of
their project locations. For these reasons they are arguably a more relevant population than
INGOs for a study of the spatial dimension of NGO work.
This study does not to evaluate the success of NGO activities in San Luis Potosí.
Evaluation is probably the single-most controversial issue in development studies, whether in the
NGO or government sector. There is little agreement on how to measure progress in rural
development. Development practitioners, beneficiaries, researchers, and donors disagree on what
should be the focus of an adequate evaluation (Edwards and Hulme 1996a). Assuming they have
the resources and incentives to carry it on, different organizations use different tools to evaluate
their progress, depending on their audience. Socio-economic development is a qualitative, slow,
gradual process that can only be appraised through detailed investigation, but quantitative
measures are still the most common indicators to measure it.
It was not feasible to collect information on various dimensions of NGO performance.
The main question here “how NGOs get where they are,” not whether they make wise choices,
or are “pushed: into the right places. Focusing on evaluation requires an assumption that NGOs
are rational actors that aim for maximum efficiency, devising their strategies to maximize the
impact of their activities for beneficiaries, that is, to increase their living standards as much and
as quickly as possible. The explicit assumption of this study, rather, is that NGOs, like other
organizations, are not entirely rational. The meaning and content of socio-economic
development in Third-World countries is still the object of a heated debate, fifty years after its
entry on the international scene. How could NGOs choose the best way to attain a goal that they
first must define, and which changes with regularity?
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Evaluation is not the goal here, but examining NGO location against the common
discourse on NGOs as rational implementers of development project implies comparing their
geographic distribution to the distribution of socio-economic indicators that they would use to
define their target areas. In order to find out where underdevelopment is located, and if NGOs go
primarily to these areas, we first need to define development. In Chapter 6 I describe the
characteristics of NGOs in the sample and their geographic distribution, in relation to the
conservative, mainstream socio-economic indicators commonly used in Mexico, such as income,
unemployment, adult educational attainment, availability of health care and infrastructure, and
housing quality. Since I intend to examine how NGO location measures up to NGO strategy, it is
more appropriate to use the same indicators they use, than to make up new ones. What matters is
not how they should measure underdevelopment, but whether or not their action is coherent with
their discourse.
Chapter 6 includes a focus on the organizational scale of the NGOs. This factor is
expected to influence their strategy and thus their location. I distinguish between local NGOs,
which operate only in San Luis Potosí, and national NGOs that are part of a national
organization. These operate in at least two Mexican states, or in some cases, several countries.
Rural NGOs are present in greater numbers in poorer regions. At the municipal level, their
numbers increase with the proportion of low income residents, but is not linked to social
indicators of poverty.
In Chapter 7, I examine how the NGO location relates to their strategy. First, the case
study of the Mexican Foundation for Rural Development, one of the largest Mexican rural
NGOs, suggests that organizational strategy does not explain location because many NGOs do
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not explicitly choose their project locations according to the economic status of the residents.
Second, interview data for the sample show that location strategy varies with organizational
scale. National NGOs have a more articulate strategy, and more resources, than local NGOs.
Both rely on opportunistic decisions to implement their projects and are limited by technical
obstacles in their geographic expansion. NGO strategies are not sufficient to explain the
geographic distribution of rural NGOs.
In Chapter 8, I focus on the characteristics of the environment that influence project
implementation. NGOs need certain resources to increase their chances of success and Mexican
NGOs receive substantial funding from government, whether municipal, state, or federal. They
also rely on beneficiaries for operating costs, since most government programs do not allow
them to use public funds directly. As predicted by resource-dependency theory, NGOs have
more contacts with government agencies than with other types of organizations, but project
location is not influenced by the location of government agencies, either in a cooperative or
competitive way. NGOs are characterized by competitive relations with each other. Once again,
organizational scale influences the structure of NGO social networks.
Resource-dependency explains much of the behavior of rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí,
but not the regional inequality in geographic distribution. In order to understand why most
NGOs are found in the Huasteca region, we must take into account the ethnic and economic
differences that lead different parts of San Luis Potosí towards distinct paths of development. In
Chapter 9 I describe these regional differences and their role in unequal opportunities for the
development of an NGO community. It is not so much the material resources, but the political
climate that influences the nature of the NGO community in various regions. A substantial
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segment of the NGO community embraces political issues and can be classified according to the
nature of their political involvement. I show that social and political conflict are crucial elements
to consider in order to understand the development of Southern NGO communities.
Throughout this work I consider NGOs as ‘things in themselves,’ entities with an
existence they strive to prolong regardless of their stated goals. Stated differently, NGOs have
goals, not often discussed, besides the well-being of their target population. The moral
imperatives that are intertwined with poverty alleviation in the Third-World usually condemn
such realities, and have made them something of a taboo in the literature, or an object of public
indignation. I intend to show that such should not be the case. In order to achieve their stated
goals, NGOs must look out for themselves. If the organization disappears, it will clearly fail to
benefit poor communities. In addition, as the examination of political factors in San Luis Potosí
shows, NGOs cannot remain impartial in the political debate that surrounds them, despite the
desire of many to see them as apolitical. Focusing on how NGOs spread over a territory, and
how they differentiate through their interaction with a particular environment, is a way of calling
attention to NGOs as organizational actors, not pawns in the international development arena.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE NGO LITERATURE
2.1.

Development NGOs as Nonprofit Organizations
In industrialized countries, a rich body of literature examines the features of nonprofit

organizations1. Its primary goal is to explain the existence of a nonprofit sector. In economic
terms, nonprofit organizations emerge as a response to contract failure, when consumers have
little ability to judge the performance of a service provider, and a for-profit firm may have strong
incentives to perform below acceptable standards (Hansmann 1987). In political terms, the
nonprofit sector allows for the provision of services that meet demands that are not shared by all,
and do not present an economic incentive for the business sector. Denominational education
presents a case in point. In order to respect the separation of Church and state, the state cannot
satisfy the demand of various religious groups for an education that would respect their beliefs,
so these groups set up nonprofit schools to do it (Douglas 1987).
Usually, the literature on nonprofit organizations does not dwell on the internal diversity
of this sector. The relevant factor, in political terms, is the free association of private citizens to
fulfil functions and needs that the state does not address. The term voluntary implies that a set of
individuals associate to pursue a common goal, but do not derive their income from membership
in the organization (they are not staff or stockholders). It tends to downplay the constraints and
pressures that individuals may face when deciding whether or not to join an organization,
particularly normative pressure from the community, or economic pressure to join a farming

1

The nonprofit sector is a residual category that groups together all the organizations that are
neither public, i.e. managed by the state, nor business organizations. A wide variety of
organizations belong in this sector: churches, sport clubs, trade and professional associations,
charities, health organizations, etc. Development NGOs in the Third-World are only a subset of
this sector.
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cooperative in order to survive. The economic theory of the nonprofit sector seems to be more
adequate to explain the development of a nonprofit sector in poor communities. Businesses are
not interested in working in poor areas, because profits there would be limited. Thus, nonprofit
organizations provide services and goods that the market does not provide (Brett 1993,
Hansmann 1987).
The body of research on nonprofit organizations, however, gives limited attention to
Third-World countries. From a methodological point of view, standardized, reliable data on
NGOs are more easily available in industrialized countries, which makes it easier to draw and
test hypotheses there than in Third World countries. In addition, Helmut Anheier’s (1987) work
on African voluntary organizations illustrates the limited applicability of perspectives developed
in industrialized countries to Third-World realities. He explains the current appeal of voluntary
organizations as agents of development by their ability to combine economic and non-economic
goals. However, the development of a private voluntary sector in Africa is restrained by the fact
that many of the functions it could provide are taken over by the state, or foreign agencies and
NGOs. Moreover, the sociological definition of voluntary organizations as spare-time or leisure
organizations cannot apply in societies that experience widespread underemployment. People
there often join by obligation rather than choice, hoping to improve their lives.
Since development NGOs are seen primarily as a solution to problems of social and
economic underdevelopment, the main body of NGO research belongs in the field of
development studies. It is guided mainly by economic and geographic perspectives. The main
concern of development research is with the outcome of development projects, and may be
summed up in a simple question: Do NGOs help solve the problems of the poor in Third-World
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countries? Following the theoretical arguments that explain the existence of a nonprofit sector in
industrialized countries, NGOs argue that they are better than the state at reaching the poor, that
they are more participatory and innovative, and more efficient and effective. However, empirical
studies in industrialized countries that examine the performance of nonprofit organizations
compared to public agencies and businesses do not give clear support for the cost-effectiveness
of nonprofit organization, and mention problems of accountability and donor dependence
(DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). Can development NGOs rightfully claim that they achieve better
results?
2.2.

NGOs in the Literature on International Development
Twenty years of research on NGOs documents the mixed results of their projects, in

terms of poverty alleviation and social development. Tendler (1982) reviewed a variety of
projects carried out by private voluntary organizations2 funded by USAID. She identified seven
“articles of faith” (p. 2.) about NGOs, and checked for empirical evidence to support them. The
articles of faith contend that NGOs are able to reach the poor, involve the poor in decisionmaking (the participatory approach), favor the process of development over punctual outcomes,
strengthen local institutions (promote democratization), and are generally less bureaucratic, more
cost-effective, more flexible, and more innovative than other actors. She found little evidence to
support these claims, and argued for a revision of the use of NGOs in international development.
Specifically, she emphasized the need for greater cooperation between NGOs and governments.
Her study became a widely used reference in development studies.

2

Judith Tendler uses the phrase private voluntary organization in the same way as it is used in
industrialized countries. She does not distinguish between grassroots and intermediary
organizations.
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Carroll (1992) also set out to check NGO performance, but focused only on intermediary
NGOs, and distinguished between grassroots support organizations, which are not directly
accountable to local communities, and membership-support organizations, which provide
services based on beneficiaries’ membership in the organization. Contrary to common
expectations, he found that grassroots-support organizations, theoretically less accountable to
their beneficiaries than membership-support organizations, performed better in service delivery.
Globally, NGOs achieved the lowest scores for their policy impact, and the participation of
beneficiaries in decision-making. Other, more recent studies challenge the ability of NGOs to
achieve sustainable development (Vivian 1994) and to outperform government services (Yadama
1997).
The research usually uses case studies, either to present successful strategies, or to report
instances where NGOs did not live up to general expectations. For instance, Carroll (1992)
selected his sample of 30 NGOs among those who had good performance records. Derman
(1995) studied the implementation of a natural resources management program in three areas of
Zimbabwe, describing the problems that efforts to simultaneously protect the environment and
boost local income may encounter. Bebbington (1996) reported on the ways different modes of
rural organization influenced the success of agricultural development and natural resource
management projects. Edwards (1999) explored the factors that explain the success or failure of
six Asian NGOs in poverty alleviation. From these studies, we get only a fragmented picture of
the situation, with a bias toward positive evaluation. It is difficult to get a sense of the impact of
an NGO community in a particular region.
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Aside from efficiency, and often in relation to it, several problems stand out in the
literature on NGOs. They revolve around NGOs’ accountability to donors and beneficiaries, their
legitimacy as agents of development, and their difficulty in scaling-up projects. NGO-state
relations, which intersect with all of these other issues, are also a major area of investigation.
Of foremost importance is the issue of NGOs’ accountability to their donors and
beneficiaries, and their legitimacy. These two issues, although distinct, are related. In terms of
accountability, NGOs in Third-World countries get their funding from a variety of donors,
including multilateral agencies, national governments in industrialized and Third-World
countries, private corporations, foundations, and citizens. As a consequence, they have to
account for the distribution of funds to donors, and meet criteria of efficiency that these deem
acceptable, usually focusing on quantitative evaluation (Elliott 1987). At the same time, NGOs
claim that they are participatory, meaning that they involve their beneficiaries in decisionmaking, and are accountable to them (Korten 1987). Donors and beneficiaries make
contradictory demands. Some fear that NGOs will emphasize accountability to the donors over
accountability to the beneficiary in order to survive (Hulme 1994, Meyer 1992, Smillie 1997).
The evaluation of NGO performance may address efficiency or effectiveness. Efficiency
measures NGOs’ ability to optimize their resource use to generate outputs. Effectiveness refers
to how well NGOs satisfy the demands of stakeholders. While the former is an internal measure
of performance, the latter involves external standards, both social and political (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Donors and beneficiaries, the main stakeholders in NGO evaluation, are likely to
differ in their perception of the relevance of each. Donors are likely to emphasize efficiency, and
equate accountability with accounting (Edwards and Hulme 1996b). Since they provide the
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funds, they may also expect NGOs to conform to their vision of development. NGO projects will
thus evolve to reflect donor priorities. When gender became an international issue, NGOs started
to include women’s groups in their proposals (Crewe and Harrison 1999). After the Brundtland
commission, NGOs began to emphasize environmental sustainability (Korten 1991).
NGOs themselves allege that they represent the poor and disenfranchised, not the
interests of local elites or foreign donors. Unlike government officials, however, they are not
elected representatives of the people, and cannot be dismissed if they do not satisfy their
constituency (Meyer 1992). Beneficiaries are concerned with effectiveness, that is how their
situation improves over the long run as a result of the work of NGOs. Evaluating effectiveness,
however, is extremely complex, because socio-economic development itself is a complex
process, influenced by a multitude of factors outside of NGO activity (Fowler 1996). If the
beneficiaries are dissatisfied with the work that is conducted, they can argue endlessly with
NGOs about evaluation, but beneficiaries have little power to force NGOs to change their
methods. Since NGOs are often far less participatory than they claim to be, in reality, they do not
represent the agenda of the poor as much as they assert.
In addition, NGOs depend on local governments. Sometimes, they receive funding from
them. Most important, local government set up the legal framework that NGOs have to respect,
and set up the public policy agenda. On the one hand, government agencies and elected officials
want to make sure that NGOs respect national and local priorities. NGOs’ reliance on foreign
funding, in particular, renders their legitimacy problematic. Governments are suspicious of their
agenda, and fear that it may reflect the priorities of Western donors rather than local
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populations.3 On the other hand, they may be wary of NGO’s efforts to strengthen the political
power of the poor, which threatens that of established elites (Thomas-Slayter 1994). Local
political authorities may then try to control NGO activity. For instance, in the 1980s, the World
Bank encouraged NGO action for democratization, and many development NGOs started to
promote greater participation of civil society in political affairs. Their work posed a threat to
authoritarian governments and established elites, which now try to stop them. Fowler (1993)
actually doubts NGO’s ability to contribute to democratization in Africa, because national
governments can counter their actions by passing restrictive laws, integrating them into the
public administration system, or letting the local political elites take them over. As a result of
these contradictory pressures, the maintenance of legitimacy is an ongoing process for NGOs.
The literature gives great attention to NGO’s relations with state organizations (see Atack
1999, Bebbington and Farrington 1993, Bebbington and Thiele 1993, Blauert and Zadeck 1998,
Clark 1995, Farrington and Bebbington 1993, Méndez 1998, Miraftab 1997, Sandberg 1994,
Sanyal 1994, Silberberg 1994, Tendler 1982). For the most part, NGOs try to keep their distance
from the state, first because of its inefficiency, and second to avoid co-optation and repression

3

A recent decision of the Brazilian government to investigate NGOs that promote conservation
of the Amazon illustrates this point. A group of small NGOs funded by individuals and
associations in Europe and North America started buying land in the Amazon, which threatens
the interest of the ranching and mining community. The government claims that because of this
policy, control over the land is slipping out of the hands of Brazilian people. Brazil is no longer
able to design its own national development policy, but has to depend on foreign agenda of
nature conservation. Thus, it will start an evaluation of all NGOs active in the Amazon. Other
NGOs, who organize indigenous communities to obtain the extension of indigenous reservations,
state that they would favor the elimination of the NGOs buying land, because they undermine the
legitimacy of the whole sector. Still, they fear that the government will use the issue of foreign
control as a means to promote business interests, to the detriment of all NGOs working with
indigenous communities (Block and Kaste 2001).
18

(Farrington and Bebbington 1993, Miraftab 1997). NGOs that carry out advocacy activities are
more likely than those focusing on service provision to be negatively affected by the presence of
a repressive government (Potter 1996). Now that research is showing that NGOs are not filling
their promise, and that the state has an active role in the development process that cannot simply
be bypassed, most authors advocate greater cooperation between NGOs and state agencies. They
note, however, that actual efforts at cooperation remain limited, mostly because NGOs and
governmental organizations are still largely suspicious of each other.
Finally, part of the criticism on NGO performance comes from their difficulty in scaling
up their activities. Scaling-up may take various forms (Uvin and Miller 1996). First, NGOs
engage in quantitative scaling-up when they increase the number of beneficiaries, either by
servicing more people in the same area, or by expanding the project to new areas. Second, they
undertake functional scaling-up by developing new activities, and diversify the services they
provide. Third, they may get involved in political scaling-up, to increase the participation of the
local populations in politics, or influence policy on their behalf. Finally, NGOs focus on
organizational scaling-up when they try to increase their financial and managerial autonomy, by
diversifying their funding sources, developing the skills of their staff, and maintaining
accountability to their beneficiaries.
NGOs argue that one of their strengths is their knowledge of local conditions, which
makes them more aware of local problems and more responsive to local needs. If this claim
holds, it explains the difficulty in scaling-up. NGOs lose their privileged connections to locality
if they move to a new area or develop new activities with which they are not familiar. Critics
point out that if NGOs want to have a significant impact on development, however, they cannot
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confine their work to micro-projects (Sanyal 1994). Whether NGOs can take up the challenge of
scaling up without losing their specificity is an ongoing debate (Farrington and Bebbington
1993).
2.3.

The Organizational Side of NGOs
The development literature gives a simplified view of NGOs as organizations. Ritchey-

Vance’s (1998) description of a project evaluation framework developed by the Inter American
Foundation gives a good illustration of how development scholars perceive the organizational
nature of NGOs: “NGOs, grassroots organizations, and networks can be vital links between
people and policy, but only so long as the NGO is the means and does not become an end in
itself” (p. 85, emphasis added). Like many other development scholars, Ritchey-Vance suggests
an instrumental view of NGOs as tools, which donors and beneficiaries use to achieve socioeconomic development, the same way they use improved seeds or micro-credit. The
development literature does not consider NGOs as social entities, research objects in their own
right.
In accordance with this perspective of NGOs as tools, researchers usually focus on the
analysis of development NGOs’ performance, relying primarily on economic theories. Brett’s
(1993) use of cost-benefit analysis to look at the differences in accountability and efficiency
between for-profit and nonprofit organizations offers a case in point. Individual actors rationally
select the organizational form that will carry out various tasks with maximum efficiency. The
role of the state is to use its regulatory power to design the most efficient combination of
incentives and sanctions in each sector. Likewise, Meyer (1995) uses neoinstitutional economics
to analyze the role of environmental NGOs in Latin America. She argues that NGO leaders
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behave like entrepreneurs who mix self-interest and altruism. They provide public goods, i.e.
environmental conservation, that the market is not interested in providing because they generate
little profit. At the same time, they use international funds opportunistically to provide
themselves with a job in a context of high levels of national unemployment.
The development literature in general mentions both internal and external factors as
having an impact on NGO performance. Still, researchers overwhelmingly assert that internal
factors are the most relevant in the analysis, or recommend changes in internal organizational
factors as a solution to various problems. Brett (1993) leaves a large role to the rational choice of
supposedly free and independent actors, and reduces the environment to state regulation. Fyvie
and Ager (1999), in their analysis of the factors that influence NGO’s ability to innovate,
mention the role of the context, but focus more attention on organizational factors. The larger
context is seen only as a constraint, not an asset. NGOs have to develop their internal strengths,
to counteract the negative forces present in the environment, if they want to improve their
capacity to innovate. In his evaluation of NGOs’ work with childcare provision, Edwards (1999)
adopts a similar approach. He recognizes that initial local conditions have a great influence on
the results of the projects, but his recommendations address organizational factors, rather than
suggesting that NGOs spend time analyzing the context before setting up their projects.
A focus on internal factors is understandable in a field with a strong pragmatic
orientation. Environmental factors, in the forms of a repressive state, political conflicts, the local
social and economic structure, or natural disasters, often restrain NGO activity. If they are
presented as the dominant forces that shape success and failure, NGOs are left with little room to
manoeuver. It would seem discouraging, and somewhat ironic, to explain to organizations that
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make empowerment one of their main goals that they have little impact on the development
process, because it depends on factors that are either too complex for NGOs to tackle, or simply
outside their control. On the other hand, directing recommendations solely at the internal
organizational processes may appear pointless if environmental factors can ultimately ruin all
efforts. This perspective also gives a negative view of the environment as primarily constraining,
and neglects the fact that environmental factors present NGOs with opportunities and positive
features that they take advantage of.
Some scholars see the limitations of this approach, particularly when they consider the
issue of scaling-up NGOs’ development impact. Hulme (1994) suggests a new agenda for
research on NGOs. Noticing that development research usually stays at the village level and
ignores larger forces, he argues that if NGOs want to reduce poverty on a large scale, research
needs to be conducted on the relationship between the micro- and macro- levels. Uvin and Miller
(1996) also hold that the issue of scaling-up can only be addressed by examining NGOs in their
broad social context, and not by assuming that NGOs operate in a vacuum. Dedicating more
research to the relations between NGOs and their environment would undoubtedly benefit
various areas of research on NGOs. Since NGOs’ geographical expansion offers the clearest
illustration of this relationship, I have chosen it as the focus of this project.
Sociological theories of organizations can help to remedy the current flaws in research on
NGOs, particularly in the analysis of environmental factors that affect them. Scott’s (1998)
classified theories of organizations into three categories. According to his classification,
development scholars conceive of NGOs as rational systems, that is goal-oriented, formalized
social structures. In other words, NGOs are means to an end, which they must achieve as
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efficiently as possible. The two other categories consider organizations as natural or open
systems. In the natural systems view, organizational goals are the result of an ongoing
negotiation process between different groups of members, who have both competing and
concurring interests. The informal structure of an organization explains its behavior better than
its formal structure. For the open systems approach, organizations depend on a continual
exchange with, and are shaped by, their environment. Participants have multiple identities and
loyalties outside the organizations, so organizing involves bargaining, and devising common
interpretative frames, to hold the organization together. Organizations are seen as systems of
interdependent activities.
In order to gain a better understanding of NGOs as actors of development, we need to
adopt a perspective that takes into account their organizational nature, and the influence of
environmental factors on their strategies and activities. In the following section, I will use the
perspective of NGOs as open systems to elaborate a theoretical framework and examine the
factors that determine NGO location, both at their initial set-up, and in their expansion. First, I
will redefine the concept of organizational ecology, so that it integrates three branches of
organizational analysis that consider the relationship of organizations with their environment,
that is, the new institutionalism, organizational ecology in its current version, and resource
dependence theory. I will then review each of the three theories in terms of this revised
framework of organizational ecology, and present research propositions related to the issue of
NGO project location.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1.

Redefining Organizational Ecology
3.1.1. The Current Perspective: Organizational Ecology as Population Ecology
The concept of ecology made its first significant appearance in organizational analysis

with Hannan and Freeman’s (1977) article on population ecology. Organizational ecologists
initially wanted to demonstrate that contrary to the assumptions of managerial theories of
organizations, organizational change did not primarily involve managers making adjustment at
the individual firm level, in isolation from the influence of environmental factors (Hannan and
Freeman 1977, Carroll 1984, Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan 1983). They also wanted to find the
conditions that favor the emergence of new organizational forms and lead to the death of existing
ones, to show that organizational founding involves more than an individual’s decision to go into
business.
Up to this point, the study of organization-environment relations was considered to be the
domain of economics and human ecology, and referred primarily to the study of resource
dependence (Aldrich 1979). Hannan and Freeman (1977) clearly do not include this level in their
models. Contrary to other organizational perspectives, population ecologists draw heavily and
explicitly on bioecology to develop their concepts. They set out to shift the focus of
organizational analysis from adaptation processes at the individual firm level, to selection
processes, using populations of organizations as an analogy to the biological concept of species.
They argue that as organizations grow older, they become more stable, but also less able to
modify their internal structure in response to environmental change. In time, less adaptive forms
die and are replaced with new, better fitted ones. Thus, selection at the population level is a more
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significant factor in organizational change than adaptation inside organizations. The process of
selection induces a focus on competition mechanisms. Organizations are divided among
generalists and specialists, each occupying different positions in the resource environment. The
concept of density dependence explains the relationship between survival chances and the
number of existing organizations (Aldrich 1999).
Even though Hannan and Freeman (1977) intended for population ecology to study
organizational forms, the bulk of research in the field remains confined to the analysis of the
change in the number of organizations in one population. Empirical studies in population
ecology essentially use longitudinal data and sophisticated statistical models to explain the birth
and death rates of organizations. Among the theorems of organizational change is the principle
of the liability of newness, which holds that young organizations are more likely to die than
older ones (Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan 1983, Singh, Tucker and House 1986). To support the
idea that organizations suffer from structural inertia, researchers also investigate the connection
between the occurrence of internal change and the death rate. Singh, House and Tucker (1986)
found that changes in the core aspects of organizations, such as changes in goals and activities,
increase the likelihood that an organization will disappear.
Carroll (1984) has reworked the original framework of population ecology to include two
more levels of analysis. First, organizational demography studies the life cycle of individual
organizations. Second, community ecology analyzes collections of populations in a given
geographical area, as well as the appearance and disappearance of organizational forms, to
provide a macroscopic perspective (Astley 1985). Population ecology then focuses on population
growth and decline, as in the studies cited above, and on the interaction between various
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populations of organizations. The mechanisms of interest at all levels, however, remain founding
and death rates. Moreover, in practice, community level studies are really studies of population
interactions. Lomi (1995), for example, compares the founding rates of two types of banks in
Italy, one specialist and one generalist. He finds relations of interdependence between these
populations and a core population of generalist banks. Such analyses do not fall under
community ecology, but population ecology. According to Carroll (1984), and consistent with
bioecological definitions, competition and mutualism1, which are the principles of interest in
Lomi’s study, are properties of individuals or populations, not communities.
Two decades of research in organizational ecology, focusing primarily on population
dynamics, have led to the development of an evolutionary perspective in organizational analysis.
Although the concept of evolution is usually associated with biology, the principles of evolution
themselves, namely variation, selection, retention, and struggle, are not particular to biological
systems (Aldrich 1999). Baum and Singh (1994b) argue that an evolutionary approach can be
applied to any system that exhibits heritable variation in form, and where variation in form
influences survival and replication. Organizational systems may thus be analyzed in evolutionary
terms.
Under the evolutionary approach, organizational change results from a dual hierarchical
process, which involves ecological and genealogical entities (Baum and Singh 1994b). First,
genealogical entities consist of routines, organizations, species, and polyphyletic groupings of
organizations. They contain the different levels of knowledge and skills that organizations use

1

Competition refers to negative effects of the expansion of one population on another, while
mutualism refers to positive effects. They are not necessarily reciprocal phenomena.
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and produce. Organizational systematics study how these elements are replicated and modified
over time.2 Second, ecological entities consist of the historical structures that embody
genealogical elements, that is, jobs, organizations, populations, and communities of
organizations. Organizational ecology studies the processes of interaction between these various
levels that lead to organizational change, and the selection of organizational forms over time.
The levels of both hierarchies are nested, so that higher levels can be broken into parts that
represent the elements of lower levels. In organizational ecology, a population is formed of a
collection of organizations, which is itself a collection of jobs.
The evolutionary perspective serves as an overarching framework, and seems to be the
logical progression of organizational ecology, given the orientation it took after Hannan and
Freeman’s (1977) original presentation. Evolutionary models examine, in a dynamic way, the
emergence of new organizational forms, and how they survive under environmental pressures.
Then, these organizational forms can be classified, and their ancestors traced. Contrary to
research in population ecology, evolutionary analysis recognizes the importance of

2

Baum and Singh (1994b) observe that organizational systematics is a generally neglected field
in organizational analysis. The study of NGOs is an exception to this rule, since many scholars
give close attention to the definition of various forms of NGOs (Carroll 1992, Farrington and
Bebbington 1993, Korten 1987). This situation may result from the lack of agreement among
development academics and practitioners over the boundaries of the NGO sector. The
classification systems usually follow the analytical issues of interest, and include, among other
criteria, the location of headquarters in industrialized or Third World countries, the activities
undertaken, the source of funding, and the formal relation to the beneficiaries. Vakil (1997)
provides an overview of the issue of the taxonomy of NGOs, and tries to design a theoretical
framework to address it. Taxonomy is a fundamental issue because it has direct implications for
an organization’s eligibility for various sources of funding, and because researchers must be
clear about their populations of interest, so that their conclusions are not applied incorrectly to
other types of organizations.
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intraorganizational processes, so it includes all levels of analysis from the intraorganizational
level to the community level.
Even though Hannan and Freeman (1977) defined their field of interest as population
ecology, the terms population ecology and organizational ecology quickly became synonymous,
and organizational books use them interchangeably (Aldrich 1999, Scott 1998). Lomi (1995)
exemplifies the position of organizational ecologists by stating that “the central problem of an
ecology of organizations is to understand how social, economic, and political conditions affect
the rates at which new organizations (and forms) are created and the rated at which existing
organizations (and forms) change and disappear” (p. 76). Likewise, according to Baum and
Singh (1994b), the purpose of organizational ecology is “to understand the mutual interactions
within and among the populations and communities comprising organizational ecosystems and
the mechanisms and processes underlying their growth, regulation and decline” (p.5). Ecology,
in this approach, is restricted to the study of the succession of organizational generations.
This overly narrow definition of the concept of ecology leads some sociologists to
question the usefulness of this perspective in sociological analysis (Perrow 1986, Young 1988).
Population ecology, and its development into evolutionary models, have in effect reduced
ecological studies of organizations to demography and population dynamics. Yet, the definition
of some of its key concepts, like birth, death, and population, lacks theoretical rigor. Young
(1988) contests the usefulness, for the sociology of organizations, of drawing an analogy
between biological and organizational phenomena, because we cannot clearly identify
organizational equivalent to concept such as species and niche. On the contrary, I argue that
organizational ecology has been reduced to organizational demography, not because it tries to
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draw too close a parallel between biological and organizational concepts, but because
organizational ecologists only applied a fraction of bioecology to organizational theory.
3.1.2. A Broader Definition: Back to Bioecology
Etymologically defined, ecology is the study of organisms in their environment. A
working definition used in bioecology is that ecology “is the scientific study of the interactions
that determine the distribution and abundance of organisms” (Krebs 1972). Bioecology studies
individuals, populations, and communities, and the relations between each level and the
environment, in terms of the flow of resources. Its has temporal, spatial, and relational
dimensions. I will show how organizational ecology has departed from this biological definition,
and how we may make the ecological perspective a more useful tool in organizational analysis.
When Hannan and Freeman (1977) set out to investigate the population ecology of
organizations, they had an accurate perception of this subarea of ecology as focusing on growth
and decline in numbers of organizations. Carroll (1984) merely aimed to extend the same
perspective to two other levels of analysis, the organization and the community. Since
population and organizational ecology became synonymous, however, ecology was inaccurately
reduced to its temporal dimension, because population analysis involves longitudinal studies of
population density. In fact, Carroll and Hannan no longer use the term ecology. They have
recently re-labeled their field of inquiry the demography of organizations, which is a more
accurate rendition of their approach. Bruggeman (2001) finds the shift in terminology confusing,
but it actually clarifies the situation. Since the empirical studies carried out so far remain at the
level of organizational demography and population dynamics, they should not claim the whole
field of organizational ecology. The population ecology of organizations, which comprises both
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population dynamics and organizational demography, should be seen only as a branch of
organizational ecology, the same way that population ecology is a branch of bioecology,
alongside individual and community ecology.
Population ecology, with its focus on selection processes over the long run, limits the
scope of organizational ecology in two ways. First, it considers population and community levels
of analysis, and excludes the organizational level. Bioecology, on the contrary, studies all three
levels, from individual organisms to communities of species. In fact, under the framework of the
evolutionary perspective, the organizational level is now included in ecological analysis (Aldrich
1999, Baum and Singh 1994b). This reorientation also comes from a reexamination of the
original assumption of structural inertia, which initially downplayed the possibility of
organizational adaptation to environmental change. Evolutionary models now recognize that
organizations, as individual entities, undergo internal evolution, which makes them valid objects
of ecological analysis.
Baum and Singh (1994b) assert that their evolutionary model accounts for the possibility
of organizational change, but they suggest examining the succession of organizational strategies,
and the selection processes that govern it. They simply transpose the use of the same statistical
models as in organizational demography to a lower level of analysis. Once again, organizational
change is conceived in terms of successive generations, and selection processes.
The exclusive reliance on selection, to the detriment of organizational change, is not an
accurate transposition of bioecological principles to organizational analysis. Taking a close look
at the biological definitions of adaptation mechanisms, it appears that natural selection is only
one of them. Biological adaptations are adjustments to the environment which may occur
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through natural selection, but also as physiological or behavioral modifications. These last types
are not passed to the next generations because, unlike mutations, they do not involve changes in
the reproduction material, and unlike natural selection, they do not lead the individual to increase
reproductive capacity. Even though they involve change that dies with the organism, they are
important factors in the analysis of the survival of individual organisms, their colonizing new
environments, and their interaction with their environment. Biological organisms do adapt, and
so do organizations.
In fact, the differences between biological and organizational systems would suggest that
behavioral modifications play a bigger role in organizational systems than in biological ones. In
biological systems, natural selection is easy to distinguish from physiological and behavioral
modifications. Birth and death are usually clearly identifiable, making generations easy to
isolate, and filiation easy to trace. Moreover, hybridization is limited, because reproductive
processes are generally confined to a species. It then becomes feasible to isolate evolutionary
processes.
Organizational events are not as clearly defined. For instance, organizational death
occurs through retirement and bankruptcy, but also merger or buy out (Aldrich 1999). Birth
occurs in similarly varied forms. Since the emergence of an organization is a process rather than
a punctual event, it is sometimes difficult to identify it, and the multiple paths of organizational
creation and death make demographic events difficult to specify with precision. Analysts depend
on official records, which do not always exist. Genealogy is hard to establish, and hybridization
common, because organizations are fundamentally open systems (Baum and Singh 1994b).
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Authors who argue for the predominance of selection over adaptation overlook the difficulty of
establishing a clear structure of organizational generations.
In addition, Perrow (1986) rightfully points out that not all organizations disappear under
selection pressure. Public organizations, in particular, tend not to die, and evolve mostly through
changes in their internal structure. This runs counter to the ecological argument that selection is
more important than adaptation in explaining organizational change. However, while Perrow
(1986) uses this case to invalidate the whole ecological perspective on organizations, I would
suggest that what it underscores is the limited potential of population ecology to cover the whole
research agenda of organizational ecology. Organization ecologists should test the hypothesis
that the relative importance of adaptation or selection processes varies with the type of
organization.
In fact, criticism of the narrow focus of population ecology and existing evolutionary
models even comes from researchers within the subfield of population ecology, which leads us to
the second limitation of population ecology as the dominant perspective in organizational
analysis. McKelvey (1994) is of the opinion that population ecology now has gathered enough
basic studies of founding and death rates, and needs to broaden its agenda. Moreover, he stresses
that the data used in organizational demography involves mostly irrelevant populations.
Researchers study the populations for which they have access to reliable records over long
periods of time, so that they choose a particular population on methodological rather than
substantive grounds. While this is a valid approach to build a theory, the empirical results may
have limited interest. McKelvey (1994) recommends that researchers focus not so much on

32

longitudinal analysis, but consider short term phenomena, such as the repercussions of
environmental disruptions, and populations of organizations that are relevant for the economy.
McKelvey’s (1994) position exposes the fact that population ecology only covers a
fraction of the range of issues that could be addressed by organizational ecology. In fact, Aldrich
(1979) did provide organizational ecology with such a broad agenda, even though he explicitly
situates his work within the population ecology perspective. The title of his book itself,
Organizations and Environments, is but a paraphrase of the term ecology. Aldrich explains that
he is interested in organizational change in general, so he covers all the topics relevant to this
phenomenon, including the characteristics of organizational environments, the ecological
processes of organizational change (variation retention, and selection), the creation,
maintenance, and transformation of organizational structures, the establishment of organizational
boundaries, flows of resources through organizations, and issues of interorganizational relations.
Aldrich (1979) probably saw his work as belonging to population ecology because he
wanted to focus on change, and thus adopted a dynamic view of organizations. In his follow-up
book, he makes this point clearer by referring to it as an evolutionary perspective (Aldrich 1999).
In his view, which is the view of population ecologists, an analysis of organizations can only be
labeled ecological if it is longitudinal. The issues of organizational boundaries, resource flows,
and interorganizational relations, however, may also be examined in cross-sectional analysis, and
still remain ecological, because they refer to the interaction between organizations and their
environment. Organization ecology has restricted itself to a narrow agenda only through a
misconception that ecological analysis relies exclusively on dynamic models. We need to
redefine organizational ecology in a broader sense, closer to its meaning in bioecology.
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Therefore, transposing the biological definition, I propose to define organizational
ecology as the study of organizations’ interactions with their environment. This environment has
both technical and institutional components. It includes other organizations as well as
individuals, and resources such as material goods, infrastructure, information, and energy.
Organizational ecology has relational, spatial, and temporal dimensions. Far from pushing the
analogy too far, this transposition would, on the contrary, allow organizational analysts to
present the differences between biological and organizational systems in a more systematic way,
and to incorporate elements of various organizational theories into a more encompassing
framework of analysis.
3.1.3. Using Organizational Ecology to Combine Different Perspectives
The point of presenting an ecological analysis, instead of relying on each theory
separately, is that it takes advantage of the complementarity of various theories. Researchers can
then establish links between various branches of organizational analysis that consider
organizations as open systems, and focus on their relations with their environment. In its broad
definition, ecology places a strong emphasis on the analysis of the environment. Population
ecologists operating under the restricted definition of ecology give great importance to past rates
of organizational founding and death, and population density (Singh, Tucker and Meinhard
1991). These represent only the factors relevant for population studies, and do not cover the
whole range of environmental factors that affect organizations. Indeed, most effects of internal
dynamics would probably disappear in the statistical models of population ecologists if they
controlled more carefully for more environmental factors. Since new organizations, contrary to
new biological organisms, are rarely directly born out of existing organizations, it is unlikely that
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internal population dynamics have a large impact. In fact, Aldrich (1999) reports that studies of
the effect of prior founding and dissolution generate largely inconclusive findings.
In addition to ecological factors, a list of relevant aspects of the environment would have
to include technological, legal, political, economic, demographic, and cultural factors (Hall
1987). In order to get a complete picture of environmental factors, we need to combine several
existing perspectives, which emphasize different aspects of organization-environment
interaction. In this section, I will briefly show what the integration of three perspectives,
institutional theory, the current population ecology, and resource dependency theory, would
contribute to organizational ecology.
First, institutional theory describes the historical context of organizational life. In fact,
population ecologists often include institutional variables in their models. For example,
Delacroix and Carroll (1983) showed the influence of political turbulence on newspapers’
founding rates, and Singh, Tucker and House (1986) showed the importance of licensing for the
survival of voluntary organizations. Current evolutionary models recognize the role of both
technical and institutional factors in organizational life, and do not posit the dominance of one
type over the other (Aldrich 1999, Baum and Singh 1994b). Institutional analysis sheds lights on
the regulatory, normative, and cognitive background that shapes organizational behavior (Scott
1995). It reveals that organizations do not adopt certain forms simply because they are the most
efficient, but because they respond to the systems of values and norms that operate in the larger
society.
Second, we can borrow the concept of niche from population ecology. Examining the
interactions between organizations and their environment means that we identify the conditions
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that favor the survival of a type of organization, or its niche. Aldrich (1979) defines
organizational niches as “distinct combinations of resources and other constraints that are
sufficient to support an organization form. Organizational forms, then, are organized activity
systems oriented toward exploiting the resources within a niche.” (p. 28). Population ecologists
use the concept of niche when they examine the role of population density on population
dynamics. The number of organizations that occupies a niche influences the availability of
resources, the intensity of competition between individual organizations, and eventually the
founding and survival rates in the population (Baum and Singh 1994a).
Little attention is devoted to the description of niches themselves. In bioecology,
however, the examination of the environment, the definition and description of its relevant
features, are considered indispensable steps before the elaboration of dynamic models. Even
though the descriptive phase of investigation is not an end in itself, it cannot be omitted if
researchers want to avoid the risk of mis-specifying their models3 (Begon, Harper and Townsend
1990). Investigating the organizational features and structures of organizational niches would
help to develop population models, and enhance understanding of the interactions of
organizations and the environment. The niche in bioecology has a spatial dimension, which is
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For example, in their analysis of the newspaper industry in Argentina and Ireland in the 19th
century, Delacroix and Carroll (1983) claim that these countries were relatively similar, because
they had comparable populations, and comparable positions of political, economic, and cultural
dependence on European powers. The fact that Ireland was a British colony for most of their
period of interest, while Argentina was a sovereign country, does not get any attention. The few
variables they consider to represent environmental effects on the founding rate of newspapers are
marginally significant, but this is probably more because of poor variable definition than low
influence of environmental factors. If they had paid more attention to the description of the niche
and adopted different variables, part of the lagged effect of birth and death rate would probably
have been absorbed by environmental effects.
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largely ignored in organizational analysis. Just as organizational niches should take into account
institutional factors, their spatial dimension should not be discarded a priori, but only when the
theory justifies it.
Third, refocusing organizational ecology on organization-environment interactions would
incorporate resource dependence theory in the ecological framework. Resource dependence
theorists advance that an organization’s survival depends on its ability to acquire and maintain
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). They consider the strategies that organizations adopt to
secure their provision, which mainly involve various types of formal and informal relationships
with other organizations. Resource dependence thus deals with the relational dimension of
ecology. Moreover, the inclusion of resource dependence theory would answer the current
criticism that population ecology considers organizations as passive entities that only react to
environmental forces (Perrow 1986). Resource dependence theory views organizations as
actively manipulating their environment to improve their survival chances. It emphasizes
adaptation over selection.
The inclusion of the concept of resources in ecological analysis, and the assumption that
organizations are active, opens a new field of investigation for organizational ecology, parallel to
an area of bioecology. Bioecology holds that organisms not only use resources from the
environment, but also release outputs, which have an impact on the total stock of resources, and
the ecology of other organisms. At the community level, it studies the flow of resources through
biological systems. This approach implies that resources and outputs are two faces of the same
concept. One species’ output is another’s resource. We may posit that organizations are different
from biological organisms in that they create their environment as much as react to it, so that
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resources and outputs are even more intertwined in organizational systems than in biological
ones. Shaping the environment, generating meaning, are forms of organizational output, and are
the result of organizational activity. Elements of society will draw on them to shape institutional
factors, which will be fed back into the organizations through constant interaction between them
and their environment. Organizational ecologists may study the flow of meaning, information,
institutional rules, and values in and out of organizations.
My goal in the remaining sections of this chapter is to present an ecological perspective
on the determination of NGO project location, using the three branches of organizational
analysis presented in this section. An internal perspective on organizations would consider that
NGOs choose project locations simply as a function of organizational goals and the skills of the
staff. It would emphasize the strategic aspects of location choice. An ecological perspective, as I
just defined it, underlines the external factors that shape and constrain organizational choice, and
posits that location is determined as much as chosen. The point here is not to present NGOs as
completely constrained by environmental determinants, but to show that these should not be
pushed aside because they seem beyond the control of organization members. Ultimately, I
intend to show that environmental factors have intended and unintended effects on NGO
location. NGOs may actively manipulate their environment, by incorporating the components of
their awareness of in their survival and growth strategy, but they are also confined to certain
niches by forces that they cannot control.
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3.2.

Why Is the Determination of Location Not Seen as a Problem? Contribution from
the New Institutionalism
3.2.1. The Rise of NGOs and the New Policy Agenda
The new institutionalism conceives of organizations as grouped in organizational fields,

or “recognized area[s] of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers,
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products”
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). NGOs are part of a field of international development, comprising
multilateral and national development agencies, donors, Third World government agencies, and
beneficiaries. Indeed, some development scholars refer to international development as an
industry, but this term is intended pejoratively to signify that the noble goal of global welfare has
been turned into a cynical business (Crewe and Harrison 1999). The notion of field does not
have this normative connotation, and highlights the links that NGOs have with other
organizations, based on a similarity of purpose.
Why did the NGO sector experience exponential growth beginning in the 1980s, when it
had been active in Third World countries since the 1940s? Institutional and ideological factors
may answer this question. At first, development projects were handled by local state
administrations. The nation-state appeared naturally as the agent that would channel
international funds and allocate them to benefit the local population. Large projects of
modernization and infrastructure construction, the ‘white elephants’, abounded. In the 1970s,
however, problems of inefficiency and widespread corruption led many to challenge this view of
development. Advocates of development from below also challenged how well the governing
elites would assist the poorest members of their constituencies (Korten 1987, Uphoff, Esman and
Krishna 1999).
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Challenges to the state, however, were not limited to the Third-World. Industrialized
countries administrations also faced an ideological shift from faith in the welfare state and the
public sector to faith in the market and the private sector in the 1980s (Salomon 1994). More and
more activities that were handled by state agencies, for instance health care, education, or prison
maintenance, could now be handed over to private firms or nonprofit organizations. The 1980s
debt crisis in the Third World gave a decisive blow to large scale public projects, and paved the
way for the redirection of aid funds to NGOs. Donors were more sensitive to arguments in praise
of the third sector as a response to state failure.
The growth of the development NGO sector reflects their increased legitimacy on the
international scene, formalized in the ‘New Policy Agenda’ (Edwards and Hulme 1996a). This
agenda has two basic tenets, one economic, and one political. The first states that private agents,
both businesses and nonprofit, are the most efficient and reliable service providers and vectors of
economic growth. The second holds that nonprofit organizations, because they work with the
grassroots, will foster democracy. Democratization became a development goal in the 1980s, and
foreign aid is now often conditioned to the respect of political procedures and laws akin to those
of Western democracies (Fowler 1993). Moreover, it is argued that democracy encourages
economic growth (Edwards and Hulme 1996a). Programs of structural adjustment recommend
the contraction of the public sector in Third World countries, to the benefit of both Northern and
Southern NGOs. Donors now channel an increasing portion of their funds through NGOs rather
than state agencies (Meyer 1992).
Institutional theorists contend that organizations which increase their legitimacy also
improve their survival chances. They are more likely to survive if the institutional environment
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considers their activities and structures acceptable and appropriate (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
Sociological institutional theories rely on two different bases for legitimacy (Scott 1995). First,
traditional institutional theory emphasizes normative factors as a source of organizational
legitimacy: An organization acquires legitimacy when its goals are deemed morally right. In the
case of development organizations, fighting global poverty became a legitimate organizational
goal when President Harry Truman made it a mission of American foreign policy (Rist 1996).
Second, the new institutionalism emphasizes cognitive factors: Organizations reflect a social
construction of reality, and become legitimate when they are taken for granted. NGOs have
become legitimate actors in the field of international development because an organization can
attract funding just by belonging to the NGO sector, regardless of its particular goals and
structure. NGOs are also increasingly present in international fora. The United Nations and other
multilateral agencies now must take them into account as partners in negotiation, even though
they are still reluctant to do so (Jasanoff 1997, Otto 1996, Spiro 1994).
3.2.2. NGOs as Users and Vehicles of Institutional Myths
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe isomorphism as the adoption of similar
characteristics by organizations engaged in similar activities. As NGOs become stable features
of the field of international development, they start exhibiting signs of isomorphism. Korten
(1987) describes the structure of many NGOs as pre-bureaucratic. They refuse to adopt
bureaucratic features, such as the development of an internal hierarchy or the formalization of
organizational positions, because these are seen as characteristic of inefficient public
administrations. Instead, he suggests that NGOs adopt a post-bureaucratic structure, combining
professionalism and technical expertise with a flat hierarchy. In fact, DiMaggio and Anheier
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(1990) see similarities between the justifying ideologies of professionals and NGOs. Both
emphasize the service dimension of their work, their autonomy from market values, and the
exercise of expertise to pursue the common good. In the field of international development,
which employs mainly professionals, the similarities probably cumulate. Low levels of
formalization and bureaucratization, however, are typical characteristics of professional
organizations, regardless of the sector of activity in which they operate (Hall 1962, 1968).
Korten’s (1987) suggestion that NGOs bypass the bureaucratic model just underscores their
evolution into another type of professional organization.
NGOs are thus not that different from other professional organizations, but their
structural features have turned into part of the myth about NGOs’ potential as agents of
development. They are seen as intrinsically non hierarchical, non bureaucratic, and flexible, and
these traits have acquired normative as well as cognitive value (Kaimowitz 1993, Tendler 1982).
Governments often expect NGOs to keep overhead costs at an extremely low level, to make sure
that the funds go to beneficiaries. NGOs comply with these often unrealistic expectations in
order to retain their funding. This spending pattern, however, prevents them from increasing
their professionalism, which is another donor expectation. Thus, they find themselves in a bind,
and resist the evaluation of internal processes, which could reveal their flows and lower their
legitimacy (Smillie 1996). It follows that the NGO’s organizational structure is elusive, and
easily overlooked. The NGO itself does not exist as its own entity, organizational survival in
itself is not a valid, or even acknowledged, goal. NGOs must be totally altruistic instruments for
the transfer of resources (broadly defined) to needy populations in the Third-World. Their
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members’ personal goals are supposed to merge with their identity within the organization, so
that the two do not conflict.
Applying the new institutional perspective to NGOs actually leads to a paradox. The
cognitive frame they enact demands that they overlook the implications of their organizational
nature. On the contrary, the new institutionalism makes it a central feature, and insists that
organizations are social entities with a life of their own, which generate social meaning beyond
the explicitly stated organizational goals, and even the personal goals of their members (Scott
1995, Powell and DiMaggio 1983). If NGOs simply espoused the institutional myth that has
developed on their account, then the location of development projects would not be an issue.
NGOs would simply fulfil their altruistic mission by going to the poorest communities, which
the state and the business sector neglect, or to the ones that need their services the most,
irrespective of any other considerations. The only problem would be to determine which
communities fall into this category. NGOs are supposed to be better than public organizations at
reaching the poorest of the poor, but empirical studies show that this is not the case. They do
usually draw on a wider basis of beneficiaries than state agencies, but still miss the poorest
fraction of the population (Tendler 1982, Carroll 1992).
NGOs, in reality, present a good example of decoupling of the formal and internal
structure. The formal structure signals to the environment an organization’s ceremonial
compliance with the existing organizational myth, while the internal structure ensures that the
organization carries out its daily operations. Decoupling allows an organization to preserve its
institutional legitimacy, and ensure its technical efficiency at the same time (Meyer and Rowan
1977). Hulme (1994) actually reports that many NGOs deliberately maintain ambiguity about
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their strategy. They pursue goals of modernization and empowerment that are ideologically
contradictory, but this allows them to present different facades to different audiences, and gain
legitimacy with all. While NGOs advocate democratization, consensual decision-making, and the
participation of beneficiaries at all stages of the development process, they often implement
division of labor and control mechanisms similar to those in public sector and business
organizations (Edwards and Hulme 1996b). They employ professionals to signal their technical
expertise, and exhibit low levels of formal hierarchy, while relying on hierarchy and authority to
carry out projects in the field. The official, public discourse they use to obtain funding is
disconnected from the practices they adopt in order to produce visible results that will guarantee
further funding.
NGOs do not only use institutional myths, they help propagate them. The number of
NGOs exploded after a value shift in Western4 thinking, and their current expansion accelerates
the spread of Western ideas in the Third World. First, their legitimacy suggests that
organizations are the necessary vector of socio-economic development. Organizations permeate
every aspect of life in the Western world, as the central feature of modern society (Scott 1998).
The multiplication of NGOs in the Third World tends to make them central in these countries
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Meyer, Boli and Thomas (1994), see a link between Western values and institutionalization.
Interestingly, they use a geographical term, the West, to refer to modern societies, but they do
not indicate the boundaries of the West. They link Westernization to the European
Enlightenment, ideas of modernization and rationalization, and associate modernization with
Christianity. From this, we can infer that Westernization is a process, and that countries where
Christianity has a strong cultural influence will show higher levels of Westernization. The myth
of the West, however, is itself another powerful component of modern thinking that they do not
consider in their argument.
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too, with the implicit assumption that the creation of a formal structure is in itself a sign of
development, because it is a sign of modernity.
Second, through the process of isomorphism, NGOs also transport Western myths, such
as rationality, universalism, and individualism. The spread of organizations into an everincreasing number of domains in Western society is a direct result of the spread of these values.
According to the Weberian theory of modernization, we use organizations as the rational actors
which pursue efficiently the two main values that emerged from the Enlightenment, progress and
justice (Scott 1998). Science is a crucial component of the rational myth, the method that will
provide us with the tools to achieve these goals. Professionals play an important role in
institutionalization, as the technical experts who rely on scientific values (Meyer 1994).
International development actually embodies both goals, and provides an ideal justification for
the global spread of organizations. In its mainstream version, development discourse posits that
we can achieve social justice, that is, acceptable living standards for everyone in the world, by
having development experts transfer the discoveries of Western science and technology to Third
World countries (Peet 1999). By employing professionals, who believe in the scientific method,
to supervise development projects, NGOs imply that modernization is a legitimate goals around
the world.
Finally, Boli and Thomas (1997) assert that the spread of international NGOs contributes
to the development of a world culture, based on Western symbolism. Its principles include
universalism, individualism, voluntaristic authority5, rational progress, and world citizenship.
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According to Boli and Thomas (1997), NGOs assume that the free association of rational
individuals produces desirable societal goals. They use this assumption to act as a source of
authority, instead of relying on a legal mandate or divine principle.
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Development NGOs, for the most part, adhere to the ideas of scientific progress and economic
growth at the core of the development project. In addition- and contrary to other agents in the
field- they emphasize individualism with such concept as self-reliance, empowerment, or human
rights. All these build on the assumption that individuals are rational actors, subjects distinct
from the social structure they live in, infused with moral authority. Top-down approaches to
development do not give as much importance to individuals. With NGO projects, the
development of the individual as subject and citizen becomes part of the development agenda.
Moreover, the circulation of expatriates even in the most remote communities shows Third
World populations that they are part of a worldwide project. The terms global actions or world
citizenship may actually have a more concrete meaning for peasants in the Andes than for fast
food workers in small town America.
The institutional perspective can explain some of the features of the development of the
NGO sector over the past twenty years, but with some limitations. First, according to Meyer and
Rowan (1977), modernization and institutionalization are linked processes. As a society
modernizes, the domain of rationalized institutional structures is extended. Therefore, formal
organizations are more likely to emerge in more modern societies, and formal organizations in a
given domain or activity are likely to have more elaborate structures in more modernized
societies. This model, like much of institutional theory, was developed for Western societies.
Third-World societies are not as rationalized as industrial societies, so it may not be extrapolated
fully there. We can also expect that Southern NGOs will not exhibit the same characteristics as
Northern NGOs, and less conformity to the rationalized myth. At the same time, we can expect
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them to pay more attention to institutional factors that are particular to their local and national
environment.
Second, institutional theory, at the global level of analysis, helps explain how NGOs as
an organizational form have gained greater and greater legitimacy in the field of international
development, and some of the features that they adopted to try and maintain this legitimacy. Its
contribution at a lower, more local level, is less clear. Meyer (1994) actually mentions that
studies on a smaller scale that intend to examine the long-term effect of environmental
conditions on the characteristics of a particular type of organizations usually neglect global
trends, or cannot detect their effect.
The development of the NGO sector is so intrinsically linked to the globalization of
modern values, however, that global institutional factors need to be included in the analysis of
NGOs. The point is to understand the process of isomorphism between Southern and Northern
NGOs, rather than assume a similar structure for both types of NGOs. While some refer to the
global factors that shape the NGO sector in general, others emphasize the importance of local
conditions, to stress that the institutional environment of development NGOs has a global and a
local component. At the global level, donors and international development discourse are the
main factors. At the local level, we can expect to see the influence of government agencies.
3.3.

Drawing from the Ecological Perspective: The Organizational Niche
3.3.1. The Concept of Niche: Limits and Relevance
The institutional perspective generates hypotheses about the context of NGO action in a

particular location. It emphasized the political, cultural, social, and legal aspects of the
environment that NGOs have to take into account when designing and implementing their
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projects. The ecological perspective and resource dependence theory focus on the means
available to supply and support an organization, that is, the aspects of the environment that
NGOs use as resources. While the context is the set of conditions that the organization face- a
framework for action- resources are assets which are used and transformed to generate output.
Biologists originally borrowed the concept of niche from the social sciences, where it
eventually made its way back to organizational studies. Population ecologists use the concept of
niche to refer to the set of environmental conditions and resources that support organizational
survival. Hannan and Freeman (1977) define the niche as the resource space in which a given
form of organizations outcompetes all other forms. Specialists concentrate on a narrow niche,
while generalists use a broad one. Aldrich (1979) provides a list six dimensions of the
environment that affect the availability of resources, and can help to identify niches:
environmental capacity, homogeneity-heterogeneity, stability-instability, concentrationdispersion, domain consensus-dissensus, and degree of turbulence. The dimensions may be
applied to various kinds of resources. Environment variability creates new niches, and the
opportunity for the generation of new organizational forms. In theory, it follows that similar
organizational forms should then occupy similar environments, but this hypothesis remains to be
tested. Aldrich (1999) sees the niche as encompassing social, economic, and political conditions,
thus accounting for the institutional dimension of the environment.
Initially, Hannan and Freeman (1977) defined a niche in relation to the organizational
form that occupies it. Although they allowed for the theoretical possibility of empty niches, the
two concepts of niche and form are inextricably linked in the definition, which produces a
circular argument. The only niches that can be identified are the ones which are occupied, an
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organizational form is defined by the niche it occupies, but the niche is defined by the
organizational form that occupies it. Both concepts lose their relevance. The central problem lies
in defining the limits of the niche (Young 1988). In order for competition and selection to occur,
a niche must be finite, meaning that resource availability has to be limited, but according to
Young (1988), the limits are virtually impossible to determine for organizations.
The problems with the current definition of the niche stems from a confusion in levels of
analysis, which following bioecology more closely would dissipate at least partially. The concept
of niche, according to Hannan and Freeman (1977) and Aldrich (1979 and 1999), applies to
organizational forms. Thus, analysts should consider niches at the community level, to determine
what organizational forms are selected in given environments. The risk of this approach,
however, is to produce very general findings that explain little more than prior macroscopic
theories of social change. For instance, Aldrich (1979) states that three main factors influence the
creation of new niches and organizational forms. First, with the shift to a market economy, labor
and land became commercial resources that could be sold freely, and money is now the universal
standard of exchange. Second, urbanization produces environmental heterogeneity, and thus
stimulates new organizational forms. Finally, political revolutions unleash a potential for new
combinations of resources and organizations, since they free resources from prior vested
interests. With such levels of generality, niches are so broad that they appear irrelevant to
explain new organizational developments, such as the spread of the multidivisional firm.
In addition, even though the formulation seems to lead to community level analysis, the
concept of niche is used in its relation to competition, a concept that is relevant at the individual
and population level, but not at the community level. The empirical research on organizational
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niches actually takes place at these levels. The association of organizational niche with
competition seems to indicate that niches are only relevant when competition takes place, and
that competition is a dominant phenomenon of organizational life. Hall (1987), however, points
out that this perspective is not useful for organizations that are guaranteed survival, such as large
private organizations and public agencies. Moreover, they overlook processes of cooperation that
also occur between individual organizations and populations. Bioecology now de-emphasizes
competition and density dependency, because research has shown that niches are not as full as
previously thought, so competition is not as intense as was assumed and not as important for
population dynamics (Begon, Harper and Townsend 1990). Organizational ecology would
benefit from taking a similar approach.
Furthermore, the original formulation of the organizational niche reifies the environment,
in a way that fits economic rather than sociological views of organizations6. By overemphasizing
competition processes, organizational ecologists downplay the role of political, social, and
cultural factors, and neglect the role of power and conflict in changing the organizational
landscape (Perrow 1986). Hall (1987) stresses the fact that niches do not appear automatically as
the result of the play of market forces. Social actors create them. Once again, institutional factors
need to be included if we want to give an accurate representation of the organizational niche.

6

The concept of niche probably gets used most frequently in marketing research, to explain the
creation of new organizations, or to develop strategies for new product lines. Marketing became
a predominant activity with the spread of the idea that in Western societies, the capitalist system
has developed beyond the mass consumption stage, and that markets are now segmented. To
survive and grow, organizations need to differentiate, or to adapt their products to consumer
tastes. Marketing sets out to find out what consumers want, to tell businesses what to sell. The
niche in marketing is a unidimensional concept, consisting of a fraction of the consumer base.
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Baum and Singh (1994a) provide an approach to the concept of organizational niche that
would answer most of current criticisms. The niche as they describe it may be used at the level of
the organization or the population, involves institutional as well as technical factors, and
considers both competition and mutualism. They indicate that there are macro-level niches for a
whole population, and micro-level niches for an individual organization. The structure of the
organizational niche will influence patterns of competition and mutualism among organizations.
Looking at childcare providers in Toronto, they found that institutional factors are important in
the initial growth of the population. Later on, competition prevails among organizations of
similar size in the same niche. Mutualism occurs where the differentiation of organizations is
greater, because they serve complementary functions.
3.3.2. Implications for the Determination of Project Location
Theoretically, the concept of niche is important because of its association with
environmental fit. Organizations have different chances of success in different environments,
making organizational location a relevant factor when examining organizational performance.
Where organizations achieve a good fit with their environment, they increase their chances of
success. In other words, the issue is not just what works, but where it will work. In
organizational analysis, the term ‘where’ is used loosely to refer to an abstract niche, which
incorporates the resources that are necessary for organizational survival. Since the components
of a niche are difficult, if not impossible to determine, organizational fit is impossible to measure
accurately. It is a qualitative, rather than quantitative, notion. Likewise, it should not be viewed
in absolute terms, to imply that organizations look for the optimum fit, or may only survive in a
few environments of maximum fit. Loose coupling of organizational parts, and between
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organizations and their environment, produces an extensive tolerance for non-optimal fit
(Aldrich 1979).
If environmental fit is such an elusive concept, why is it useful? In the case of NGOs, the
determinant role of environmental factors on success and performance is generally downplayed.
The concept of environmental fit may be used as a reminder of the relation between NGOs and
the resources available in their environment. Since quantifying environmental fit may not be
possible, we may not use it as a continuous variable, and assume that the greater the fit between
NGOs and the environment, the better the NGOs will perform. Instead, we may use it as a
threshold variable, with the idea that below a certain level, that is, if external conditions are too
unfavorable, NGOs are highly likely to fail. This way, it may be easier to integrate the factors
that are crucial for NGO survival in the definition of the niche.
More importantly, using the idea of organizational niche reintroduces the geographical
dimension of organizational activities. As a first step in environmental analysis, we may
visualize the geographical repartition of NGOs in a given area on a map, check it against other
features of the environment to generate hypotheses about the relevant dimensions to include in a
model, or test existing ones. For instance, since development NGOs are supposed to solve
problems of market and state failure, they should be present in areas that state agencies and
businesses neglect. We should be able to observe a pattern contrasting areas of large NGO
presence, matching the areas of greater poverty, and areas of greater state coverage, in the more
affluent communities or regions.
In the sub-field of rural development, many social dimensions intersect with the spatial
dimension. Since rural populations derive a substantial part of their income from agricultural
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activities, and agricultural land, NGOs have to deal with the micro-regional differences that
affect agricultural production, for instance in terms of land use and productivity, or the
organization of labor markets. NGOs that implement agricultural projects will work with
landowners rather than landless peasants, who are usually the poorest in rural communities
(Carroll 1992). Patterns of land ownership in different areas will have an impact on project
implementation. In this respect, we may expect international and Southern NGOs adopt different
approaches, because the latter are probably more familiar with the subtleties of regional and
micro-regional differences.
NGOs claim to be small-scale organizations, know local conditions better than state
agencies or large multilateral agencies, and pay more attention to local needs in their project
design (Carroll 1992, Kaimowitz 1993). While large agencies adopt a ‘one size fit all’ approach,
NGOs may take time to know an area, and tailor their activities to local conditions. Of course,
this is also why some argue that they have a marginal impact on poverty alleviation, and are not
able to scale-up their projects (Farrington and Bebbington 1993, Uvin and Miller 1996). We may
assume, from this, that NGOs will operate in fewer communities than state organizations, and
that these communities will be homogenous.
Carroll (1992) presents some evidence of the impact of geographical factors on NGO
activities. He examined the performance of service organizations in three Latin American
countries, and found that the NGO that worked in a well-defined territory performed better than
spatially dispersed ones. He recommends a regional approach to rural development, because it
allows the organization to gain expertise on the local conditions, and scale up its impact. NGOs
define a region in terms of particular characteristics that are relevant for the coherence of the
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project. The boundaries of a region often also correspond to a political or administrative entity,
where the laws and regulations are more likely to be homogenous. Carroll (1992) argues that it is
often easier to establish cooperation with regional, rather than local or national, authorities. Wils
(1996) also suggests that NGOs base their expansion on administrative units, going from village
to province to state, or based on other relevant entities that delimit the working areas of
government agencies, and define actors with whom NGOs interact. Examining the geographical
distribution of NGOs will reveal if this approach, since it is supposed to increase success, is
actually widely used, or not.
Finally, the geographical component of an organizational niche has an impact on the
competition between NGOs. Aldrich (1999) mentions that organizations face the most intensive
competition from other organizations in the local environment that have a similar size, and
compete for the same resources. We can thus expect that NGOs active in the same domains will
not work in the same communities. Aside from reducing competition, this would also increase
coverage, by maximizing the number of communities, and the total population, that benefits from
a given service.
The next step in ecological analysis, before a longitudinal analysis of population
dynamics, is to define and describe the organizational niche. The new definition of
organizational ecology provided earlier broadens ecological concerns to the whole spectrum of
relationships between organizations and their environment. To begin an ecological analysis of
NGOs, one would inventory the aspects of the environment that have an impact on their
activities in a limited territory, and describe the types of relationships, formal and informal, that
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NGOs establish with these relevant environmental factors. Resource dependence theory provides
useful concepts to take this next step.
3.4.

Processes at the Organizational Level: Resource Dependence Theory
3.4.1. Resources and Organizational Strategies
While population ecology examines the survival of organizational forms, resource

dependence is concerned with the survival of individual organizations. Rather than focusing
exclusively on the use of resources inside the organization, resource dependence theorists claim
that obtaining resources is problematic for organizations. Organizations face an unstable
environment, and their ability to secure an adequate supply of vital resources will condition their
survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This approach examines the strategies that organizations
employ to deal with environmental uncertainty. Organizations are becoming increasingly
interdependent, and have to contend with many stakeholders whose interests are likely to
diverge. Yet they need to secure an uninterrupted flow of inputs and outputs, and devise
strategies to deal survive in the midst of these conflicting demands. Resources are understood
not only as the necessary inputs, but also as the ways an organization releases its output. A
clientele is therefore considered a resource.
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), organizations can go about securing their
resources in two ways. First, they may try to lower their dependence on a resource, or the level
of insecurity in its availability, using a variety of techniques. For example, they may buffer
themselves from the impact of environmental fluctuations by increasing their stock of an input,
or securing a long-term contract for the sale of their output. Organizations may also try to
monitor the rules of exchange, or take direct control of the resource provider, through merger or
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direct integration. Finally, they may develop several exchanges instead of one, by diversifying
their activities, suppliers, or clients.
The second set of strategies limits the level of control that a stakeholder has over the
organization. Antitrust laws and suits avoid the formation of monopolies or oligopolies, which
would eliminate competition and distort the market. Organizations may use co-optation, that is
bring potentially hostile elements on their side. They may also try to acquire some form of
control over the group that they depend upon, and establish interdependence, in lieu of a onesided dependency. Both sets of strategies reflect efforts to either adapt to the dependence, or
avoid it.
Resource dependence theorists analyze the interorganizational links that develop with the
use of adaptation and avoidance strategies. They do not dwell much on the analysis of the
resources themselves, for instance by providing lists of relevant resources, or even classification
systems for different types of resources. Quite often, in ecological and resource dependence
analysis, ‘the environment’ has a monolithic, undifferentiated character. Analysts such as
Aldrich (1979) briefly enumerate a set of dimensions, along which environments vary. These
determine an organization’s dependence, success, and ultimately, survival. Hall (1987) simply
divides resources among raw materials, funds, personnel, and services and products. Indeed,
given that organizations may draw on an infinite variety of elements, the relevant resources need
to be established empirically for each type of organizations, but we may define some general
elements of classification.
The first classification is between limiting and non limiting resources. A resource is
limiting if it is necessary for the organization’s survival, but the available quantity is not large
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enough to satisfy the needs of all present organizations. Organizations will become dependent on
purveyors of limiting resources. They will also develop patterns of interaction with each other,
either in a competitive or mutualistic manner, to manage their dependence. Because of the
strategic work they trigger, resource dependence theory focuses on the limiting factors,. Factors
such as funding, qualified staff, clients, would fall under the category of limiting resources. Even
though organizations rely on a large number of resources to sustain themselves, the distinction
between limiting and non limiting resources shows that all resources are not equally important
for their functioning. For analytical purposes, we can then reduce the complexity of the
environment to more manageable proportions.
What resources will be limiting varies geographically. In industrialized countries,
organizations expect easy access to resources such as potable water and electricity, and an
extensive communication and transportation network. Aldrich (1999) downplays the spatial
dimension of resource dependence, by arguing that the current state of transportation and
communication technology makes location irrelevant in corporate decisions. Infrastructure
should not be seen as a limiting factor for organizational development in a global economy. In
the Third World, however, the supply of commodities and infrastructure that industrialized
countries take for granted may be problematic. Access to new technology and existing networks
of road and telephone lines are often limited. Various locations will thus offer different levels of
infrastructure, which will affect organizational performance.
Contrary to Aldrich’s (1999) argument, transnational corporations do not locate factories
at random. First, in accordance with the neoinstitutional perspective, and despite the
Westernization of the institutional global environment, locations vary in terms of their legal,
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political, and cultural context in organizational life (Meyer 1994).Plant location is thus part of a
strategy for transnational corporations. They evaluate a potential location for advantages in tax
laws, labor costs, political stability, and environmental regulations. They also take into account
the presence of a trained labor force, and of a reliable infrastructure, because these factors
influence their efficiency. All these factors are resources for organizations. Although they may
not be modified in a given location, organizations can address them by choosing where they
settle.
In theory, non limiting resources may be shared without depleting the total supply. The
use of the postal service by an organization, for instance, does not diminish its availability to
others. The transportation infrastructure may be shared in the same manner, except around large
cities all over the world, where the intensity of the traffic flow now exceeds the road capacity.
These shared resources are usually classified as public goods, and organizations may use them
without bearing the cost of their implementation.
Information constitutes a special case of a resource that may be shared without the supply
diminishing, and it deserves particular attention. In his description of resources, Aldrich (1979)
actually leaves information out. He distinguishes between two visions of organizations. The first
one, which includes population ecology, sees organizations as resource flows, and the selection
of organizational forms as the motor of organizational change. The second sees organizations as
information flows, and emphasizes how the members of an organization interpret the
environment, and act upon these interpretations to generate organizational change. These two
visions are complementary rather than competing, as both types of processes simultaneously
shape organizational activities. Therefore, information should not set apart from other types of
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resources, as generating an alternative perspective on organizations, but rather be included
among ‘non exhaustible’ organizational resources.
Nowadays, organizations heavily depend on information to survive in an uncertain and
unstable environment. The environment is far too complex for actors to attend to its totality, but
loose coupling between organizational structures and the environment allows organizations to
survive with partial information. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) stress the importance of the
information gathering, storing, and processing structure in organizational life, as it shapes the
perception organization members have of their environment. Organizational actors will tend to
act on the information that the structure captures, and perceive it as the most relevant
information. Moreover, organizational actors do not passively react to the environment, but enact
it. They reconstruct past events and infuse them with meaning in order to devise organizational
strategies.
Aldrich (1979) may have chosen to consider information separately from other resources
because it blurs the boundaries between organizations and environments more than any other
resource. The meaning and potential use of information may change when it moves from
external to internal, and with every actor who uses it. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) put it, there
may be as many enacted environments as there are enactors. Moreover, to address their
dependence on information and sources of information, organizations have to consider factors
other than its sheer availability. With the recent progress of information technology, the
information supply is far superior to the capacity of organizations to address it. Meyer (1997)
actually argues that lower costs of information sharing will facilitate the work of NGOs. when it
is easier for NGOs to disseminate the information they produce, either to beneficiaries or other
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NGOs working in similar fields, they may scale-up their activities without increasing operation
costs.
The key dimension of information as an organizational resource is not its quantity, but its
accuracy and timeliness. Organizations need to secure access to reliable information, and their
members must be able to discriminate between relevant and superfluous information. Outdated
information is still available, but useless, or even dangerous to use. For instance, whether or not
an NGO will get a particular grant depends first on awareness, so that monitoring funding
sources is an important activity. Second, the information must be acquired in time to prepare a
good proposal. Organizations that get information first will have the opportunity to act on it
rapidly.
This last statement on organizational access to information emphasizes competition
between organizations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that resource dependence leads to
greater interdependence between organizations, but they only present cases where the power
differential are such that stratification develops. They conceive of information sharing in a
hierarchical fashion, but neglect its cooperative dimension. Organizations may react to resource
dependence by creating non-competitive forms of association, such as coalitions and networks.
By sharing useful information, organizations may increase their chances of individual survival,
and engage in collective action that increases their sectoral legitimacy or access to resources
(Aldrich 1999). These will probably be even more prevalent in cases where the organizational
niche is not filled, and competition not very intense.
As is particularly apparent in the analysis of information as a resource, resource
dependence theory sees organizations as actors that strategically manipulate their environment to

60

maximize their survival chances. Including this in an ecological analysis corrects the perception
of organizations as passively reacting to environmental forces that population ecology conveys.
More so than institutional theory and population ecology, resource dependence theory provides
analytical tools at the level of individual organizations.
Since the environment is enacted, however, organizational actors act on their perception
of dependence, and may misjudge their dependence on a resource, or misinterpret the demand
that a group is placing on the organization. In addition, environmental factors may affect
organizational outcomes without affecting organizational behavior, because they remain
invisible to organization decision-makers. Organizational outcomes are not solely the result of
internal organizational processes. Thus, it is important to get a sense of how an organization
perceive its environment, but also to get an independent assessment. It is important to spot
discrepancies between actual and perceived dependence, and understand gaps between strategies
and outcomes. Relying on resource dependence should not lead us to overemphasize the role of
organizational strategy.
3.4.2. NGOs and Resource Dependence
Institutional theory helps us understand how the NGO sector is shaped by global societal
changes, and ecological analysis looks at the community level in a given area. As individual
organizations, NGOs need to secure adequate resources to carry out their development projects.
To examine how resource dependence affects NGOs, we need first to determine the resources
requirements of NGOs, and the ones that are limiting factors for their survival and growth. Table
1 presents a list of the NGO resources, their organizational sources, and the dimensions of these
resources. I will now review the main actors mentioned in Table 1. The bottom of the table
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mentions natural resources, as a reminder of their importance for development, particularly in
rural areas. Organizational ecology, however, focuses on the social aspects of the environment,
so I will not detail the issue of natural resources.
Table 1: Resources Relevant for Development NGOs
Resources

Relevant Dimensions

Providers

Funding

Amount, duration, conditionality

Donors: multilateral agencies, national
governments in industrialized countries
and Third World, private citizens in
industrialized countries, Northern NGOs,
corporations, private foundations

Beneficiaries

Level of local organization,
social stratification, skills,
political situation

Individuals, grassroots and community
organizations (women’s groups, unions,
political parties, community council,
etc.)

Technology

Adaptation to local conditions

Universities, research centers (public,
private, and international), beneficiaries,
other NGOs

Services and
products

Prices, accessibility, customer
service, reliability

Local, national, and international
businesses

Quality, existence
Local and national government agencies
responsible for set- up and maintenance,
political leaders

Infrastructure
and public
goods
Skills

Individuals and educational facilities in
industrialized and Third World countries

Staff
Information

Natural
Environment

Treatment time and technology,
organizational and individual
networks

climate, soil, pollution levels,
mineral resources, flora and
fauna, agricultural productions
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Local, national and foreign governments
and their agencies, other local, national
and foreign NGOs, grassroots
organizations, universities and research
centers, media

First, the degree of autonomy from donors is part of a current debate among development
practitioners. Resource dependence theory suggests that since donors provide the most essential
resource to NGOs, they should hold power over them, and be able to influence their agenda.
Meyer (1992) is of the opinion that externally funded NGOs basically serve the interests of these
donors, and cannot claim to possess the qualities with which the theory of the third sector credits
them. For Biggs and Neame (1996), dependence on donor funding is a given, since NGOs
generally do not manage to generate income from the projects they implement. They need to
focus their effort on the negotiation of accountability, so that evaluation criteria emanating from
donors do not overshadow the beneficiaries’ input. So far, it seems that NGOs are affected by
their dependence on official donors, and that they need to diversify their sources of funding to
reduce their dependence (Edwards and Hulme 1996b). The fact that NGOs claim to promote the
agenda of the disfavored, but rely on funding from agencies that may have a different vision of
development, explains the problems of accountability that NGOs face.
Beneficiaries, contrary to funding, are not a limiting factor. Sadly, there are many more
poor people in the world than NGOs can attend to. The characteristics of the communities,
however, will make a difference for the success of a project. Considering beneficiaries as
resources also sheds light on dimensions that may either be incorporated in an NGO strategy of
location selection, or have an impact on the presence of an NGO, even though they are not
mentioned as selection criteria. For instance, Edwards (1999) found that projects were more
successful in communities that had a homogenous social structure than in those exhibiting
marked social inequality.
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Viewing beneficiaries as a resource is not a new approach in development studies.
Projects advocating self-reliance and bottom-up, participatory approaches generally favor using
the skills and knowledge that already exist at the grassroots level, rather than importing them
from outside (Uphoff, Esman and Krishna 1999). A more exploitative approach to development
requires that beneficiaries contribute free labor to implement projects, as a means to lower
project costs (Crewe and Harrison 1999). NGOs may also rely on existing local organizations as
a resource. They can help scale-up activities in the number of beneficiaries, by drawing in more
participants. NGOs may also use the existing relations of grassroots groups with local officials to
increase the efficiency of advocacy work.
While the supply of goods and services are generally not considered a limiting factor for
organizations, development NGOs must attend to it, because it is not as widely available and
accessible in Third-World countries as in industrialized countries. Bebbington and Thiele (1993)
mention that each country has “fashionable” areas where NGOs tend to flock, because their high
level of poverty attracts donors, or because their proximity to cities appeals to NGO staff who
want to reside in town. This case shows the dependence of NGOs on both donors and
infrastructure. The proximity of a city is important for the organization as a whole, beyond the
personal interest of the staff. In Bolivia, the area to which Bebbington and Thiele (1993) refer,
having headquarters in La Paz provides access to reliable phone, electricity, mail, and banking
services. The unpaved roads that lead to rural communities also cause extensive damage to
project vehicles.
Like transnational corporations, international development NGOs deal with political,
social, and cultural dimensions that are extremely variable in the different countries where they
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work. NGOs may thus incur higher costs than they would in industrialized countries, because
public goods are not as readily available. For instance, in rural development, NGOs often work
with several communities, all distant from one another. Working with communities that are near
each other, or along paved roads, is easier, and may influence project location. All these factors
influence the efficiency of an NGO, but they are likely to be taken into account only in
evaluation frameworks, after the fact (Béjar and Oakley 1996). Unlike transnational
corporations, NGOs do not seem to have a clear or official strategy for location selection,
because they have to maintain their ceremonial agreement with the normative requirement that
they go where they are most needed.
The third main actor that NGOs depend on will be the national state, and local
representatives of state authority. As mentioned earlier, the state may be a donor, in which case
NGOs depend on it for financial sustainability. NGOs will have to interact with state agencies
for a variety of other matters. Farrington and Bebbington (1993) report that NGOs in agricultural
development depend on the state research centers to provide them with technological innovations
to apply at the grassroots level. For the provision or implementation of public goods, such as
sewage systems or electricity, NGOs need to comply with state regulations and obtain required
permits (Uphoff, Esman and Krishna 1999). In advocacy work, the ultimate goal is to change the
legislation, so that NGOs will have to be aware of the political climate and use it to the best
advantage of their beneficiaries, as state officials may facilitate or hinder their action (Blauert
and Zadek 1998, Clark 1995, Ndegwa 1996).
Donors, beneficiaries, and the state, are the most important actors for NGOs since they
provide multiple resources. All resources are not equally critical, and which ones matter most
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will depend on the type of projects. A hierarchy of resource relevance may be established for
different NGOs, and resource dependence should vary accordingly. The strategy of dependence
management, and the perception of dependence, will matter most for the most relevant resources.
For instance, while agricultural projects will depend on state research centers and extension
services, childcare NGOs will depend on the state health agencies. Agricultural projects will
look for input providers and markets to sell agricultural products, while health projects will
consider where to locate a medical center so that a maximum number of people may access it.
The availability of various resources will have an impact on NGO location at a different scale.
The national context will matter for international NGOs, but not for Southern NGOs, who
operate in their country of origin. The local context will impact both, but in different ways, since
they do not have the same amount of information about local conditions, and the same
dependence on local, national, and foreign donors.
According to resource dependence theory, we can expect that NGO’s dependence on
donors, beneficiaries, states, and other actors will influence the structure of their social networks.
Resource dependence theory gives great importance to social networks, but usually in a
hierarchical form, and as a strategy to reduce dependence. In this respect, we can assume that
NGOs will establish regular links with donor agencies, for purposes of accountability. They
should also have contacts with the state agencies that are most relevant for their work, in order to
gain information on new policies and strategies. Relations with the state may be either
conflictual or cooperative, depending on the state’s perception of NGOs, and the extent of the
discrepancy between state and NGO goals. While many scholars recommend cooperation
between NGOs and states, because they have complementary functions, this is not always
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possible (Clark 1995, Farrington and Bebbington 1993, Sandberg 1994, Thomas-Slayter 1994).
The networks that NGOs establish with the state are often hierarchical rather than horizontal.
Aldrich (1999), however, observes that horizontal networks are gaining in importance for
organizational change. Given NGO’s distrust of bureaucratic, hierarchical structures, horizontal
networks should be even more prevalent among them than other kinds of organizations. As
Meyer (1997) stresses, sharing information may help save time and money. If NGOs conduct
similar activities in isolation, they must all go through the same learning process. If they share
their experience, they can move forward more rapidly, by drawing on the learning of others. In
terms of policy advocacy, a network of NGOs will carry more weight than a single NGO
(Blauert and Zadeck 1998). Unfortunately, competition between NGOs for funding and other
resources often limits their attempts to build coalitions (Anheier 1994, Clark 1995). Networking
also requires investments, without bringing NGOs tangible benefits, so that they may not be
inclined to invest (Vivian 1994).
In the case of NGOs project locations, networks may have a significant impact on the
initial location, and on patterns of expansion. Why would an NGO start working in a given
community, rather than another? In the first stages, the NGO probably relies on the personal
networks of its staff, and sets up a project in the community or region of origin of the founder, or
in a location that matches the available skills of the staff, or that is the target of an emergency or
special fund. Northern NGOs may rely on experts to establish a first contact. Later on, however,
location may evolve as part of a strategy, or in reaction to environmental factors. NGOs may be
solicited to come and work in a community, or set up information campaigns to encourage
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communities to participate. Contacts with other NGOs, grassroots organizations, government
agencies, universities and research centers, may incite them to work in a certain area.
Instead of focusing exclusively on where NGOs work, we can also examine where they
do not go. Are there special characteristics in resource availability that do not attract NGOs? Do
they avoid, consciously or not, areas that are too resource-poor, or too well-off? Do they
concentrate in areas that have adequate infrastructure, research facilities? Are they able to reach
communities of ethnic minorities? Do they follow certain agricultural productions more than
others? While the institutional view leads to the assumption that NGOs will go where they are
needed the most, resource dependence reminds us that they also aim to survive as organizations.
Thus, we can expect that they will try to select and manipulate an environment that will give
them the best survival chances.
By combining three perspectives, we can include both technical and institutional aspects
of the environment. The new institutionalism reveals the global level trends that explains the rise
of development NGOs, and suggests that we consider the role of the state at the local level. From
population ecology, I adapted the concept of organizational niche, so as to highlight the spatial
dimension of NGOs’ work in Third World countries. Resource dependence theory complements
the concept of niche. It provides a more differentiated view of the environment, and emphasizes
the relations that NGOs create with other actors in their environment to secure access to
resources.
The three perspectives also lead to propositions at different levels of analysis, that is, at
different geographical scales. The generality of some claims made in the development literature,
or in neo-institutionalist theory, implies that their findings apply in any context, which is not the
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case. The ecological perspective insists that claims and conclusions need to be contextualized,
and often have a limited geographical relevance. An ecological model thus offers flexibility in
level of analysis, and emphasizes the need to clearly define a territory before starting an analysis.
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CHAPTER 4: CHOICE OF LOCATION
4.1.

Mexico
From an ecological perspective, several factors are likely to have a large influence on

NGO location, and thus were instrumental in deciding on a research site. First, if NGOs emerge
as a response to state failure, their relations with public organizations will greatly affect the
success of their work. The government holds the political power and can pass laws, or use force,
in ways that may facilitate or hinder the work of NGOs. It also carries political legitimacy on the
international scene. Thus, whether state organizations and NGOs cooperate or compete will
impact the work of NGOs, and the location of their projects. In case of cooperation, NGOs may
wish to work in the vicinity of state facilities such as experiment stations, medical centers or
schools. In case of antagonism or competition, NGOs may be relegated to the fringes, in the
socially and geographically most remote communities.
Unlike most Latin American countries, Mexico only experienced one incidence of severe
political unrest in the twentieth century, the 1910-1917 Revolution. Since then, the country has
enjoyed political stability and a civil, though authoritarian, government, under which it had
achieved the highest level of social and economic development in Latin America. The
Revolution became a symbol of national pride for all Mexicans, and the party that came to power
after it took the name of PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) in order to claim its legacy.
However, it tightly controlled political and social change, so that democracy or a more equitable
distribution of wealth never took place. The PRI has enjoyed massive public support for most of
the post-Revolution period. It ruled for seventy years without interruption, a world record. For
this reason, Levy (1989) classified Mexico in the category of "hegemonic party systems" (p.
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462). In July 2000, for the first time, the Mexicans elected a president from the PAN (National
Action Party), Vicente Fox. The reign of the PRI finally came to an end at the national level. The
PRI, however, still holds the majority in Congress, and most state legislatures.
The Mexican regime is far from being as brutally repressive as other Latin American
regimes, such as the Chilean or Argentinean dictatorships of the 1970s. However, human rights
violations against union members, opposition parties, advocates of liberation theology and a
variety of social activists, are widely documented (Levy 1989, Foweraker 1990, Collier and
Lowery Quaratielo 1994, Katzenberger 1995). The Mexican government has allowed a
substantial level of criticism from the media, the intellectuals, or civil organizations (Monsiváis
1990).
Over the years, the PRI has made an extensive use of a combination of repression and cooptation in order to stay in power (Adler 1994, Davis 1994). The Mexican state has shown an
unusual ability to quench protest by incorporating social actors who are deemed dangerous
within the system. Politicians with charisma are granted a political office that quickly silences
them, and university professors get official nominations depending on their agreement with the
PRI’s agenda (Camp 1985). This way, plausible challenges to the PRI are difficult to organize.
Under the rule of the PRI, Mexico was what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) call a
"democradura": Despite regular elections that demonstrate the change of the individuals in
command, and a limited use of its repressive power, it could not be considered a democracy. The
PRI dominated the political scene in a hegemonic fashion. Civil liberties were partially
restricted, so that issues and groups that the regime wanted to keep off the public agenda were
not brought up.
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The government’s strategy to remain in power and achieve its goals involved the
implementation of a corporatist system, where the state directly controls unions and many other
organizations (Hernandez and Fox 1995). At first, both peasant and labor unions, in the form of
the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers) and the CNC (National Peasants Confederation)
were the pillars of the strategy. Since the revolution of 1910 was largely based on agrarian
demands, the government paid close attention to the rural sector. Controlling its organizations
was a way of channeling its demands. With time, and the industrialization of the country, more
attention shifted to the labor union, but controlling the ‘green’ of rural populations still remains
important to political candidates (Algara Cossio and Winder 1985, Castañeda 1994). Later on, to
reflect the emergence of an urban middle-class, the PRI created a third organization, the CNOP
(National Confederation of Peoples’ Organizations). Globally, the corporatist system was useful
to end popular demands for increases in wages, or to organize political support for the PRI
(Couffignal 1993).
Nonetheless, in recent years, the party has lost most of its appeal for many Mexicans. In
the 1980s, Mexico faced a dreadful crisis when oil prices collapsed. The external debt became an
insurmountable burden and many investors lost confidence in the country's development
potential (Levy 1989). Mexicans started to lose faith in the party's ability to lead them to a
brighter future. Protest among the urban middle-class, the labor movement and grassroots
organizations intensified (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In the 1988 presidential
elections, electoral fraud, a common practice in Mexican politics, reached unprecedented
heights, to insure the victory of the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. In reality, it seems
that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the candidate of the PRD ( Democratic Revolutionary Party), came

72

close to victory (Aguayo Quezada 1995). Before the 1994 election, further disturbance shook the
system: the uprising in Chiapas to protest against NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement), the kidnaping of prominent businessmen, the assassination of the designated PRI
candidate, and the continuation of the economic crisis.
Yet, the state is still more involved in development action than in other, poorer countries.
Mexico, contrary to many Third World countries, still possesses a strong government1. Mexican
state organizations are able to mobilize resources to achieve their goals, and effectively control
the political and economic orientations of the country. The nonprofit and public sectors are likely
to interact more substantially there than in other Third-World countries. Thus, state-NGO
relations will be more instrumental there in defining NGO strategies, than they would be in a
country with a weak government. That Mexico has a strong government makes it a good location
to compare the role of NGOs and government agencies in rural development, and to examine
their relations.
A second key element in choosing a research site was NGOs’ relations with the business
sector. NGOs are often described as a solution to market failure. The assumption is that they
have few relations with the private sector, simply because it is not present in the areas where
NGOs operate. Studies of NGOs that take this stand usually take place in remote areas, or in

1

According to Migdal (1988), a strong state is one which regulates and controls social relations,
extracts resources from societies, and can appropriate them or use them in determined ways. He
argues that the state in Third-World countries is weak because, even though the state has a strong
presence, it is not able to affect social change according to its objectives. He classifies Mexico as
an intermediate state, between strong and weak. His work, however, classifies all countries as
weak or intermediary, and never strong, even in the industrialized world. Since Mexico is
usually considered a strong state by political scientists (Levy 1989), I will follow their analysis.
Another Third-World country state apparatus that can be classified as strong is India.
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countries where the business sector is extremely weak. Mexico offers an intermediary position
between industrialized and less developed countries in this respect. Above all with the
implementation of NAFTA, the Mexican economy has opened up to international trade and
massive industrialization. A large local business community exists, which may provide support
to nonprofit organizations in terms of funding or research, as an alternative to state organizations
or international donors. On the other hand, if Mexican NGOs do not show any significant
amount of interaction with the business sector, we can expect little cooperation between
development NGOs and the business sector as a general rule.
4.2.

Rural Development in Mexico
In Third-World countries, early development efforts often focused on increasing

agricultural production, and led to the implementation of the Green Revolution. Rural
development serves various goals. Economically, successful rural development helps a country
achieve self-sufficiency in food production, or develop the export of cash-crops, which provide
foreign currency. Socially, it provides employment for rural population, and reduces the
migration to urban areas that creates over-urbanization and fuels the informal economy.
Politically, it works as an instrument of social control over rural populations, which are less
likely to protest, and more likely to provide political support for the government, if they have
viable employment.
The history of rural development in Mexico covers all these functions of rural
development. The Mexican revolution started with cries for land and freedom, and was largely
the result of the oppression of landless campesinos by latifundistas, or owners of vast domains
that dated back to the Spanish conquest. From then on, the PRI relied extensively on the agrarian
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sector to stay in power. Mexico experienced one of the most extensive agrarian reforms of Latin
America. In the 1930s, then-President Lázaro Cárdenas created the ejido system, to turn over
idle commercial land held by latifundistas to landless peasants, while the property titles
remained in the hands of the state. Ejidos could be divided in individual plots or farmed
collectively, so that ejidatarios, or users of ejido land, could choose the production system that
was closest to their traditions. However, this system provides little incentive to increase
agricultural production (Grindle 1988). In the 1950s and 1960s, with the help of the United
States, Mexico did develop structures to implement Green Revolution technologies, such as an
agricultural research system and extension agencies (Jennings 1988). A small commercial
agricultural sector developed as a result, but the ejido sector did not participate.
To try and recapitalize the ejido sector, and with low agricultural productivity now
arguably one of the major issues facing Mexico in the 21st century, President Salinas de Gortari
set up to reform article 27 of the Mexican constitution, which addresses land reform. In 1992,
after much controversy, he passed a reform that ended the process of land redistribution, opened
the sector to direct foreign investment, and allowed individuals ejidatarios to rent or sell their
plot (Cornelius 1992). Moreover, all pending land claims became invalid, and many peasants lost
the possibility of access to land (Couffignal 1993).
Land redistribution under the ejido system did not solve the problem of low agricultural
production because it was used more as a political tool than a developmental asset (Grindle
1988). Campesinos had to petition to be granted land, and depending on what group would ask,
in what area, and who owned the land, the petition could take years or decades to be processed.
Land could also be granted to avoid political protest against the PRI (Torres 1998). Moreover,
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the government extension services, sent out to implement development programs, were at times
an instrument to divide the poor rural communities and avoid the rise of independent peasant
organizations (Algara Cossio and Winder 1985).
State programs have evolved over the years to reflect the President’s personal views on
rural issues, and in response to pressures in the economy. Rural development is now the
responsibility of several federal and state-level government agencies. At the federal level,
SAGARPA, the Federal Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Fishing, and Food
oversees agricultural development issues. At the state level, its actions are relayed by the State
Department of Agricultural Development and Water Resources. These two administer the large
budget envelop of Alianza para el Campo (Alliance for the Country), a program designed by the
government of Ernesto Zedillo after consultation with farmers organizations. It replaces the
system of price support that was ended with the approval of NAFTA, with PROCAMPO
(National Program for Agricultural Direct Support), a system of financial help provided directly
to the farmer, and designed for a period of fifteen years. It also transfers basic research and
extension work in large part to organizations controlled by the farmers and funded partly by the
government and external sources, thus starting the privatization of agricultural extension. The
program offers financing possibilities for infrastructure, machinery, and production inputs such
as fertilizers, seeds, and livestock (Comisión Intersecretarial del Gabinete Agropecuario 1995).
After the reform of article 27, some Mexican decision-makers have given up on
agricultural development (Cornelius 1992, Gledhill 1998). Rural development, however, cannot
be achieved solely by relying on agriculture, above all in Mexico. Grindle (1988) showed that
because of the low productivity of the land, and migration to cities or the United States,
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increasing agricultural production in Mexico would only have a limited impact on rural
development. Hence, some governmental programs for rural development cover non-agricultural
activities, and are administered by other agencies.
SEDESOL, the Department of Social Development, is in charge of distributing funds for
a variety of development projects at the federal level. At the state level, its actions are relayed by
SEDESORE, the Department of Social and Regional Development. While it directly administers
some of the programs it funds, other are administered by separate government agencies,
organized by area of operation. Under the new administration, it administers directly housing
and land management projects, and human development projects, which include regional
development projects, funding of temporary work programs, legal assistance, and special
programs for young people, women head of households, indigenous populations, and the urban
poor. The separate agencies that it funds include PROGRESA, which provides monetary
assistance to low-income families, LICONSA, specializing in subsidies for milk and tortillas for
needy families, the INI (National Indigenous Institute), in charge of indigenous affairs, the
CONAZA (National Commission of Arid Areas), which provides assistance to populations in
semi-desertic areas, DICONSA, a chain of government stores based in isolated areas,
FONHAPO, which gives loans for housing projects, and FONART, promoting the
commercialization of local crafts (SEDESOL 2002).
4.3.

NGOs in Mexico
The corporatist nature of the Mexican political regime greatly weakened Mexican civil

society for most of the twentieth century (Davis 1990). Civil society organizations were either
created or controlled by the PRI. In 1987, 213 NGOs were inventoried in Mexico (Alatorre and
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Aguilar 1994). By comparison, in 1986, the same inventory counted 1,041 NGOs in Brazil and
300 in Peru (Landim 1987). Mexico, up to the end of the 1980s, had fewer NGOs than other
Latin American countries, for several reasons. First, NGOs target mainly the poorest Latin
America countries (Kaimowitz 1993). Mexico’s resources and economic indicators make it the
richest country of the region, and thus not a primary target for development NGOs. Second,
while grassroots social movements have always been a component of political life in Mexico, the
structure of the PRI made it difficult for independent organizations to work in the long term
(Alatorre and Aguilar 1994). As described above, leaders of social movements which may have
turned into NGOs were co-opted, and movements either disappeared or were incorporated in a
government program. If they tried to remain independent, social activists faced threats and
harassment from the local authorities. NGOs advocating human rights have denounced state
violence around the country for years, especially in a poor state like Chiapas, with a large rural
Indian population (Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos 1997). Social unrest
often remained sporadic, informal, or underground. Third, the Mexican state has a tradition of
resistance to foreign investment, based on fear that foreign capital would take over the country
(Couffignal 1993). The situation changed when Mexico joined the GATT (General Agreement
on Tarriffs and Trade, now the World Trade Organization) in 1986, and NAFTA in 1994.
Nationalized Companies are now sold to private investors. International NGOs face less
suspicion when setting up development programs funded by industrialized countries.
Since 1994, Mexico has endured frequent outbursts of protest from the middle-class, the
working class and students. The December 1994 financial collapse of the stock market
precipitated another major economic crisis and drove many to the streets, as they faced
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unemployment and drastic reductions of their living standards. With the recent election of
Vicente Fox, the regime has taken a major step towards procedural democracy. It is still too
soon, however, to evaluate the impact of this change on civil liberties. Mexico is thus in a
transition period, between seventy years under the rule of a hegemonic party, and a movement
toward a more democratic, economically liberal but socially conservative presidency. The state
is progressively losing its grip on civil society, which presents NGOs with opportunities, and
may promote the development of grassroots organizations.
The first development NGOs emerged in the 1970s. These often originated with the
radical left or liberation theology in the Catholic church, although they progressively lost all ties
with these movements (Hernandez and Fox 1995). An NGO boom took place after the
earthquake that destroyed large parts of Mexico City in 1985 (Coulomb and Herrasti 1998). A
vast popular movement organized to respond to the inaction of the state in the face of disaster,
but unlike previous movements, it did not recede after a short period of time. Instead, it sparked
a lasting wave of popular demand for social services, and led to the creation of many grassroots
and intermediary organizations. The trend spread across the country, carried by the measure of
structural adjustment that promoted private action and the dismantling of state institutions. Now,
Miraftab (1997) estimates that there are between 1200 and 2500 NGOs of all kinds in Mexico.
Only a fraction, however, are development NGOs.
Few studies of the role of NGOs in Mexico exist so far, but we can expect to see more in
the future, as the number of Mexican NGOs increases and they become more visible. Advocacy
NGOs have played a crucial role in fighting electoral fraud and promoting democracy, above all
after the beginning of the Chiapas uprising, which expressed these demands dramatically
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(Aguayo Quezada 1995). Citizens organizations, social movements, and labor unions joined in
the Civic Alliance. This coalition was created to monitor the presidential elections on 21 August
1994, coordinate the activities of all these organizations, create links between them, and promote
the democratization of the Mexican regime.
In most of Latin America, as in most of the less developed world, most NGOs belong to
the category of “development NGOs”. These organizations implement or assist development
projects in local communities. In rural Mexico, however, there are few mentions of the presence
of NGOs as agents of rural development. Alatorre and Boege (1998) present two examples, from
Quintana Roo and Campeche. They show how technicians from both governmental extension
services and NGOs work with grassroots peasant organizations to help them strengthen forestry
enterprises. They argue that NGOs should take a new role as mediators between several actors,
and summarize the action of NGOs in the forestry sector in Mexico as follows: “On account of
their ability to act as ‘cultural translators,’ those NGOs that advise on forestry issues have
already responded to the need for bridges between the peasants’ world, civil organizations,
academic or governmental institutions, and the international aid community.” (p. 211).
Successful NGOs serve as links between different groups in society, not as direct implementers
of development projects. This role of NGOs as interface, “cultural translators,” “bridges,”
corresponds to what Alatorre and Aguilar (1994) envisioned recently. They see the potential for
NGO action increasing with the decline of state power in Mexico. NGOs are independent actors
in a privileged position to link rural movements and the rest of civil society. They include
dialogue with state and international institutions as an important aspect of NGO action.
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Overall, the trend seems to be for NGOs to act as advisors or network builders in Mexico,
while the bulk of development and advocacy action is left to grassroots organizations. It is
interesting to note that the existing classifications of NGOs, and the confusion over what is or is
not an NGO, probably serves to mask the reality of the NGO community in Mexico. When
setting up organizations, rural and urban communities traditionally refer to themselves as
movements, confederations or unions. They fit into the category of Social Movement
Organizations, or SMOs. These popular movement organizations, however, also qualify as
Membership Support Organizations (MSOs), a term used to refer to grassroots organizations
(Carroll 1992, Farrington and Bebbington 1993). There is no clear difference between an SMO
and an MSO.
Yet, according to some authors, only Grassroots Support Organizations, or GSOs, qualify
as NGOs (Kaimowitz 1993). These include organizations based in industrialized countries, or in
developing countries, but not based in the communities where they implement projects. Thus,
many popular organizations are probably left out in official counts of NGOs in Mexico, and in
analyses that focus on social movements. It is important to be aware of this taxonomic difficulty
when discussing the development of an NGO community in a country. Differences in approach,
or in the local official classification, may influence organizational demography. The literature on
NGOs in Mexico does not consistently refer to the same set of organizations.
Mexico is now in a period of transition. The PRI has lost a great deal of its power over
civil society, due to the government’s efforts at integration in the global economy, but also to
increasing popular demands for democratization. Mexico’s entry in the OECD and later NAFTA
meant better opportunities for those in export-oriented sectors, but weakened the position of
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those who are not able to compete. Slowly, the state has to dismantle a whole apparatus of
support structures, such as price subsidies for basic agricultural products. Not only does this
means tougher market conditions for small farmers, it also increases the cost of living for the
urban population, as prices fluctuate according to the laws of international markets.
This restructuring of the political and economical regime provides new opportunities for
civil society to organize and gain power. Social movements in Mexico have opposed the state for
the last thirty years with only meager results. However, Mexican civil society has always been
active, organizing and making demands. The corporatist state, in an odd way, may have
inculcated the idea that structured collective action was an appropriate strategy to oppose the
PRI. Faced with a tightly knit web of party organizations, unions, and government institutions,
rural and urban activists chose to respond with their own, alternative structures. Grassroots
action in Mexico usually does not remain spontaneous or informal for long.
As a result, there seems to be a greater distinction between intermediary organizations
and grassroots organizations in Mexico than in other developing countries. Several analysts
notice that NGOs only come into the picture when popular organizations need to expand their
movement or to gather more information. In rural areas, they also provide technical assistance.
They do not serve as a catalyst for social action. Such a pattern follows the model of developed
rather than developing countries. The future of NGOs in Mexico probably consists in being
bridges between grassroots organizations, the state, the private sector, and international
institutions.
Finally, the polarization of Mexican society, with a Northern half integrated in the global
economy, and a more rural and indigenous Southern half, caught in poverty, may generate
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further developments in the NGO community. We may see a greater NGO presence in the
Southern states than in the Northern ones, as well as more NGOs dedicated to issues of rural
development and environmental conservation, in the form of sustainable development projects.
The Zapatista movement in Chiapas, and its offspring in Oaxaca and Guerrero, lead to NGOs’
involvement in this part of Mexico. Organizations focusing on democratization and civic
activities may concentrate in Mexico City and other urban centers. While in the poorest
countries, NGOs dedicate most efforts to service provision and technical assistance, in Mexico
they are at least as involved in advocacy and organizational activities such as network formation.
The federal state does not have a clear strategy to interact with NGOs. The minimal
progress of the law on NGOs, which many NGOs advocate, reveals lingering suspicions toward
civil society organizations that present a potential threat to the political system. Now that the
President of the Republic is of the PAN, a party which emphasizes private initiative over state
control of society, many had hoped that NGOs would get more attention, but so far, these hopes
have not been fulfilled. The federal government does not show overt hostility to NGOs, but
neither does it help promote their work. Several federal funding agencies rely on NGOs to
implement projects, but their funding rules are such that NGOs cannot use them to finance their
operating costs.
At the state level, however, the situation is more diverse. States such as Chiapas have a
repressive attitude. There the government sees NGOs as supporters of the EZLN. Other states
have a progressive approach involving open collaboration with NGOs. Oaxaca, Veracruz, and
Nayarit figure among such states. In these cases, the state government allows NGOs to receive
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public funds, and encourages state agencies to work with NGOs and share information with
them.
NGOs include a variety of organizations, covered by different sections of Mexican law.
Some organizations fall under civil law, and others under agrarian law. Organizations that fall
under civil law are divided into two broad categories: asociaciones civiles (civil associations)
and sociedades civiles (civil societies). Asociaciones civiles can engage in any non-economic
activity, while sociedades civiles are centered around economic, but non-speculative, activities.
Both are prohibited to distribute profits to shareholders, and follow the same legal regulations.
For several years now, NGOs have advocated in Congress the establishment of a legal
framework to regulate the third sector in Mexico (Pérez-Yarahuán and García Junco 1998).
NGOs would like their status to be clarified, so that they are not subject to the same tax laws as
businesses, which is presently the case. Some of them, however, fear that since this law would
include a national registration process and a formalization of relations with the state, the
government may be tempted to use it to control NGOs it opposes, such as human rights NGOs.
Rural organizations that qualify as NGOs and fall under agrarian law include uniones de
ejidos (ejido unions), SPRs (Rural Production Societies), ARIC (Rural Associations of
Collective Interest), unions of SPRs, cooperatives, and UAIMs (Women’s Agricultural and
Industrial Units). Officially, these entities were created over the years to promote rural
development through the organization of producers. Cooperatives are organized around the
production or commercialization of agricultural goods. Until recently, however, most
campesinos had little trust in them, because they were controlled by the PRI. By law, they had to
be part of the party, which nominated their managers and oversaw all their decisions. The law of
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cooperatives was reformed under Zedillo (1994-2000), generating new interest in this form of
organization. The SPRs also have individual members, like cooperatives, but their purpose can
cover any activity, as long as members are working in rural areas. The ARICs, unions of SPRs,
and ejido unions are associations of organizations. Ejido unions group together two or more
ejidos, SPRs unions two or more SPRs, and ARIC two or more ejidos, ejido unions, rural
communities, or SPRs in a given area. While ARIC can take on any activity not prohibited by
law, the others are focused on the coordination and organization of agricultural production and
commercialization, and the provision of mutual assistance between members (Procuradoría
Agraria 1993).
The UAIMs were created to correct a bias in the allocation of ejido land. The ejido law
originally stated that land should be allocated to the head of the household, which in was
commonly interpreted as meaning that a man should be chosen as representing the family
(Stephen 1997). As a result, many ejidatarias were left without means to provide for themselves
if they were not related to a man (father, spouse, or son) who could give them access to it. As
interest in the issues facing women in development mounted internationally, the 1971 Federal
Law of Agrarian Reform established the UAIMs. Under this new form of association, the ejido
authorities were mandated to allocate a plot of their most productive land for groups of women
to develop their own projects. In many cases, women encountered opposition from male ejido
members (Stephen 1997).
For most of the twentieth century, in rural areas, the dominant campesino organization
has been the CNC. To capture the ‘green vote’ from peasant communities, the PRI and state
governments tried to control the peasantry by controlling the local unions (Whitmeyer and
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Hopcroft 1996). The CNC was created in 1935 by Lázaro Cárdenas, in order to unite various
factions within the peasant movement, and stop armed conflict between them (González Castillo
1978). Graciano Sánchez, a native of San Luis Potosí and a revolutionary leader who founded
the first national peasant union in 1926, was elected its first president. Since the government and
the union saw eye to eye on agricultural issues, the campesinos were fully supportive of federal
policies. In the decades that followed, the situation changed, but the CNC continued to support
the government because of its links with the PRI. CNC officials at all levels were members of
the PRI, as were authorities of many other rural organizations.
To counter criticism of the CNC hegemony over rural areas, the CCI (Independent
Peasant Union) was created in the 1970s, but it was still an organ of the PRI. It was only the
1980s, with increased activism in civil society, and the economic crisis, that dissident voices
were heard, and truly independent peasant organizations created. Nowadays, the nine largest
peasant unions are gathered in the Permanent Agrarian Council. Together, they lobby the federal
government on public policy for rural areas. They may be rival organizations at the local level,
but try to overcome disagreements at the national level. While some of them are independent of
party politics, others are affiliated with a party. For instance, the CCC (Cardenist Peasant Union)
is affiliated with the PRD. Since Mexican law does not provide for a specific organizational form
for unions, peasant unions adopt the legal form of asociación civil. Agricultural policy may not
be the main priority of the Mexican government in terms of economic development, but the rural
population in Mexico has historically been particularly active and highly organized in the public
sphere. With the recent boom in NGO activity, Mexico presents characteristics that make it a
suitable location for a study of rural NGOs.
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4.4.

The State of San Luis Potosí
Mexico is too large a country to examine as a whole so this study is limited to one

particular state. I chose the state of San Luis Potosí for its diversity in geographical and cultural
factors, as well as its high proportion of rural population, and its relatively low level of economic
development. These characteristics should make it a favorable environment for the presence of a
sizeable community of rural NGOs. The existence of several geographical areas that differ
markedly in climate, economic activity, and cultural backgrounds, should allow me to examine
factors that influence the location of these NGOs.
San Luis Potosí is located in the Northern central part of Mexico, five hours by road
North-West of Mexico City (Figure 1). The climate in most of the state is dry and cold, and the
average altitude is 2,000 meters. Traveling from the East, near the Atlantic coast, to the NorthWest, the state geology presents a staircase structure, a series of mountain ranges that climb
successively from slightly above sea level to high altitudes of over 3,000m. It is divided into
three natural regions, according to the succession of three main geological steps.
The southeastern area of the state, bordering the states of Tamaulipas, Veracruz and
Hidalgo, is called the Huasteca zone. Its Northern half is a low tropical plain, the Planicie, and
the Southern portion is made of a mountainous tropical jungle, which is part of the Western
Sierra Madre. Going up and West from the Huasteca is the Zona Media (middle zone), averaging
1,000 m of altitude. The climate here is drier than in the Huasteca, and arid in some parts.
Finally, the Western half comprises the Altiplano (high plateau), the largest, highest and driest
part of the state. Given its size, the area has been divided in two administrative units, the
Atiplano zone in the North, and the Zona Centro (central zone) in the South. The state capital,
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San Luis Potosí, is located in the central zone, which contains the largest proportion of the state
population.
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Figure 1: The State of San Luis Potosí, Its Administrative Regions and Main Cities
San Luis Potosí is classified among the Mexican states with a high proportion of
indigenous population (SEDESOL 1997)2. The geographical division of the state somewhat

2

The ethnic category of Native Americans in the United States is currently designated in Mexico
by the term indígenas, or indigenous people. It is meant to be a politically correct name to refer
to Mexican descendants of groups that were present before the arrival of the Spanish
Conquistadores. The name indio is still commonly used, sometimes as an insult, but often with
no malicious intention. Indigenous individuals use it too. SEDESOL (1997) inventories several
international and local definitions of what constitutes an ‘indigenous population’, but notes that
Mexico does not give an official definition, and that the term has no more scientific validity than
the racial categories of ‘white’ or ‘black’.
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matches its ethnic composition. The Huasteca contains the largest proportion of Native
Americans, divided mostly in two ethnic groups, the Teenek, original inhabitants of the area, and
the Nahua, descendants of the Aztecs, who conquered the Huasteca and incorporated it in their
empire before the Spanish Conquest. The indigenous population comprises 11.2% of the total
population of the state, but 34.6% of the population of the Huasteca3. While 96% of the
indigenous population of San Luis Potosí resides in the Huasteca, the Zona Media also includes
an indigenous population, the Pames. They are the only surviving descendants of the
Chichimecs, who used to inhabit the Altiplano. The Chichimecs have officially disappeared from
the rest of the state. As a result, there is no native pre-Hispanic group in the Zona Centro and
Altiplano.4 The combination of geographical factors and ethnic composition allow us to
distinguish between strikingly different regions in San Luis Potosí and compare the development
of the NGO sector in terms of these factors.
In addition, the history and demography of the state make it an adequate location for a
study of rural NGOs. Historically, San Luis Potosí has been heavily involved in the political life
of the country, due to its central location. It became a battle ground between liberal and
conservative forces, particularly around the time of the Mexican revolution (Monroy Castillo and
Calvillo Unna 1997). At that time, the state economy, which used to be centered around the
mining industry, was becoming more agricultural, and thus susceptible to agrarian conflicts.

3

The INEGI (National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information) mesasures indigenous
population as residents 5 years or older who are able to speak an indigenous languages. For
Mexico as a whole, the proportion of indigenous people in the 2000 census was 6.8%.
4

If one except the annual Huichol pilgrimage from their homeland in the states of Nayarit,
Jalisco, Zacatecas, and Durango, to the desert of Real de Catorce, where they harvest the peyotl,
to use as a ceremonial drug.
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Regional revolutionary movements were created in San Luis, and later joined the national armies
of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. While national movements were successfully dismantled
after the revolution, a local caudillo5, Saturnino Cedillo, took advantage of a plan of national
reconciliation to establish a 20-year personal dictatorship over the state. By redistributing land to
peasants who had served in the revolutionary army under his orders, he gained the support of the
rural population. His rule delayed the democratization of the political institutions in the state,
and comforted its rural orientation. The importance of rural affairs in San Luis Potosí is also
evident in the choice of Graciano Sánchez as the first leader of the CNC.
Today, San Luis Potosí has nearly 2.3 million inhabitants (INEGI 2001). While at the
national level, a quarter of the population (25.4%) lives in rural areas, in San Luis Potosí, this
proportion reaches 41%. Agricultural products now represent only 6.8% of its GDP (Gross
Domestic Product), slightly higher than the national average (4.7%). San Luis Potosí is still a
rural state in terms of population, but its economy has diversified, and its agricultural
productivity is low. Looking at general economic indices, the state of San Luis Potosí itself is not
among the poorest of the Republic, but still in the lower half. In 1999, its GDP per capita was
10,310 pesos, placing it in 20th position among the 31 states of Mexico (INEGI 2000). San Luis
Potosí does not have a particularly strong economy. Given that poverty in Mexico tends to be
concentrated in rural areas (Torres Salcido and López Paniagua 1996), we can expect that rural
development will be an issue of concern for the government. We can also expect that NGOs
involved in rural development would be interested in working in this state.

5

Charismatic military leader.
90

Finally, San Luis Potosí may present interesting characteristics in the development of its
local NGO community. In the 1970s and 1980s, the state was marked by an important
democratic movement, led by Dr. Salvador Nava (Hernández Navarro 1995). To this day, the
civic movement is important in state political life. Compared to other states, San Luis Potosí
counts with numerous organizations that are trying to open a public space for local citizens. As a
result, San Luis Potosí may present a more dynamic NGO sector than other states, even though
its history limited the development of a democratic culture (Monroy Castillo and Calvillo Unna
1997). At the municipal level, the PAN, and to a lesser extent, the PRD, have won some power,
the state government remains in the hands of the PRI for the foreseeable future. The government
may not engage in open repression of independent organizations, but does not favor a thriving
dialogue either.
In summary, San Luis Potosí combines several elements that make it a suitable location
for research. First, its geographic and cultural diversity will allow me to examine the impact of
these factors on NGO activity. Second, it has a rural population far larger than the Mexican
national average, which suggests that rural development will be an important topic in public
policy. Finally, both state government agencies and NGOs are active in the state. The
antagonism between the public and the nonprofit sector is not as strong as in more turbulent
states in Southern Mexico, and it may thus be possible to identify examples of cooperation
between them, rather than just competition.
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY
5.1.

Population: The Quest for the NGO Directory
In February 2000, I undertook a short preliminary research trip to explore the possibility

of conducting my fieldwork in the state of San Luis Potosí. The main objective of this trip was to
get a sense of the size and characteristics of the local NGO population. Getting a census of
NGOs is a notoriously difficult task in research on NGOs. Complete lists of existing NGOs in a
state or country are practically impossible to find in the Third-World. Directories of NGOs are
usually incomplete or inaccurate and individual organizations have to be identified in situ
(Shrum and Beggs 1997). Part of this problem originates in the lack of a standard definition of
what constitutes an NGO. The term NGO refers to all forms of nonprofit private organizations,
from schools to sports associations, in industrialized and developing countries. Boli and Thomas
(1997) use it to describe all forms of associations. In the development literature it now represents
only these organizations that are involved in socio-economic development in Third-World
countries, as opposed to those involved in other activities (e.g., sports, religious activities,
cultural associations).
Development scholars, however, disagree on what organizations the category should
include. Uphoff (1996) restricts the third sector to grassroots organizations, and excludes
intermediary NGOs, which he compares to private businesses. Nugent (1993) speaks of Local
Organizations and Institutions, and Brett (1993) of voluntary agencies, but it is never clear if
they mean to include grassroots organizations only, or intermediary NGOs as well. Some studies
start with a classification of organizations that will be included and excluded as NGOs for their
particular purpose (see Carroll 1992, Farrington and Bebbington 1993, Korten 1987, Vakil
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1997). Many authors use the term without explaining what type of organizations they are
analyzing, other than private, nonprofit organizations involved in development activities. This
only makes the construction of a coherent study of NGOs more difficult.
First, my population is defined geographically as NGOs operating in rural areas, defined
operationally as communities inhabited by no more than 2,500 people.1 To be included in my
population, an NGO had to conduct at least part of its activities in rural areas, and to benefit the
local community as a whole rather than specific individuals. An example of individual-level
action that would be excluded is the provision of scholarships for students to attend school away
from their home. In this study, I use the term rural NGOs not to refer to organizations that have
their headquarters in a rural locality, but to NGOs that conduct all or part of their activities in
rural communities. Thus, some of the NGOs in my population of interest are based in cities like
San Luis Potosí. Others may conduct activities in both urban and rural settings.
The second element in the definition of the population was the organization’s activities.
This distinguishes between NGOs that belong in the field of rural development and those that
focus on other activities. The definition of development and the activities that fall under this
category opens another debate. In designing a typology of NGOs, Vakil (1997) gives the
following list of NGO activities: welfare (charities), development (building local self-reliance),
advocacy, development education, networking, and research. The only types of activities that
were excluded completely were nongovernmental facilities in healthcare and education. Their
characteristics set them apart from other organizations, particularly in terms of
professionalization and relations with the state (Anheier and Salomon 1998). I will include all

1

INEGI definition.
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NGOs engaged in activities that are directed primarily towards improvements in the living
standards of the residents. For some, development activities are a secondary activity, but I will
classify all NGOs according to their primary activity.
Third, I initially intended to use Carroll’s (1992) dichotomy of NGOs according to the
status of members and staff. He establishes the distinction between Membership Support
Organizations (MSOs), which are directly accountable to the communities they work with, and
Grassroots Support Organizations (GSOs or GROs), which are external to client communities. In
the Mexican context, a large portion of MSOs consists of local grassroots organizations, the
SPRs, UAIMs,2 ejido unions,3 Triple S,4 cooperatives, and savings groups. These organizations
do not fit the focus of my study, so they will be considered as part of the environment rather than
the research population. These groups generally operate only in one community. Moreover, a
recent government requirement that limits public funding to legally registered groups, rather than
to individuals, has led to a drastic increase in the population of these groups. However, most of
them only exist on paper as a means to receive subsidies. These do not have an organizational
activity independent of the intervention of an intermediary NGO or a government agency that
coaches them in their development project.
Finally, I will separate NGOs according to the location of their headquarter in an
industrialized country or in the Third-World, since this factor influences an organization’s

2

See Appendix B for a complete list of acronyms.

3

These types of organizations are explained in the chapter on project location.

4

Sociedad de Solidaridad Social, or SSS. This form of association, centered around incomegenerating projects, is no longer legally available. Existing Triple S are being phased out, or
transformed into another type of organization, mostly SPRs.
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characteristics in terms of funding, ideology, bureaucratization, and professionalization. Most
authors distinguish between Northern, or international NGOs (INGOs), and Southern NGOs
(SNGOs), depending on the location of the NGO headquarters (Clark 1991, Elliott 1987,
Farrington and Bebbington 1993, Korten 1987). International NGOs are based in the
industrialized world and operate abroad, either in multilateral agencies like the United Nations,
or in the developing world. Southern NGOs reside and operate in developing countries. The
distinction is relevant in terms of the sources of funding that an NGO has access to, its ideology,
its internal organization, and its relation to the local context. Foreign NGOs often send
expatriates who do not have an extensive knowledge of local conditions, and are culturally and
socially very different from the project beneficiaries (Crewe and Harrison 1999).
The reality of the NGO community in San Luis Potosí, and the theoretical focus of my
study, led me to rethink my classification scheme. While preparing my field trip, I tried to gain
more specific information through the Internet, hoping that I could build a first list, however
incomplete. The website of the state government of San Luis Potosí offers a link to a category on
NGOs, which I was never able to open, even after the state rebuilt their site while I was in
Mexico. I managed to access a couple of national lists through the websites of national
organizations, such as the CEMEFI (Mexican Center for Philanthropy), and the UNAM
(National Autonomous University of Mexico). The CEMEFI lists voluntary organizations
involved in philanthropic activities, by state. I was able to generate a list of 111 organizations in
San Luis Potosí from their site. However, most of these NGOs are urban-based and devoted to
the provision of social services such as care for the disabled and shelters for the homeless. Only
two eligible organizations were discovered by this means. From the UNAM website, I gathered a
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list of sixteen potentially relevant NGOs, in the area of rural development. However, the site did
not specify where these organizations were active. Internet search proved of limited use to
generate a sampling frame. It became clear that I would have to build it in the field.
During my preliminary trip to San Luis Potosí, I met with academics in the Colegio de
San Luis, a local university focusing on social sciences. My question: ‘Are there many NGOs
here?’ either prompted a description of specific projects the respondent knew about, or allusions
to conspiracy theories on the negative attitude of the state towards NGOs. A few remarked that
the first question to ask was indeed what an NGO was. None of the people I spoke to, however,
were able to explain to me how the label was used either among Mexican scholars or the
Mexican government. I kept using it as a generic term that might allow me to capture the widest
potential population. The term encompassed voluntary organizations at the grassroots level as
well as professionalized organizations, and advocacy as well as income-generating activities.
Among vague leads and speculative discussions on the nature of NGOs, I learned of the
existence of a state registry of about 50 local NGOs in the Huasteca alone. Unfortunately, this
list was kept from public scrutiny, because the state used it as an instrument of social control.
Government workers at the state department of agricultural development mentioned the presence
of NGOs all over the state, and also confirmed that the state administration is heavily involved in
rural development. I was not able to get more specific information.
Thus, locating a reliable NGO directory became one of my first tasks when I arrived in
San Luis Potosí to conduct my fieldwork, from May to October 2001. Before attacking the issue
of access to a state-controlled list, I visited the Consejo Estatal de ONGs de San Luis Potosí
(NGO State Council of San Luis Potosí). This NGO was created to coordinate NGOs in the state
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and negotiate with the state on their behalf. There, I obtained a one-page list of 44 NGO names,
without any information about their location or activities. The complete listing was not available
at the time of my visit, but I was assured that I would be able to get a copy at a later date.
Repeated attempts to contact this organization again failed. I eventually learnt that the
organization was experiencing financial difficulties that effectively eliminated its activities.
To try and gain access to a state-generated directory, I visited the State Department of
Ecology and the Environment and SEDARH, the State Department of Agriculture. In both cases,
I was able to use personal contacts to overcome bureaucratic red tape.5 To my knowledge, the
State Department of Ecology is the only government agency that published an NGO directory,
listing organizations with activities relating to environmental issues. It gathers all types of
organizations, from universities to neighborhood associations. Of these, 34 qualify as NGOs. It
includes information about members and activities. However, it had not been updated since its
publication in 1997, so its accuracy is low.
SEDARH, on the other hand, denied possessing any NGO directory, but gave me a list of
22 rural organizations that this agency was working with as part of the federal program on
sustainable development. This list provides contact information and alerted me to the importance
of peasant unions in rural development. The status of labor unions is not clear in the NGO
literature. They are not explicitly mentioned, but are usually excluded from studies that focus on
income-generating development projects, because they do not typically take an active role in
these activities. In Mexico, however, the distinction between peasant unions, social movement

5

It is often claimed that in Mexico much information that is not accessible through official
channels can be obtained using informal networks. I was able to verify this claim on several
occasions.
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organizations, and development NGOs, is blurred. All three types of organizations can take on
development projects, seek funding on behalf of beneficiaries, and give technical assistance. The
activities of social movement organizations and peasant unions are far more encompassing than
protest, political action, or the defense of specific group interests. Thus, I included them in my
population of rural NGOs.
After these three visits, it became clear that trying to generate a sample from a directory
would require me to devote much of my time to finding a hypothetical list of NGOs and gaining
access to it. Gathering as complete a listing of NGOs as I could, in order to get a sense of how
representative my sample was compared to the whole NGO community, became in itself one of
my research activities. The information I obtained, or failed to obtain, from governmental and
nongovernmental sources, provides a good illustration of the complexities of the NGO
community in San Luis Potosí, and the mixture of interest and suspicion caused by NGOs- and
by association anyone interested in the sector. As a general rule, government agencies in San
Luis Potosí are reluctant to give away information.
Contacts with government agencies only yielded results when I had gained entry through
personal contacts with some staff members, or through the recommendation of a common friend.
Such was the case for the State Department of Ecology and the Environment, SEDARH, and at a
later date PROEM, the State Program for Women. On the contrary, informants from the INI and
SAGARPA, with whom I had no informal connection prior to my visit to the organization, were
either unable or unwilling to give me any specific information. However, I was repeatedly told
that information was available, just not from them. By crossing information from several
sources, I could establish that two reasonably reliable directories existed, in two different
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government agencies. First, every new organization has to register with the federal Department
of Foreign Affairs, which keeps record of the main characteristics of these organizations (date of
creation, legal status, location, name of the board members, activities, number of members). In a
visit to their central office in San Luis Potosí, I was clearly told that this information was not
available to the public. This fuels the speculation that the state and federal government are using
registration to monitor civil society, as is often the case in Third-World countries.
The second directory is the result of an extensive survey that SEDESOL conducted in
coordination with other government agencies. My contacts with this organization proved
unfruitful, once again probably because of the lack of personal connections. However, at the
very end of my stay, a student from the Colegio de San Luis who was starting a project on
NGOs, unexpectedly handed me the partial list that she was able to get from SEDESOL through
personal contacts and much negotiation. She still had not been able to get the evaluation report.
The list she was given merely reproduces the diario oficial,6 which only inventories the
organizations listed with Hacienda as authorized to receive tax deductible donations. They
represent only a fraction of the complete listing of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Moreover,
most of the rural NGOs are omitted, because they do not register for tax exemptions, since their
financial activity is too low for them to be subject to taxation. In the version I obtained, the
diario lists 117 NGOs (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 2001). Since it does not keep
track of organizational disappearance, it probably inflates the NGO population.

6

A daily official publication that lists all legal acts and laws that were passed or modified on a
given day.
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NGOs were more willing to share information with me, as they appreciated interest in
their activities. I am indebted to DEMITAN (Development of the Indigenous Woman of
Tancanhuitz) for sharing with me a list of 39 NGOs working with indigenous groups in the
Huasteca. La Corregidora, and the Comité Regional del Altiplano, provided me with the state
NGO directory that I could not get from the NGO State Council, as well as with extensive
information from the NGO National Council. The directory of the State Council was compiled in
2000. It was useful to classify NGOs by location and type of activity, but not to draw a sample,
since it often omits contact information, and misses most rural organizations.
Aside from chasing the ghost NGO directories- much talked about, but seldom sighted, I
also stumbled across various types of ghost organizations. In the process of cross-referencing
several lists and following respondents’ indications, I regularly came across what respondents
referred to as ‘ONGs de membrete’ or ‘de papel’, i.e. “membership roll” or “paper” NGOs.
Respondents used the term to describe NGOs that were registered, but not active. In some cases,
they were created by a single individual as a way to demonstrate political support for his or her
program in times of elections. I included them in the population when I could verify the
existence of a physical representative. The fact that respondents perceived them as inactive did
not necessarily mean that they were. Such statements could reflect a lack of knowledge, or a
negative perception, of the organization’s activities. Also, saying that an NGO was not doing
anything was sometimes an evaluation of the results of its actions, rather than of its level of
activity. In fact, several of the NGOs that I included in my sample were inaccurately described
by others as inactive.
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For several NGOs, I obtained contradictory information that I could not verify by
meeting with one of its members. Usually, distant observers of NGO activity were relying on
hearsay or outdated information when mentioning these ghost NGOs, but key informants who
were particularly knowledgeable of the area where the NGO was supposed to operate could
accurately attest its existence or disappearance. A couple of times, I found out about an
organization by seeing its name on a building, only to find out that it had never existed, or was
now defunct, despite the fact that a few informants still thought that they were active. I also had
a number of incorrect addresses, and was not able to verify if the organization had disappeared,
or just moved. In the absence of definite information that confirmed an NGO’s death, I left it in
the population.
Finally, other organizations deliberately avoid public scrutiny. These underground NGOs
are usually involved in political and social protest, and subject to, or fearful of repression from
the government. They are suspicious of those who try to gather information on their activities. If
I managed to locate a potential interviewee, he or she would not come to the appointment. In this
case, the existence of the organization is undeniable, but they still qualify as ghosts, because they
are almost impossible to locate and include in a sample. However, these organizations were
included in the population, even though I was not able to interview any of their members.
Combining the various directories I located, and weeding out as many ghost
organizations as possible, I could identify a total of 472 NGOs in the state of San Luis Potosí.
The various directories that I used have not been updated recently, so this total number of NGOs
is probably not accurate, but it gives a good estimate of the size of the NGO population in San
Luis Potosí. My research population includes only rural NGOs, a subset of the whole population
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of Potosino7 NGOs. Rural NGOs were mostly absent from the directories that I found, so I
compiled my own directory, relying on key informants and information from my respondents. I
have been able to identified most of the rural NGOs active in San Luis Potosí, coming up with a
research population of 89 rural NGOs. This figure is probably more accurate than the figure I
have for the total population of NGOs, since I cross-referenced information and checked on the
existence of all of them.
5.2.

Data Collection
5.2.1. Sample of Organizations
Given the exploratory nature of this work, multiple methods are necessary to increase the

validity of the findings. The methodology consists of a combination of face-to-face interviews
and participant observation. I conducted interviews with representatives of NGOs, government
and business organizations, and key informants who were mentioned to me as knowledgeable
about the NGO sector in San Luis Potosí. Within the population of rural NGOs, I conducted 82
interviews in 51 NGOs (57.3%). The examination of organizational records such as annual
reports, when available, complemented the interview data.
For interviews with key informants and members of organizations other than NGOs, I
conducted open-ended interviews. With key informants, the interview focused on their personal
experience with NGOs, their assessment of their work in San Luis Potosí, and their opinions
regarding state-NGO relations. With members of other organizations, the focus was on the
organization more than on the respondent, so I usually did not collect respondent information. I

7

In the absence of an English adjective for ‘from San Luis Potosí’, I will use the Spanish
Potosino.
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focused on the organizations’ activities, its contact with NGOs, and the respondent’s opinion of
NGOs in San Luis Potosí. An important part of the interview involved asking them for
information about specific organizations to complete my NGO directory. I conducted a total of
26 interviews with key informants, representing 24 organizations.
For NGOs, I tried to interview at least two members, one being the head of the
organization, and the other someone who had worked in it for a long time, preferably since the
creation. This way, I could increase the validity of the accounts that I was given. Talking with
the staff of public organizations and grassroots organizations fulfilled the same function.
Participant observation involved accompanying NGOs in their work activities, undertaking a few
field trips in some communities where development projects are implemented, and attending the
regular meetings of rural development programs.
I had initially planned to use a pre-established NGO directory to generate a random
sample, and ensure that my findings could be generalized to the whole NGO population in the
state of San Luis Potosí. Given the uncertainty of the process of finding an NGO directory, I
modified my sampling strategy. To identify respondents, I used a snowball sample rather than a
random sample, asking respondents to give me contact information on the NGOs they knew, and
visiting these. I developed the list of NGOs in the course of my fieldwork, to create my own
directory, relying on the information I gathered from my respondents and key informants. In the
absence of a good sampling frame, and the time it took me to establish a functional NGO
directory, snow-ball sampling was a more efficient strategy. However, what I gained in time
management, I lost in generalizability. The sample cannot be assumed to be representative, and
the findings are not generalizable to the whole population of rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí. As I
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mentioned earlier, I was not able to reach the most radical, underground NGOs, so the sample is
probably more mainstream than the whole population, ideologically speaking. Appendix C lists
the NGOs included in the sample.
Tables 2 and 3 show how the sample of rural NGOs compares to the whole population
for the region and sector of activity. Table 2 indicates that the proportion of rural NGOs from
each region of the state in the sample is close to that in the population. The Altiplano NGOs are
somewhat over-represented in the sample. They account for 17.7% of the sample, while rural
NGOs from the Altiplano represent 13.5% of the population. The other three regions are slightly
under-represented. The most under-represented area is the Huasteca. Rural NGOs operating in
the Huasteca represent 65.2% of all rural NGOs, and 60.8% of the sample.
Table 2: Population and Sample of Rural NGOs by Region
Region

Population

Sample

Altiplano

13.5%

17.7%

Zona Centro

2.3%

2.0%

Zona Media

6.7%

5.9%

Huasteca

65.2%

60.8%

All the state

12.4%

13.7%

Total
100.1*% (N=89)
* Total does not equal 100% due to rounding error.

100.1%* (N=51)

Table 3 gives the distribution of rural NGOs by type of activity, according to Vakil’s
(1997) classification. It shows that this distribution differs notably in the population and in the
sample. In the population, over half the NGOs (53.9%) are involved in development activities,
but they account for almost a third of the sample (64.7%). They were usually more visible and
easier to identify. The sample also contains a higher proportion of organizations involved in
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Table 3: Population and Sample of Rural NGOs by Sector of Activity
Activity

Population

Sample

Welfare

2.3%

3.9%

Development

53.9%

64.7%

Advocacy

29.2%

11.8%

Development Education

11.2%

13.7%

Networking

1.1%

2.0%

Research

2.3%

3.9%

Total
100.0% (N=89)
* Total does not equal 100% due to rounding error.

100.1%* (N=51)

development education than the population (respectively 13.7% and 11.2%). Advocacy NGOs
are under-represented in the sample. While they amount to over a quarter (29.2%) of the
population, the sample only includes only 11.8%. The underground NGOs that try to avoid
public exposure fall under this category, which explains why there are few advocacy NGOs in
the sample.
It became clear during the data collection process that Carroll’s (1992) distinction
between membership-support and grassroots-support organizations was not feasible to use in
Mexico. Most membership-based NGOs engage in activities that included non-members. I thus
dropped this classification, and replaced it with a classification based on the geographical scale
of activities. I distinguish between NGOs that are locally, nationally, or internationally
implanted. Local NGOs are those that are active only in the state of San Luis Potosí or one of its
areas. National NGOs are active in more than one state of Mexico. Their representation in San
Luis Potosí depends on a central office at the regional or national level for some aspects of its
strategy and its funding. International NGOs are either based in a foreign country, or are
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Mexican NGOs with an international outreach. Table 4 shows the distribution of rural NGOs in
San Luis Potosí according to their geographical orientation.
Table 4: Population and Sample of Rural NGOs by Geographical Scale
Geographical Scale

Population

Sample

International

4.5%

7.8%

National

36.0%

43.1%

Local

59.6%

49.0%

Total
100.1%* (N=89)
* Total does not equal 100% due to rounding error.

99.9%* (N=51)

International NGOs represent only a small proportion of the population in San Luis
Potosí (4.5%). This is not surprising, since Mexico in general, and San Luis Potosí in particular,
are often not considered poor enough to attract large international NGOs. One NGO director in
the Altiplano recalls with indignation how he had to drag the representative of a US foundation
to rural communities to prove to him that people there were as poor as in the poorest Latin
American countries, and thus that his development project was worth funding. Most Mexican
NGOs do not even get this opportunity to argue their case with international donors, who are not
likely to give priority to projects in Mexico. International NGOs (7.8%) are slightly overrepresented.
National Mexican NGOs are more common in San Luis Potosí, where they amount to
over a third of the population of rural NGOs (36.0%). Among them are the national peasant
unions, whose number has increased recently. Since the mid 1980s, efforts toward
democratization have induced the creation of several new unions, breaking the monopoly of the
CNC. National NGOs (43.1%) are also slightly over-represented in the sample. Local NGOs
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make up the majority of rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí, both in the sample and in the population.
However, they are under-represented in the sample, accounting for just under half of the
participating organizations (49.0%), but 59.6% of the population.
In summary, the composition of the sample is close to that of the population of rural
NGOs in San Luis Potosí in regional terms, but not when it comes to the type of activity and the
geographical scale. Rural NGOs involved in development activities are over-represented, and
those involved in advocacy are under-represented. International and national NGOs make up a
slightly greater proportion of the sample than the population, while local NGOs are underrepresented.
5.2.2. Characteristics of the Respondents
The data to be analyzed here comes mostly from information collected at the individual
level, even though I focus on the organizations. In order to increase the validity of the findings, I
tried to interview more than one person in each organization. In some cases, this was not
possible, because only a single individual was active in the organization, or because only one
person was available for an interview. As a result, I conducted more than one interview in only
12 organizations, which were the larger, more professionalized ones. If these were national
NGOs, I interviewed a representative of the national branch.
Table 5 summarizes the main characteristics of the 82 respondents in the NGO survey. A
large majority of them (71.2%) were men. Globally, it is often noted now that development
activities tend to be administered by men, even when the beneficiaries are women (Crewe and
Harrison 1999). In Mexico, women involved in grassroots activities claim that men are jealous
when they are successful (Townsend et al. 2000), a perception that I have verified in the field.
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Men have also been reported to take control of programs aimed at women, particularly in the
case of UAIMs (Stephen 1997, Villareal 1998). The large proportion of men in the sample thus
reflects a general situation.
Table 5: Characteristics of the Survey Respondents
Variable

Percentage of Respondents

Gender
Male
Female

71.2%
26.8%

State of Birth
San Luis Potosí
Mexico City
Other

70.3%
9.5%
20.3%

Originally from the area where the NGO operates

55.4%

N
82
74

74
69

Other languages spoken
Nahuatl
Teenek
Pame
Other indigenous language
English
Other foreign language

24.6%
17.4%
1.4%
2.9%
26.1%
5.8%

Level of education
Master’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Other college education
High School
Middle School
Primary School
No formal education

4.0%
61.3%
12.0%
5.3%
6.7%
8.0%
1.3%

75
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(Table continued)
Place of education
San Luis Potosí
Mexico City
State of Mexico
Other Mexican state
Foreign country

45.1%
18.3%
9.9%
21.1%
4.2%

70

Degree Major
Agriculture Science
Business Management/Economics
Law
Education
Veterinary Medicine
Accounting
Other
No major

21.3%
12.0%
6.7%
6.7%
4.0%
4.0%
22.7%
22.7%

NGO founders

56.0%

75

80
82

Current responsibility in the organization
President/Director
Technician
Board member/Representative
Regular member
Assessor
None

36.6%
23.2%
20.7%
2.4%
14.6%
2.4%

Paid Staff

49.0%

81

Currently employed outside the NGO

59.2%

76

Professional background
No prior work experience
Worked in the public sector
Worked in the private sector
Worked in the NGO sector

2.6%
38.2%
15.8%
23.7%

76

A large majority of respondents (70.3%) were originally from the state of San Luis
Potosí. Over half of them (55.4%) were from the area of the state where their NGO operates.
Given the high proportion of local NGOs in the state, this is not surprising either. Moreover, all
respondents were born in Mexico, in keeping with the limited presence of international NGOs.
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This suggests that the respondents have an extensive knowledge of the area of influence of their
NGO. However, this proposition is somewhat undermined by the relatively low proportion of
respondents who speak Nahuatl or Teenek, the two main indigenous languages found in the
Huasteca. While about two thirds of the organizations in the sample are located in the Huastecawhere they are highly likely to work with indigenous groups- only 24.6% of the respondents
spoke Nahuatl, and 17.4% Teenek. Since some of the respondents speak both, only a third of the
respondents speak at least one indigenous language. Education in indigenous languages is not
easily accessible, so the few NGO members of non-indigenous origin are able to learn them as
adults. These must rely on interpreters to communicate with beneficiaries, which makes their
task more difficult. Not speaking the local language also makes gaining trust more difficult.
The fact that a high proportion of respondents were originally from San Luis could
suggest low mobility and little exposure to other parts of the world. Indeed, almost half the
respondents (45.1%) received their highest level of education in the state of San Luis Potosí.
Mexico City drew 18.3% of students, mostly to the UNAM, the largest university in the country.
One fifth of the respondents (21.1%) studied in other states of the Republic, mostly in the
neighboring states of Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz. Only 4.2% of the respondents
studied abroad, even though over a quarter of the respondents (26.1%) have at least an
elementary level of English.
Over three quarters of the respondents have some college education. This proportion is
very high, even considering the low cost of Mexican public universities and the high regard that
Mexicans traditionally have for intellectuals, which would motivate many to pursue a college
education (Camp 1985). The degrees of the respondents who received specialized education
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were varied. About one fifth majored in agricultural studies, a relatively small proportion for
NGOs based in rural areas. A total of 18 other majors were cited, the most common being
economics and business management (12%), law and education with 6.7% each, and veterinary
medicine and accounting, with 4% each.
This diversity of educational background, as well as the high level of education of the
respondents, are linked to several factors. First, DiMaggio and Anheier (1990) noticed an affinity
between the work of professionals and the third sector, based on a common ideology of service,
autonomy, and the use of technical expertise for the common good. It is unsurprising that
professionals would be attracted to activities in the third sector, either as a paid activity or as a
hobby. In fact, nearly half the respondents (49%) are volunteers. As some of them indicated, they
choose to participate in a non-profit organization that does not match their professional skills, in
order to fulfil personal goals. Finally, the Mexican labor market is very tight for professionals.
Many of the paid NGO staff are forced to accept jobs that do not necessarily match their
qualifications. Several respondents did mention that they considered their work with an NGO as
a regular job, and were planning to move on to better paying jobs as soon as the opportunity
arose. Some of them hold two jobs to make ends meet. Fifty nine percent of the respondents have
a paid job outside the NGO.
I had planned to interview people who had been in the NGO for a long time, to get a
sense of the history of the organization. On average, the respondents had worked in their
organization over seven years. Over half the respondents (56%) had been involved in the
foundation of the NGO. I managed to interview a founding member in 39 organizations. NGOs
where I did not interview a founder were either old organizations, or professional organizations
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where I interviewed a manager. A total of 57.1% of the respondents were involved in decisionmaking activities in the organization, either as president or director (36.6%), or as board member
or representative (20.7%). They were more likely to influence the strategy and activities of the
organization, and therefore able to provide reliable answers to the questionnaire for my purpose.
Another useful category of respondents were assessors, usually paid staff who guided the
development of the NGO. They accounted for 14.6% of the sample. Another 23.3% were
technicians from the professional organizations. Their interviews usually complemented
information provided by the manager or the president of the organization.
5.3.

Questionnaire
Appendix A presents the translation of the questionnaire administered in Spanish to NGO

respondents.8 It includes structured and unstructured sections that address the respondent’s
biographical data, the characteristics of the organization, the location of their activities, and their
contacts with other organizations. The format of the interviews themselves was flexible, to gain
the trust of individuals who were often unfamiliar with the interview process, and to obtain as
much reliable information as possible. Thus, questions were not always asked in the same
sequence. The presence of a number of semi-structured questions, which elicited elaborated
answers, allowed for such flexibility.
The questions that addressed the respondent’s characteristics focused on information
relating to their professional experience, to get a sense of what kind of individuals are involved
in the nonprofit sector in San Luis Potosí. The questions about the organization provided general
information about the history of the organization and basic characteristics, such as number of

8

All respondents were fluent in Spanish, which the large majority spoke as a first language.
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people involved or funding. However, in many cases the organization had such a low level of
formalization that systematic information was not available.
The lack of systematic information was problematic for the questions on project location.
I had originally planned to map out project location for all rural NGOs in the sample at the
community level. However, only the more structured NGOs kept records that included the
number of beneficiaries and the type of projects. The others lacked the resources (staff,
equipment, and funds) to do so. I ended up collecting such information at the municipal level.
The final section focuses on the relation of the NGO with other organizations. This part is
adapted from Shrum (1996). The list of organizations with which NGOs interact was designed
on site, in the first weeks of the trip. It includes mostly other NGOs in San Luis Potosí that I
identified early in the data collection process, a few national NGOs with activities in rural
development, state and federal Mexican government agencies, international aid agencies, and a
few private businesses. The list of organizations was not meant to be exhaustive, but to identify
the most common organizations. The respondents were encouraged to add any other organization
that was not included. Most added one or more linkages, particularly in the categories of
businesses and Mexican NGOs. This section yielded the most structured answers, suitable for
statistical analysis.
5.4.

Data Analysis
The analysis of the fieldwork data combines several methods. First, I map out the

distribution of NGOs in the state of San Luis Potosí, and the location of project activities for the
sample. Prior studies of NGOs have not included such information on geographical location in a
systematic way. A map will provide a visual map of the distribution, including the repartition of
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NGOs across the state by sector of activity, size, and type. Using the ArcView Geographic
Information Systems (or GIS) software, I will relate this distribution to other geographical
features such as the location of cities, economic and demographic data, including the importance
of migration, and the presence of grassroots organizations.
The exploratory nature of the data, and the lack of systematic quantitative data on many
factors precludes the use of statistical methods to analyze the data. Hence, the analysis will focus
on the mechanisms of NGO implementation in different parts of San Luis Potosí using a
qualitative approach. In keeping with an ecological approach to organizational analysis that sees
organizations as actors, and not as passive reactants to the influences of their environment, I
show the importance of the actors’ interpretation of their environment in shaping actions. This
will be particularly important for the examination of the relations between state agencies and
NGOs in illuminating the relationship between civil society and the state. Several case studies
will illustrate how specific NGOs addressed these issues. The next section of the analysis will
focus on NGO networks, with particular attention to the resource-dependency hypothesis that
NGO location is directly related to funding opportunities. Throughout the analysis, I will
compare and contrast the NGOs according to their organizational scale, distinguishing between
local NGOs and NGOs affiliated with national organizations.9

9

This second category will include a handful of international NGOs, since these were too few to
adequately represent a separate category.
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CHAPTER 6:
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RURAL NGOS OF SAN LUIS POTOSÍ
6.1.

NGO Demographics
The first step is to establish a demographic profile of NGOs. This profile is generally

required for studies in population ecology. It focuses on the life events and main attributes of the
organizations: age, size, budget, access to organizational resources, main activities, and goals.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the main characteristics of the NGOs in the sample. The standard
deviation for most of the continuous variables in Table 6 is high, pointing at the heterogeneity of
the organizations included in the sample. Their longevity varies greatly, from one to 66 years.
Overall, the NGOs in the sample are young, reflecting the recent development of the NGO sector
in Mexico. They are about eleven years old on average, but fewer than a quarter of them are
older than this, that is, were created before the presidency of Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994).
Although he is commonly viewed as the worst Mexican president, he did promote the
development of the NGO sector in Mexico. In this, he was following the New Policy Agenda,
both in its political and economic facets. A large NGO sector would show increased
democratization of the country, which was then under internal and international criticism for
being one of the last Latin American authoritarian regimes. In addition this allowed the state to
transfer some of its functions from the public to the nonprofit sector, thus following the
neoliberal call for the reduction of the public sector.
Table 7 shows that the government was involved in the creation of over a quarter of the
NGOs in the sample (27.5%). Another fifth (21.7%) were local representations of national
organizations. Overall, nearly half the NGOs in the sample (49.2%) were not independent local
initiatives. Even if all the rural NGOs that I did not include in the sample were local, the
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Rural NGOs, Continuous Variables
Variable
Years in activity
Financial resourcesc
Human resources
Number of members
Number of paid staff
Number of volunteers
Scale of operation
Number of communities
Number of municipios
Number of statesa
Number of countriesb
Number of beneficiaries

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Median

Minimum

Maximum
66

N

11.33

14.06

8

1

51

183052.93

230399.24

96156

0

798658.80

24

7848.54
5.27
101.73

29325.73
12.58
352.43

284
0
17

6
0
0

172848
70
2240

35
49
41

35.70
9.04
20.71
44.00
41303.61

38.50
12.25
11.15
48.56
134449.62

25
5.5
25
42.5
2337.5

1
1
2
2
0

191
58
31
89
690592

30
46
21
4
28

a

For organizations that operate in more than one state
For organizations that operate in more than one country
c
2000 budget in US dollars. US$1=9.2 Mexican pesos.
b

proportion of rural NGOs that are not indigenous to San Luis Potosí would still reach a quarter
of all rural NGOs. The oldest organizations were created by the government, or are branches of
national organizations. The government-created organizations include the CNC and La Forestal,
a federation of cooperatives of ixtleros1 that operates in the Altiplano region of five Mexican
states. With the exception of the FMDR (Mexican Foundation for Rural Development), the
national organizations are mainly social movement organizations, such as the CIOAC

1

Ixtleros collect and work the lechugilla, a type of agave cactus that produces a resistant fiber. It
is used worldwide for the manufacturing of brooms and industrial cleaning brushes, for instance
in the computer industry. La Forestal was created by Lázaro Cárdenas as part of a strategy to
weaken a powerful cacique of San Luis Potosí, Saturnino Cedillo, who controlled the peasantry
in the state. The Mexican president used the law on cooperatives, which gave the federal
government direct control, to rally the ixtleros under his banner.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Rural NGOs, Discrete Variables
Variable

Percentage
51

Circumstances of the creation
Created by a government agency
Created by another NGO

27.5%
21.6%

Financial resources
Include operational costs in their budget
Receive funds from the government
Receive funds from businesses
Receive funds from international donors
Receive donations
Charge for their services
Receive occasional contributions from members
Charge regular membership dues

40.0%
54.0%
14.0%
22.0%
40.0%
21.6%
62.0%
17.0%

50
50
50
50
50
51
50
47

47.1%

51

Material resources
Have an office
Have a vehicle
Have a phone
Have a computer
Have access to the Internet
Produce an annual report

67.3%
19.7%
87.2%
57.8%
40.0%
41.2%

49
51
47
45
45
51

Goalsa
Economic development
Social development
Local institution building
Promotion and defense of human rights
Environmental conservation
Cultural preservation
Sustainability
Land redistribution

70.6%
56.9%
37.3%
25.5%
23.5%
15.7%
11.8%
11.8%

Activitiesa
Were active at the time of the interview
Income-generating agricultural projects
Other income-generating projects
Education
Diffusion of information
Advocacy
Environment management
Housing provision or improvement
Legal assistance
Cultural activities
Research
Charity

88.2%
62.7%
51.0%
51.0%
51.0%
35.3%
25.5%
21.6%
17.6%
11.8%
5.9%
5.9%

Human resources

a

N

Have paid staff

51

51

Respondents could give several answers.
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(Independent Central of Farm Workers and Peasants), or the UNORCA (National Union of
Autonomous Peasant Organizations).
On paper, at least, taking San Luis Potosí as an indicator, the government can claim that
the sector has experienced dramatic growth. However, as mentioned above, the lack of
information on NGO dissolution produces an overestimate of the NGO population. The youth of
most NGOs could also be a sign of high ‘infant mortality,’ similar a characteristic of newly
created businesses (Aldrich 1999).
In this respect, one noteworthy finding from Table 7 is the level of activity of the
organizations. Since the sample was generated with a snow-balling technique, I relied on
informants’ accounts to select respondents. For six of the 51 NGOs in the sample, I found myself
meeting with people whose organization was no longer active. Inactivity itself was not simply
determined by outsiders’ statements that an organization was ‘not doing anything’. Such claims
sometimes reflected a performance assessment, or an outsider’s negative opinion of a rival
organization. Such organizations often still held meetings, handled beneficiaries’ requests,
looked for funding, or attended meetings with other organizations. Inactive organizations were
the ones that did not show any of these signs of activities, and had not done so for some time,
usually over a year.
From the information I have gathered about the whole population, it is quite probable that
this portion of the ghost NGOs represents about 10% of the total number of rural NGOs. The
respondents who were in charge of such inactive NGOs, however, still identified with them and
expressed hopes for renewed activities. Most of them had concrete plans to regenerate the
organization, either by taking on new activities, seeking new funding, or renewing membership.
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They did not consider the NGO dead, and had not taken action to terminate its legal existence.
The level of activity may vary substantially over the years, but the organization does not vanish.
Nongovernmental organizations seem to share with public organizations the
characteristic that they do not die easily, but linger in a moribund stage. Businesses face intense
pressures from their economic environment to generate profits, or else they disappear. The
selection principle of organizational ecology applies in their case. Public agencies, on the
contrary, are not subject to market sanction as quickly as businesses. They disappear when they
are no longer needed, but usually after opposing much resistance. When they do not employ paid
staff, but represent a voluntary activity for their members, NGOs display the same characteristic.
Thus, they are more likely to become moribund than to disappear.
The main reason why an NGO may become moribund has to do with lack of funding.
Many NGO respondents were reluctant to answer direct questions on their financial resources, be
it their actual budget, or even the name of the institutions that funded them. In the absence of
publicly accessible data on government-funded organizations, I was not able to check
systematically how much money all the organizations included in the sample received, and how
they used it. I was able to get budget figures for less than half the organizations in the sample
(Table 6). On average, the budget of the 24 reporting organizations was slightly over $180,000.
This figure varied greatly, from $0 to over $230,000. For the 27 organizations that did not
disclose their budget, some answered right away that they did not have a budget, even though the
activity that they displayed required funds. They equated the term ‘budget’ with ‘operating
costs’, and reported not having a budget to show that they were not using any money from
outside sources for personal gain. As a result, only 40% of the NGOs in the sample admitted to
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dedicating part of their funding to the maintenance of the organization itself (Table 7). Some also
denied receiving any salary, so that only less than half the NGOs in the sample (47.1%) have
paid staff. Only a fifth of the NGOs (21.6%) reported charging beneficiaries for their work. One
final way to avoid disclosure of financial information was the absence of an annual report or
other accounting material. Only 41.2% of the NGOs in the sample produce such material. For the
others, it is almost impossible to get accurate information.
Although it gives a distorted picture of the financial situation of NGOs, this finding
reveals the normative framework under which Mexican NGOs operate, and which is consistent
with the institutional myths on NGOs. Government programs specify that they do not finance
organizational expenses, to ensure that all funds go to the beneficiaries. NGOs that channel
public funds often insisted that they did not have a budget for operating costs, to indicate that
they were respecting the law, and do not use part of their funding for their professional gain. The
government requirement is a way to limit fraud and corruption, and stems from the belief that
NGOs should be more cost-effective than public agencies. Having them declare no operative
costs is one way to show their greater financial efficacy. It also allows the government to reduce
its budget, by transferring development services to the nonprofit sector without financing it.
The strategy that NGOs adopt of not reporting their budget only masks their financial
situation. It preserves external legitimacy, but does not reflect the level of resources that is
actually available to the organization. Of course, some of the NGOs in the sample were small
groups with a low level of activity. These did not manage to get their projects funded, or
explicitly refused to seek outside funding to avoid issues of accountability. Other NGO
informants, when probed, denied receiving a salary for their work in the NGO, but admitted that
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they accepted ‘voluntary contributions’ from beneficiaries. As one respondent put it, ‘There are
thankful people who give us for the work that we do for them.’ Contributions from members,
either in exchange for a service, or as a cooperation for specific activities, such as a meeting or a
trip, were the most common reported source of funds for the sample, reportedly 62% of the
NGOs (Table7). Government funding, either from the municipal, state, or federal government, is
the second largest source (54%). Contributions from businesses (14%) and international donors
(22%) were notably low. The small impact of international funding is consistent with the relative
isolation of Mexico from international sources, and its low attractiveness for international
donors.
The struggle for funding, particularly to finance organizational expenses, results in
uneven access to material resources.2 The confusion between private and organizational
resources was frequent, above all for small NGOs that did not rely on paid staff. For instance,
only two-third (67.3%) of the sample organizations had an office. The others operated from their
home. Access to the phone was the most common (87.2%), but often meant that NGO members
were using their private phone.3 Access to a computer and the Internet could only be assessed for
45 NGOs.4 Over half of them (57.8%) did use a computer, but only 40% had access to the

2

Material resources were assessed visually during the interview, and were not part of the
questionnaire. Thus, the information is not available for all organizations.
3

The telephone system in Mexico is extensive, but still does not cover all the territory. Some
communities of the Altiplano and the Huasteca are not connected. Cellular phones are becoming
popular, but are costly.
4

Some NGOs use equipment available at the NGO office or at work, and sometimes their
personal computer. The six missing organizations represent cases where the respondents did not
give a clear answer as to what organizational or personal computer resources, they might be
using, and where the setting of the interview did not allow for a visual assessment.
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Internet. In several cases, this was through a member’s computer, not as part of formal
organizational resources. The least common organizational material resource was a vehicle,
which was available to fewer than one fifth of the organizations (19.7%). Some small, voluntary
groups relied on their personal vehicle, but the high cost of gasoline in Mexico limited their
mobility, particularly to reach isolated communities of the Huasteca and Altiplano regions.
The number of people who were involved in the NGOs in the sample varies greatly too,
particularly the number of members (Table 6). Social Movement Organizations, such as the
CNC, CIOAC, CODUC (Coalition of Democratic, Urban, and Peasant Organizations), or
UNORCA, claim a large membership, that they mobilize in large demonstrations against the
government. The CNC is the largest such organization in the state, claiming a membership of
172848 people, or 80% of the male farmers in the state.5 Membership is highest among
ejidatarios, and lowest among individual farmers, who tend to be more oriented to commercial
farming. Excluding it from the distribution, average membership drops from 7849 to 2996. The
NGOs also rely on far more volunteers than professional staff. For the 41 organizations that had
figures on the number of volunteers relied on an average of 101.73 volunteers. In comparison,
only 24 organizations had paid staff, with an average of twelve staff members for the 22
organizations that provided a staff number.
The data on age, financial, material, and human resources, reveal an NGO sample with a
low level of institutionalization. These NGOs are young, rely primarily on sporadic financial
resources that do not provide them with long term financial security, and as a result, have limited

5

In keeping with gender-biased ejido laws, the CNC only includes the male head of the
household as a member, but it enlists all the members of his family as beneficiaries of its
activities.
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organizational infrastructure for communication, transportation, and administration. Even though
many professionals are involved in the NGO sector, a portion does it “por el amor al arte,”
literally, for the love of the art. If this somewhat contradicts the vision of professional NGO
members as greedy opportunists (Petras 1997), it also indicates that members will have limited
time available for the NGO. This in turn will limit the NGO’s activities, efficiency, and impact.
Table 7 details the activities and goals of the NGOs in the sample, in non-exclusive
categories. The goals were stated by respondents in answer to the question ‘What is the mission
of the organization?’. When available, information from the NGO articles of association was also
used to inform the answers. The responses given were varied, but the most commonly stated
goals remained economic development, mentioned by 70.6% of the organizations. Reducing
rural poverty is seen as the most pressing task, and was often the single factor that sparked the
creation of the organization. It is typically easier to get funding for income-generating activities
than others. Social development, which over half of the organizations (56.9%) cited, came
second. Organizations that cited both economic and social development as their goal often saw
social development as a consequence of economic development. They believed that the incomegenerating projects they were helping to implement would eventually lead to higher levels of
health, education, and a more fulfilling life among beneficiaries. However, they did not have
projects specifically addressing these issues.
Over a third (37.3%) refer to the strengthening of local institutions as one of their goals.
The meaning of the term varies according to the type of NGO. NGOs that are mainly oriented to
income-generating projects are more interested in forming small, grassroots groups or
cooperatives, that would work together on a concrete, small-scale project. Social movement
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organizations, usually more openly oriented to advocacy, envision the organization of
beneficiaries on two levels. First, like the first group of NGOs, they promote the organization of
small groups around income-generating projects. Second, they try to rally large numbers of
people for their advocacy activities, such as demonstrations, in order to increase their political
leverage.
NGOs are also pragmatic in their emphasis on local institutional building. They may not
have included this goal in their mission if the government did not condition the release of
funding to the legal constitution of a group, as one respondent explains:
Now it is about opening possibilities for them [the beneficiaries] to organize by
themselves to do what they want. To decide for themselves the life of their
community, health, education, services. To feel that this love for the organization,
for us, is nothing more than a pretext to get funding.
Few programs are now available to individual farmers, other than the crop subsidies of
PROCAMPO. As a result, NGOs that try to get government grants for projects first need to
explain to potential beneficiaries how to create and run a grassroots organization. They are aware
that without the carrot of government funding most campesinos would rather work individually,
and groups would fail. Even with the promise of government funding, keeping a group active is
often difficult and time-consuming for the NGO.
A quarter of the NGOs included in the sample focused on the defense and promotion of
human rights. The term grouped together organizations that focused on human rights in general,
for instance denouncing police brutality or political corruption, as well as organizations that
focused on the needs of specific groups. These covered two categories, indigenous rights and
women’s rights. In 1991, the INI launched a national grant program to sponsor the promotion of
indigenous rights in indigenous communities. The beneficiaries could be grassroots groups or
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intermediary NGOs. This funding opportunity induced the creation of several NGOs in the
Huasteca and in the Pame area of the Zona Media.
In addition, the 1994 insurrection in Chiapas brought national attention on issues of
indigenous rights. Until then, many Mexicans were largely unaware of the deplorable conditions
of life among the indigenous population, and the discrimination they faced, notably in their
dealings with the legal system. Many local tribunals and police facilities did not offer the service
of a translator to indígenas who do not understand Spanish. Residents of isolated rural
communities, who mostly belong to the indigenous groups, also are not aware of their rights.
They do not possess the tools to defend themselves adequately, falling victim to undue
condemnations and police corruption. Now, several organizations provide legal assistance to the
indigenous populations, and hold meetings and seminars to inform people of their rights.
National social movement organizations active in the Huasteca include indigenous rights as part
of their program, probably as a strategy to gain new members, or prevent loss of current
members, who might join a new organization involved in this issue.
The issue of women’s rights has not benefitted from the same level of public attention as
indigenous rights in recent years. In the sample, few NGOs included women’s rights in their
mission, or directed their efforts primarily at women. DEMITAN and the Federation of UAIMs
were the major ones. DEMITAN is a local NGO based in the Huasteca. It started by training
local promoters of women’s rights in indigenous communities of the municipio of Tancanhuitz,
in the Huasteca, but gradually moved on to include income-generating projects in its activities.
The Federation of UAIMs is the local branch of a national federation. Even though it represents
all 228 Potosino UAIMs, it is also based in the Huasteca, where it concentrates most of its
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activities. The UAIMs are geared towards income-generating activities, which the Federation
supports by organizing technical training courses, and offering project assessment. Now that
DEMITAN has shifted its focus, no NGO in San Luis Potosí is dedicated specifically to the
promotion of women’s rights in rural areas. In the city of San Luis Potosí itself, Mujer, Igualdad
y Lucha (Woman, Equality and Struggle) organizes numerous activities connected to the issue of
women’s rights, but they do not reach rural areas.
A few of the organizations that are active in the Huasteca have their roots in the struggle
for land redistribution. Although many movements disappeared when the reform of the ejido law
in 1992 officially put an end to the possibility of further land grants by the government, a
minority of NGOs in this region (11.8%) still mention land redistribution as one of their goal.
They are exclusively social movement organizations, and none of them concentrates exclusively
on it. The prospects for a change in the law are dim, however, and a further decline in the focus
on land distribution can be expected in the future.
While about one quarter of the NGOs indicated that they were concerned with
environment conservation, only 11.8% explicitly referred to sustainability in any form.6 This
now popular buzzword of the development community does not dominate the development
discourse in San Luis Potosí, despite the fact that a substantial portion of the state benefits are
from a World Bank program for sustainable development. Even organizations that drew part of
their funding from this program did not use the term sustainability either to describe their

6

Although sustainability usually refers to the preservation of natural resources for future
generations, Redclift (1992) considers it along three dimensions of economic, political, and
epistemological sustainability. Respondents in this survey were allowed to specify what they
meant by sustainability. The few who did spoke of economic sustainability.
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mission, or in other parts of the interviews. Likewise, the term was not mentioned in the articles
of association, except in the case of Luz Verde al Desarrollo Sustentable, which uses the word in
its name.7 We can probably link this situation to the low penetration of international NGOs in the
area. If we follow Boli and Meyer’s (1997) argument that international NGOs create a world
culture, it is more likely that an area where international NGOs do not have a strong influence
will not conform to widely used international terminology.
The activities reported by the NGOs were closely related to their goals. Consistent with
the goal of economic development, nearly two-thirds of the NGOs (62.7%) were involved in the
implementation of agricultural income-generating projects, and over half (51%) in other incomegenerating projects. With the exception of the few NGOs who manage to capture international
funding, NGOs do not have their own funds that they can distribute directly to beneficiaries. For
the most part, their action consists in assisting beneficiaries in project design, relaying their
proposals to the relevant government agencies, and if the request was granted, assisting in the
management of the project. Agricultural projects included the dominant crops and stocks in the
area: goats and cacti in the Altiplano and the Zona Centro, goats, cattle, and grain in the Zona
Media and cattle, orange, coffee, and sugarcane in the Huasteca.
Several NGOs noted the need to include commercialization in their production activity,
but many projects still stopped at activities designed to increase production, and in some cases,

7

Mexicans use two words as a translation for sustainability. Sostenibilidad is derived from the
Spanish verb sostener, to sustain. Sustentabilidad is a neologism, coined from the English
sustainability. I asked several respondents and informants who used both terms if there was a
difference between the two. Some did not believe there was. Other did, but were not able to give
me clear definitions. This difference of opinion shows how little development workers in San
Luis Potosí have internalized this concept.
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to transform the primary product. For instance, in the Huasteca, COCIHP (Coordination of
Indigenous Peasant Organizations of the Potosino Huasteca) and the CRAC (Regional Council
of Supply and Commercialization) try to develop local brands of coffee, where producers would
not only harvest the coffee, but have facilities to roast and package it. Government staff in
charge of following such projects report that they often fail because the groups did not conduct
any market research before engaging in productive activities, and because they are not
competitive, compared to existing products.
The same problems exist with non-agricultural income-generating projects. The majority
of these are directed to women. At the time of field work, the state of San Luis Potosí was swept
by a fad of garment-making micro-projects.8 In 2000, the State Program for Women funded
nearly 100 of these, of which only 4 turned out to be viable. In the other cases, the groups were
not able to sell their products, either for lack of a market, or because of the existing competition.
The program no longer finances garment micro-projects unless a group can prove that they will
be able to sell their products, but many rural women and NGO technicians keep investing in nonviable proposals. This phenomenon took place in every part of the state.
The activities of education and diffusion of information that were undertaken by more
than half of the NGOs in the sample (51%) are a corollary of the importance of incomegenerating projects in their activities. NGOs organize training sessions for the beneficiaries to

8

Frances Rothstein witnessed the same enthusiasm for the garment industry in the state of
Tlaxcala, but does not know how the phenomenon originated (personal communication). I
recently saw a television advertisement from USAID presenting these as a solution for rural
Mexican women. It is possible that the idea came from international donors, but it may also be a
result of the development of textile maquiladoras along the border, where many Mexican
women find job opportunities.
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acquire the necessary skills to implement their projects, and the government makes funding
available for such courses. NGOs that support the development of grassroots groups also give
seminars and courses on the administration of organization. In addition, NGOs focusing on the
promotion of human rights consider information meetings as one of their most important
activities.9
Advocacy was an activity of over a third of the NGOs in the sample (35.3%). All social
movement organizations took part in lobbying or protest actions. Since they represent a lower
proportion of the sample than of the population, the proportion of rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí
involved in advocacy is probably even higher. Advocacy was an important component of the
activities of NGOs whose mission involved land distribution, indigenous rights, or
environmental conservation. Several organizations described the successful outcome of some of
their campaigns. For instance, Proyecto Verde, a small environmental group of the Huasteca,
managed to close a wood-processing plant that was polluting the waters of Ciudad Valles, the
largest city in the area. The Comité Regional de Derechos Humanos-Zona Altiplano led a
demonstration that ended municipal corruption in the distribution of drinking water.
Actions at the state and national level, however, do not seem to give satisfying results. A
case in point would be the large protest movement against President Fox’s project to reform the
constitution regarding indigenous rights in the summer of 2001.10 Large fora were organized in

9

The NGOs that provide legal assistance (17.6% of the sample) are part of this group.

10

The reform of the Mexican constitution to recognize indigenous populations and their rights
was one of the demands of the EZLN to reach a peace agreement with the federal government.
Former President Zedillo granted it, and a reform was passed by Congress before his term came
to an end. Instead of passing it into law, however, Vicente Fox decided to present his own reform
project to Congress, to override the previous reform. Indigenous groups see his version as a step
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all the regions of the country where indigenous populations reside, including the Huasteca. Two
meetings were held there, where numerous social movement organizations and NGOs came in
front of state officials to express their disapproval of the project. In the city of San Luis Potosí,
various groups held meetings and rallies in front of the Parliament building for over a month.
The state Parliament in San Luis Potosí rejected the project, but because Mexican states with an
indigenous population are a minority at the federal level, Fox’s reform still passed. No NGO
whose representatives I spoke with, even those with headquarters in Mexico City, could name a
public policy change at the state or federal level that resulted from their advocacy efforts.
Other activities concern few NGOs in the sample. A quarter undertake environmental
projects, mostly reforestation to fight soil erosion. A fifth (21.6%) work with housing
improvement and construction, including the provision of water, sewage, and electricity. The
demand for better housing infrastructure is high, but the funds available are limited. NGOs can
only address a fraction of the cases that come to their attention.
Smaller proportions of the sample engage in cultural activities (11.8%), charity work
(5.9%), or research (5.9%). Even though it characterized only three NGOs in the sample, the
case of research NGOs is noteworthy. The development of research activities in NGOs is a
relatively recent phenomenon, which may have various causes. Some NGOs develop their own
research because the available public research does not meet their needs (Farrington and
Bebbington 1993). In Mexico, the creation of research NGOs is part of a national strategy to

back from the previous text, and the EZLN rejected it. The main point of disagreement is the
return to the old formula that considers indigenous populations as ‘objetos de derecho público’
(objects of public law), while new text mentioned them as ‘sujetos’ (subjects). They interpret this
as a continuation of policies that considered indigenous people as second class citizens in their
own country.
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transfer the activity of agricultural extension from the public to the nonprofit sector. The
Fundación Produce national network was created to carry out this strategy. The branches in each
state publish brochures, and organize courses and events to disseminate the results of research
undertaken in public agricultural research centers. A board of representatives from government
agencies and farmers organizations decide the orientation of the local branch. The funds,
however, still come from the government, which has a powerful impact on the strategy of the
organization.
Globally, in terms of goals and activities, most of the NGOs in the sample engage in
mainstream income-generating projects, primarily aiming to increase family income. Such
activities are the easiest to fund, and most NGOs consider them a priority to address rural
poverty. A significant number of NGOs, however, also include advocacy as part of their
activities. Following Korten’s (1987) classification, they are third-generation NGOs. Rather than
focusing exclusively on small-scale activities, they try to affect public policies at the regional or
national level. They believe that the success of their efforts in development depends on the
existence of a larger legal framework. In this respect, it is significant that even NGOs that focus
on advocacy, human rights, or the environment, combine the activities of income-generation and
advocacy rather than carrying on purely promotional work. They consider development to be a
multi-faceted process, where economic, social, cultural, and political factors are interdependent,
and should be addressed simultaneously.
6.2.

Effect of Organizational Scale
I examined the relationship between the geographical scale of activities and the

characteristics of NGOs. Since only four international NGOs were present in San Luis Potosí, I
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did not create a specific category for them. I classified NGOs according to a dichotomy between
local NGOs, which operate only in the state of San Luis Potosí, and national NGOs, which
operate in at least two states of Mexico and have representation at the federal level. NGOs that
were legally registered in San Luis Potosí as local NGOs, but were branches of NGOs that exist
at the national level, such as the branches of the Mexican Foundation for Rural Development,
were classified as national NGOs. Of the 51 NGOs in the sample, 25 were classified as local
NGOs and 26 as national NGOs.
To examine the effect of organizational scale on NGO characteristics at the ratio level of
measurement, I used a one-way analysis of variance. For variables at the nominal level, I used
the chi-square test. However, where the expected value was less than five in more than 10% of
the cells, I used Fisher’s exact test. This test gives more reliable results when expected values in
the cells are small. For both the analyses of variance and the crosstabulations, it is important to
keep in mind that the sample is not random, and that it is small. Relative to the population of 89
rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí, a sample of 51 organizations is quite large, but the results cannot
be extrapolated to the whole population of rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí. The variance in the
sample is probably smaller than in the whole population, which influences the result of the
significance test in both models (ANOVA and Fisher’s test). The results should be taken only as
a first step in a quantitative investigation of NGOs, to be compared with the results of future
investigation.
The analysis of variance was performed to assess the effect of organizational scale on the
variables listed in Table 6. The results were significant only for the age of the organization, but
for the other variables, the variation within each group (local or national) was far larger than the
variation between the groups, so no conclusion can be drawn. Organizational scale has a minimal
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impact on these variables. This negative finding, however, has some relevant implications. The
attachment of NGOs to national organizations did not influence their local outreach in San Luis
Potosí, either in number of members, or in number of municipios and communities of activity.
The results of Fisher’s exact test, presented in Table 8, are more conclusive. Significantly
more national NGOs than local NGOs were created by other NGOs, indicating that national
NGOs have an active policy of geographical expansion. A few of them send out members to start
groups in various states where they think they can have an impact. Top-down expansion, from
the national headquarters to local communities, has an impact on the formation of the NGO
community in San Luis Potosí. In a few cases, groups formed at the local level, later to join a
national organization.11
Table 8: NGO Characteristics by Organizational Scale
Variable

Local NGOsa

National
NGOsa

Circumstances of the creationb
Created by a government agency
Created by another NGO

10
3

4
8

Financial resourcesc
Include operational costs in their budget
Receive funds from the government
Receive funds from businesses
Receive funds from international donors
Receive donations
Charge for their services
Receive occasional contributions from members
Charge regular membership dues

8
14
1
1
6
3
20
3

12
13
6
10
14
8
11
5

Human resources
Have paid staff

11

13

11

N

Fisher’s exact test

51
1.669
5.006*
50
50
50
50
50
51
50
47

3.463
0.911
6.385*
13.848***
10.728***
5.006*
1.422
1.569

51

CIOAC would be one such example, the only one in the sample.
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2.248*

(Table Continued)
Material resources
Have an office
Have a vehicle
Have a phone
Have a computer
Have access to the Internet
Produce an annual report

17
2
21
13
6
9

16
8
20
13
12
12

Activitiesc
Were active at the time of the interview
Income-generating agricultural projects
Other income-generating projects
Education
Diffusion of information
Advocacy
Research
Charity
Environment management
Cultural activities
Housing provision or improvement
Legal assistance

24
17
14
12
10
8
1
3
10
5
7
3

21
15
12
14
16
10
2
0
3
1
4
6

Goalsc
Economic development
Social development
Sustainability
Environmental conservation
Local institution building
Land distribution
Cultural preservation
Promotion and defense of human rights

19
13
2
8
7
3
6
8

17
16
4
4
12
3
2
5

49
51
47
45
45
51

1.307
6.891*
2.184
1.527
7.348*
2.855

51
1.942
0.489
0.197
2.480
7.322*
1.749
0.719
2.418
2.862
1.942
0.262
2.467
51
0.833
3.970
1.535
0.615
4.948*
0.131
1.272
0.156

*: p<.05, **: p<.01, ***: p<.001.
a
For each item, number of NGOs yielding a positive answer.
b
The subcategories are not exhaustive.
c
Respondents could give several answers.
An effect of organizational scale on financial resources was to be expected. More
national NGOs than local NGOs charge for their services and receive funding from businesses,
international donors, and private citizens. NGOs that are organized at the national or
international level are more bureaucratized than the local NGOs. The operations are divided
between the headquarters and the local representations. The headquarters in Mexico can recruit
professional staff, or representatives that devote time to obtaining funds from national and
international sources. Some organizations, such as CODUC or World Vision, actually centralize
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their financial operation entirely in their headquarters in Mexico City, and dispatch their funds to
the local branches that focus exclusively on recruiting members and implementing projects.
A member of World Vision mentioned that the organization had trouble keeping
qualified staff in management positions in remote areas of the country, such as the Huasteca. On
the contrary, being located in the capital city gives national NGOs access to a pool of
professionals looking for employment. These professionals are more attracted to positions in the
metropolis than in rural areas. Reaching international donors is also easier with skilled staff
members, who can deliver effective proposals, write accounting reports, and also speak English,
in order to get information about international donors in the first place. Mexico City also offers
the advantages of any capital city. The communication facilities are also better than the rest of
the country, since government agencies, businesses, international agencies, and private donors
tend to concentrate in this economic and political center. Concentration of organizations in the
metropolis is probably higher in Mexico than in other countries, due to the highly centralized
nature of the regime for most of the twentieth century. Mexico City is the first industrial center
of the country. At the political level, even if Mexico is a federal state, all decisions and
government budgets pass first in the national legislature and in the national agency headquarters.
NGOs with national headquarters thus have access to a larger pool of financial resources.
Higher bureaucratization is also reflected in the fact that national organizations employ
more paid staff, include operational costs in their budget, and produce an annual report. The last
two elements are sometimes a requirement of donors, and particularly international donors
concerned with financial accountability. Local NGOs are more dependent on volunteers and
members’ personal resources to carry out their activities. For the smaller ones, this delays the
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completion of their projects, or reduces the scope of their activities altogether. If members are
involved in other activities or organizations, the NGO will be put on hold.
Organizational goals and activities vary little with organizational scale. More national
NGOs are involved in the diffusion of information and in local institution building. Diffusion of
information is a significant part of the work of advocacy NGOs concerned with environmental
conservation and the promotion of human rights, including women’s and indigenous rights. It is
also significant for several social movement organizations, which are often linked to a national
headquarters. Likewise, local institution building is a focus for several NGOs involved in
agricultural income-generating projects, but it is a constant in the agenda of social movement
organizations, which again explains the higher proportion of national NGOs that include it in
their goals.
In summary, organizational scale influences the financial and material resources accessed
by NGOs, as well as their level of bureaucratization. In theory, a greater bureaucratization gives
nationally represented organizations a better chance of survival in the long run, because they are
less dependent on individuals such as charismatic leaders. At the same time, national NGOs are
more dependent on external donors, particularly international donors. The criteria for funding
renewal are determined by factors largely outside the control of the NGO. Those who are more
dependent on Mexican funds may be more financially secure in the long run, because they can
pressure funding agencies directly at a lower cost to the organization. Finally, since the activities
and goals of the NGOs in the sample are only marginally affected by organizational scale, both
types of organizations seem to be as responsive- or as indifferent- to local needs.
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6.3.

Geographic Distribution of the NGO Population
The description of the characteristics of the rural NGOs in the sample draws the picture

of a heterogeneous sector, with a high proportion of young organizations, low levels of
institutionalization, and goals focusing on the economic situation of rural populations. In terms
of activities, this means that the majority try to implement income-generating projects. In terms
of their location, it should imply that they will try to attend the poorest segments of the
population. This section examines the geographical distribution of rural NGOs, and its
relationship to characteristics of the municipios, including demography, social development, and
grassroots organizations.
Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of all the rural NGOs identified in San Luis
Potosí by administrative region. Since eleven NGOs were active in all areas of the state, they
were included in the count for each region. Most NGOs, however, concentrated their activity in
one region only, rather than be spatially dispersed. Except for the Huasteca, the four regions are
internally homogeneous both economically and culturally. What is more, even though the
Altiplano and Zona Centro are similar, NGOs do not commonly work in the two areas at the
same time, as if they were constrained by the administrative division of the state.
Regional NGOs are found disproportionately in the Huasteca, followed by the Altiplano.
These areas are typically considered the poorest of the state, even though their physical
characteristics differ widely. The Altiplano has a semi-arid climate, which offers little potential
for agriculture. Population density in this area is extremely low. On the contrary, the Huasteca
benefits from a tropical climate that allows the development of a diversified agriculture. The
region specializes in a few products. The Planicie, in the Northern part of the region, specializes
in cattle ranching, while coffee, oranges, and sugarcane predominate in the Zona Serrana. The
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Altiplano: 23

#

Zona Media: 17
Huasteca: 69

N
#

#

#

Zona Centro: 13

Figure 2: Number of Rural NGOs by Region of Activity (N=89)a
a

The eleven statewide NGOs are included in each region.

Huasteca is characterized by high population density, and is the home of the vast majority of the
Potosinos who speak indigenous languages. Rural NGOs seem to concentrate their activities in
the poorer regions, but primarily on the region with the highest natural potential for
development. NGOs do not work in the most deprived areas, because they lack a minimal level
of resources with which to work.
While rural NGOs regional distribution seems in keeping with an orientation towards the
poorer population, their headquarters, as shown in Figure 3, are overwhelmingly located in urban
areas. The location of NGO headquarters is linked to their regional orientation. In the regional
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capitals of the state, NGOs have access to all services (telephone network, Internet connections,
mechanics, stores for supplies). NGOs staff travel from the regional capitals to their project
locations. As a result, the municipios farther away from the regional capital will require the
heaviest traveling expenses, including time.

#

N

#

Legend
Region
Altiplano
Zona Centro
Zona Media
Huasteca
Number of Headquarters
0
1-2
3-6
7 - 14

Matehuala

San Luis Potosi
#

Rioverde

#

Ciudad Valles

Figure 3: Number of NGO headquarter by Municipio (N=89)
San Luis Potosí, the capital city, is in an area deserted by rural NGOs, but remains the
base for seven NGOs. These are mostly statewide NGOs, the rest of which are based in Ciudad
Valles, the second largest city in the state. Two of the NGOs that work in the Huasteca are also
based in San Luis Potosí. Despite the existence of a fairly good road linking San Luis Potosí to
the Huasteca, the logistics of such an arrangement are demanding. These two NGOs were
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founded by urban professionals, following a typically opportunistic logic. Both tried to take
advantage of funding made available by the INI at the beginning of the 1990s for the promotion
of indigenous rights. Although not indigenous people themselves, the founders of these
organizations had some professional experience with indigenous population. Creating an NGO
was a way for them to strike out on their own. The INI eventually decided to stop funding of
such NGOs. The director doubted their ability to reach their designated beneficiaries, and
considered the traveling costs required by long-distance management a waste of government
funds.
Given the unequal potential of the different regions of the state, are the activities of rural
NGOs different in different areas? To consider this question for the whole population, I use
Vakil’s (1997) classification of NGO activities.12 I did not have enough information on the entire
population to use the more precise inventory of NGO activities presented for the sample in the
previous section. Focusing on the primary activity of the organizations, we uncover regional
differences in the distribution of NGOs by activity. In the Altiplano and the Zona Media,
development NGOs are over-represented. While they represent 54% of the population, they
represent 83.3% of NGOs in the Altiplano, and two-thirds (66.7%) in the Zona Media. Advocacy
NGOs are under-represented in the Altiplano and the Zona Centro. In these semi-arid regions,
they account for only 8.3% of all NGOs, while they are over a quarter (29.9%) of the population.
Over two-thirds (69.2%) of all advocacy NGOs are found in the Huasteca, as well as
nearly all NGOs involved in development education (90.0%). Development education
encompasses local institution building, but also environmental educational and technical
training. In addition, the statewide rural NGO that is listed in this category is the State
12

Presented in the methodology.
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Federation of UAIMs, with headquarters in Ciudad Valles, the main city of the Huasteca. A large
proportion of its activities take place in the Huasteca. Thus, development education in San Luis
Potosí is a regional activity, based in the Huasteca.
Statewide NGOs are the most diverse group in terms of their activities. Of the six
possible activities, five are represented in this group. Only statewide organizations are primarily
involved in networking and research. The existence of an ‘umbrella’ organization at the state
level makes sense to centralize information and concentrate lobbying efforts on the state
government. However, the absence of regionally-based networking NGOs also indicates that
rural NGOs do not seek to coordinate their actions based on geographical proximity. As we shall
see, this is symptomatic of the poor communication and cooperation among NGOs in San Luis
Potosí.
For research NGOs, regionalization would make sense, given the climatic diversity of the
state. Agricultural research must be location-specific to be transferable to the end-users. As a
rule, however, research activities represent only a fraction of the NGO community (Farrington
and Bebbington 1993). They generate high costs for NGOs, which often have only scarce
resources to spare. Moreover, it requires planning over the long term and no tangible benefits for
the target population in the short term. NGOs usually concentrate on activities that can answer
the needs of their beneficiaries in the short-term using existing technology. In San Luis Potosí,
two NGOs (Fundación Produce and the Unión Ganadera Regional) are involved in agricultural
research, mainly to remedy the disengagement of the state in agricultural research and extension.
They are part of national networks of NGOs. In the case of Fundación Produce, the NGO
coordinates its activities with the public research centers, located in all regions of the state. This
way, the program of investigation can be adapted to the needs of local users.
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A certain regionalization of NGO activities exists in San Luis Potosí. In the semi-arid
part of the state, development activities, in the form of income-generating projects, take
precedence, while advocacy NGOs are less represented. The NGO community is more
production-oriented, consistent with Korten’s (1987) ‘second generation’ of NGOs. Second
generation NGOs focus on developing self-reliance by implementing community projects similar
to government projects, without trying to address the causes of poverty or inequality. In the
Huasteca, on the contrary, advocacy and development education play an important role. The
NGO community is more policy-oriented, leaning towards Korten’s third generation. These
NGOs aim to develop sustainable systems by trying to affect public policy at the regional or
national level. Advocacy NGOs often fall into this category.
6.4.

Location in Relation to Social Indicators
I have established the existence of regional discrepancies for the population of rural

NGOs in San Luis Potosí, in territorial coverage, and their activities. The analysis of the sample
of NGOs allows us to examine in more detail the geographical distribution of NGO projects, and
their possible link to economic and social characteristics of the municipios. In my interviews, I
asked respondents to list the locations where their NGO was active. Originally, I had intended to
get information at the community13 level, but it was impossible to get such detailed data for the
whole sample. Only a portion of the sample NGOs keep track of the list of locations where they
are active. The others were not always able, or willing, to recall it from memory. Depending on
their activities, NGOs did not necessarily operate at this level. Social movement organizations,

13

The words comunidad (community) or localidad (locality) in Mexico refer to the smallest
political units, and usually count less than 2,500 inhabitants. I will use community as a
translation for these two terms.
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for instance, count their membership at the municipio level. Thus, I shifted the unit of analysis to
the municipio level.
On average, the NGOs in the sample work in nine municipios, and their scale ranges from
one to 58. Statewide organizations, by definition, work in more municipios than other NGOs (41
on average), but they represent a small proportion of the sample. Of the seven statewide NGOs
included, only four had information on geographical distribution. If they are excluded, the
sample of 44 local NGOs is present in an average of five municipios. NGOs in the Altiplano
work in 4.2 municipios, and those in the Huasteca almost five.14 The four local NGOs in the
Zona Centro and the Zona Media work in an average of five municipios. NGOs may have a
regional orientation, but only cover a fraction of the municipios in each region. Given their
relatively young age and uneven level of organizational development, they have not saturated
their spatial territory.
Figure 4 shows the number of NGOs in the sample that were present in each municipio,
including the four statewide NGOs that gave their coverage, two of which present in all of the 58
municipios. On average, seven of the NGOs of the sample work in each municipio, but the map
reveals sharp contrasts within and between regions. A small number of municipios in the
Huasteca attract most NGO activity, while large areas of the Altiplano and the Zona Centro are
left unattended. The most covered area of the Huasteca is the Planicie, the lowland area
comprising the Northern half, which is devoted to cattle ranching. In the Zona Centro, the
municipio of San Luis Potosí is the only one to receive special attention. In the Altiplano, the
municipio of the regional capital, Matehuala, also gets extensive coverage. Both of these have
14

An ANOVA (not shown) performed on the average number of municipios by region was
inconclusive, but the number of municipios varies more within regions than between regions.
Region of operation is not a good predictor of geographic outreach for this sample.
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large rural areas. The area of the Altiplano that receives less coverage is the farthest away from
Matehuala.

Legend
Region
Altiplano
Zona Centro
Zona Media
Huasteca
Number of NGOs
3-5
6-8
9 - 11
12 - 18

N

Figure 4: Number of Sample NGOs Active in Each Municipio (N=47)
In the Huasteca too, access is an issue. Even though the area is smaller than the vast
Altiplano, the Southern half is mountainous. Building and maintaining roads in the torrential
summer rains is difficult, and the constant twisting and turning of the roads limit the traveling
speed. Remote communities are only accessible by foot. Traveling smaller distances takes much
longer in the Huasteca than in the other regions of the state. The three municipios with minimal
NGO presence, Tanquián de Escobedo, the only municipio of the Huasteca in the three to five
category, and San Vicente Tancuayalab and San Martín Chalchicuautla, are the most difficult to
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access from the main roads. The municipios farther away from urban centers in each region
receive less attention from the NGOs in the sample.
As population ecology suggests, NGOs work at the regional level rather than dispersing.
Most of them work in contiguous municipios, rather than in municipios that are distant from one
another. In the Huasteca, for instance, they work either in the Planicie or the Zona Serrana, the
mountainous Southern part, but not in municipios spread across both areas. Other than being
more efficient to organize visits, this ensures greater homogeneity of the municipios
characteristics. This does not mean, however, that they will work in clusters of communities
within the same municipio.15
Do other characteristics of the municipios, besides ease of access, account for this
distribution of NGOs? Resource-dependence theory argues that NGOs should work where they
find sufficient resources to ensure their survival. To test this idea, I first examined the
relationship between the number of NGOs in each municipio and social and economic data. This
analysis allows direct examination of the resources that beneficiaries may provide.16 The data on
municipio characteristics come from the 2000 census of the Mexican population, carried out by
the INEGI.17
The first important resource is the size of the population, and particularly the rural
population, of the municipio. Next, characteristics of the population that may affect NGO
presence are included. Here, I will check for a possible relationship between NGO presence and
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The results of this analysis cannot be shown here, because they would require one map for
each NGO in the sample. In the next chapter, I develop a case study that supports this point.
16

The issue of funding will be addressed in the next chapter.

17

Its results are generally considered reasonably reliable, probably not as much as the US Census
Bureau, but far superior to what would be available in other Third-World countries.
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migration. Migration in Mexico, either to cities or to the United States, is a widespread
phenomenon. It affects the composition of the population by income, age, and gender, and thus
the pool of potential participants in NGO projects. I will then use the proportion of people who
speak an indigenous language as an indicator of ethnic diversity. The Mexican census does not
use racial and ethnic categories comparable to those of the US census, so the linguistic criterion
is the only available indicator of the size of the indigenous population. Given the negative
stereotypes attached to indigenous origin in Mexico, it is more reliable than asking directly for
ethnic background, because some people, motivated by social desirability, would deny their
indigenous origin.
Second, I will look directly at the level of poverty in the municipio, to examine whether
NGOs in San Luis Potosí follow the pattern of location in poor areas, but still not in the poorest.
In addition to measures of income, the availability of social infrastructure, and literacy that are
available in the census, I will use an index of marginality that the CONAPO (Mexican National
Population Council) computes based on these individual measures.18 The index aims to measure
access to goods and services, combining measures of the level of education of the population,
quality of housing, population density, size of the community, and income. Based on the index,
CONAPO publishes grades of marginality (five categories, from very low to very high
marginality) for each state, municipio, and community in Mexico. Table 9 presents the
correlation between resource and poverty dimensions and the number of NGOs present in each
municipio. Only results that reflect an existing linear correlation on the scatter plot are

18

In keeping with World Bank documents, I translate the Spanish índice de marginación as
index of marginality (see World Bank 1999a and 1999b).
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mentioned. The others are considered non significant, because Pearson’s coefficient is not a
valid measure of nonlinear correlation.
Table 9: Correlation Between the Characteristics of the Municipios and the Number of Rural
NGOsa, b
Characteristics of the Municipios
Human Resources
Population
Population density
Percentage of rural population
Percentage of out-migration
Percentage of international out-migration
Percentage of the population who speaks an indigenous languagec

Correlation with the
Number of NGOs
0.229
0.196
0.097
-0.156
-0.489**e
0.450**

Poverty
0.191
Index of marginalityd
-0.357
Percentage of alphabetized population
-0.154
Percentage of dwellings with running water
-0.378
Percentage of dwellings with electricity
-0.242
Percentage of dwellings with drainage
Percentage of the occupied population earning no more than the
0.565**
minimum wage
*: p<.05, **: p<.01.
a
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, unless otherwise indicated.
b
For 47 rural NGOs and 57 municipios. The municipio of San Luis Potosí was excluded because
it is an outlier for most variables.
c
Only for the 25 municipios of San Luis Potosí that are classified as indigenous areas.
d
Spearman’s correlation coefficient
e
Where the percentage of people who speak indigenous languages differs from 0.
Looking first at the relation between NGO presence and human resources, only two of
the variables of interest, ethnic composition and international migration, are linked to the number
of NGOs in each municipio. Population, and even the percentage of rural population, do not
relate to NGO presence in a municipio. Since the sample represents NGOs that are active in rural
areas, it was expected that they locate in areas with a greater proportion of rural dwellers. It is
worth remembering that the Mexican census counts are rural the agglomerations of fewer than
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2,500 inhabitants. When the proportion of rural population increases, the population decreases in
density. NGOs must invest more time and money to reach a dispersed population, but they do
not seem to systematically target areas with lower densities, even though these constitute their
target population.
Only part of the Zona Media, and the Huasteca, are considered indigenous areas in San
Luis Potosí. In the rest of the state, the proportion of the population that speaks an indigenous
language is negligible and dispersed. Thus, I analyzed only the relation between ethnic
composition and the number of NGO projects in the indigenous areas, or 25 municipios. In
indigenous areas, the proportion of indigenous people correlates positively with the number of
NGO projects. Some NGOs directly target indigenous populations, or were created by
indigenous groups, to address their generally lower standards of living. The indigenous
population is disproportionately found in the poorer, more rural, and less educated segments of
the Mexican population. Targeting indigenous people is a way to target poverty.
Migration and NGO presence are also related. Although the percentage of total outmigration is not a significant factor, international migration to the United States is significant.
Higher levels of international migration are associated with fewer NGO projects. Figure 5 shows
that international migration is located in the Western part of the Altiplano, the most desertic,
isolated part of the state, and mostly in the Zona Media. In these two areas, migration to the
United States is a long-term tradition, part of what Kandel and Massey (2002) label a culture of
migration. Fathers and their sons leave the home to earn a living North of the Rio Grande, and
send remittances to their wives and children.
Migration to the United States is qualitatively different from migration to the city or to
other states. Usually, it involves men who leave their dependents behind, and involves longer
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Figure 5: Percentage of International Migration from San Luis Potosi, by Municipio (Source:
INEGI, 2001).
stays (Massey, Durand, and Alarcón 1987). On the contrary, in rural areas, families who move
temporarily to other states to work as harvesters do so as part of their yearly work cycle and
maintain the integrity of the family unit at all times. Where people move to the city, they have
more opportunities to visit their homes: links between place of origin and site of migration
remain stronger.
Moreover, Mexico remains a patriarchal society, where men, particularly in rural areas,
retain almost all the decision power in the family (Townsend et al. 2000). Respondents in NGOs
and state organizations mentioned that the migration of men to the United States influences the
likelihood of starting development projects in communities with high rates of migration.
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Agricultural activities are usually controlled by the men, so income-generating projects focused
on increasing agricultural production are more difficult to implement, because their primary
target population, working men, is reduced. Men do not easily relinquish control of agricultural
activities to women. On the contrary, projects that are directed primarily at women are more
successful when the male head of the household is gone. Wives gain greater autonomy, and
invest in activities of their own such as cooperatives for the production of corn tortillas, sewing
workshops, or the production of cosmetics with local medicinal plants. The interaction of gender,
migration, and rural development is a complex phenomenon that deserves further investigation.
If the spacial distribution of NGOs was the result purely of a strategy targeting the
poorest municipios, the number of NGOs should be correlated with all or a majority of social
indicators. Table 9, however, shows that the number of NGOs does not increase significantly
with the degree of marginality, or with any of the social indicators. Nationally, the state is
considered to have a high degree of marginality. Its index of marginality is the sixth highest in
the country (CONAPO 2001). Figure 6 shows that all the regions of the state have a high
proportion of municipios with a high marginality, but all the municipios with a very high degree
of marginality, except for one, are located in the mountainous Southern half of the Huasteca. The
greater proportion of NGOs here would be consistent with a focus on poorer areas.
The only indicator that correlates significantly with the number of NGOs by municipio, is
the percentage of the population that earns the minimum wage.19 Given that many of the NGOs
in the sample implement income-generating projects, it is unsurprising that areas where a large
proportion of the population finds itself unemployed, underemployed, or with limited financial
resources, would respond better. People are interested in projects that promise to improve their
19

The equivalent of about $400/month.
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Figure 6: Degree of Marginality by Municipio (Source: CONAPO, 2001).
economic situation. The social environment, measured either in terms of levels of education or
social infrastructure, bear little relation to NGO involvement in a municipio. This would suggest
that NGOs have a unidimensional conception of poverty, based on income only, even though the
majority of them include social development in their mission. I will further examine how NGO
strategies and poverty are connected in the next section.
The municipio is probably not the best level of aggregation for an analysis of the location
of NGOs that implement projects in communities. Marginality varies by communities, and the
aggregate measure at the municipio level does not reflect the high variation within each
municipio. Many informants pointed out that fewer communities may be classified with a very
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high degree of marginality in the Altiplano than in the Huasteca, but the intensity of poverty
there is often far higher, due to the harsh climate of the Altiplano. The municipio level does not
reveal whether NGOs concentrate on the most marginal communities. To get to this more
detailed level of analysis, I examine the community location of one particular NGO that focuses
on community-level projects in the next chapter.
In sum, rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí are found in greater numbers in the poorer regions
of the state. For this sample, their number in each municipio increases with the proportion of
people with low incomes. However, their presence is not linked to the level of social
development, suggesting a focus on only one dimension of poverty. In addition, with the data
available, it is impossible to tell whether they reach the poorest people. NGOs with highly
localized impact could select the poorer municipios, but still work with the better off
communities and beneficiaries in these municipios. This caveat is supported by the fact that their
dependence on the modern facilities of urban areas prevent them from reaching the most isolated
areas. In order to understand whether these patterns, as well as the effects of the intensity of
international migration and ethnic diversity, on NGO presence, I now turn to an examination of
NGO strategies of geographical expansion.
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CHAPTER 7: NGO STRATEGIES AND PROJECT LOCATION
7.1.

Case Study: the Mexican Foundation for Rural Development
7.1.1. History and Structure of the FMDR
The Fundación Mexicana para el Desarrollo Rural (Mexican Foundation for Rural

Development) is the largest and most renowned rural development NGO in Mexico. Created in
1969 by a group of business philanthropists, it now operates 35 local branches, or centrales, in
25 of the 31 Mexican states, employs over 300 professionals, and reaches over 11,800 rural
families (FMDR 2002). The logo FMDR is now attractive to individuals who are planning to
start a rural development NGO. As one board member explains, ‘there are many individuals who
want to join. There are people who come and ask me: What do I do to work with the
Foundation? Is there a franchise?’. The FMDR enjoys national and international legitimacy, to
the point where development agents in Mexico look at it as a trademark.
In San Luis Potosí, three centrales in the Altiplano, the Zona Centro, and the Zona Media
are affiliated with this national organization. As one of the few institutionalized NGOs in
Mexico and in San Luis Potosí, the FMDR lends itself to an examination of how NGO strategy
can account for project location. The FMDR, contrary to most of the NGOs in San Luis Potosí,
has a clear mission statement, strategy, and method that it applies to locate beneficiaries and
implement projects. I will use it here not as representing an ‘average’ NGO, but a ‘best case
scenario,’ to show how much NGO strategy accounts for project location.
Like numerous NGOs, the FMDR has religious roots. Unlike many others, they are
combined with strong links with the business sector. The idea initiated in 1963, when a group of
Mexican entrepreneurs, members of the Unión de Empresarios Católicos (Union of Catholic
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Businessmen) decided to unite to fight poverty in the Mexican countryside. Its aim was to
provide an alternative to government policies that were considered inefficient and to avoid
popular support for radical movements akin to the Cuban revolution (Gordon 1998). Initially, the
group identified the lack of access to credit as the main obstacle to rural development for lowincome peasant families. It set out to act as a financial guarantee for creditors. Eventually,
however, there was a realization that credit was not the only problem. In 1969, the group created
the FMDR, and adopted a more comprehensive strategy to address underdevelopment (30 Años
2000).
The FMDR refers to itself as a movement rather than an organization. This does not
indicate any political involvement, but rather a decentralized, network-based organizational
structure. This network encompasses several organizations, the beneficiaries at the grassroots
level, and individuals attracted by its model of development. The organizational structure
consists of federal headquarters in Mexico City, three regional offices, 35 centrales, and the
IMEDER (Mexican Institute of Education for Rural Development). All these organizations are
legally independent from the headquarters in Mexico City. They are registered as asociación
civil in the state where they operate. Each signs a convention of affiliation with the headquarters,
by which they adhere to the principles and methodology of the FMDR. In return, they receive
technical assistance, training, and administrative support, in order to get federal and international
funding.
The main office is responsible for creating the original impulse for each central, but then
each central is supposed to generate its own funds, mainly through donations by local
entrepreneurs, state contracts, and fees charged to the beneficiaries for development assistance.
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Each central also administers its own staff, and designs its own projects. The regional offices act
as the liaison between the headquarters and the local centrales. The country has been divided
vertically in the Northern, central, and Southern zones. The division does not reflect natural
agricultural regions, or cultural homogeneity, but is intended to be cost-effective. The grouping
minimizes traveling costs for regional directors between their headquarters and each central.
Mostly, the regional offices check that the centrales comply with the objectives and methods of
the FMDR, and relay demands for funding or professional training to the national office.
The core principles of the organization reflect this business vision, rather than Catholic
values. References to business concepts permeate the vocabulary of FMDR members, in contrast
to what is heard in other NGOs. One respondent summarizes the vision of the organization in
these terms: ‘The FMDR does not give charity. It makes an investment in the development of the
country’. The directors of the centrales refer to the NGO they manage as “la empresa,” or the
company. The technicians refer to their beneficiaries as “famiempresas,” a contraction of the
words for family and business. The family unit and the economic unit are seen as one and the
same. The underlying idea, as explained by the technicians, is that development should focus on
economic factors first. Economic development will spill over, and lead to social, and cultural
development for the whole family. The ultimate goal is to change the culture of the beneficiaries
to adapt them to the market economy, turning peasants into entrepreneurs, rural replicas of their
urban benefactors. This vision spells out the tenets of the sociological version of modernization
theories of development (Peet 1999).
Until recently, government programs consisted in ‘gifts’ in the form of subsidies,
equipment, or inputs, with no obligation to produce, and no evaluation. This policy was mainly
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meant to secure the ‘green vote’, or campesinos’ vote. From the start, the founders of the FMDR
set out to combat this paternalistic model of rural development implemented by the state, and
deemed economically inefficient. Among its principles, the FMDR emphasizes subsidiarity, by
which it ‘stimulates the development of the rural residents themselves through their own
projects, and avoids doing on their behalf what they can do for themselves,’ and efficiency, or
‘an entrepreneurial vision which must translate into actions which increase productivity and
bring concrete benefits to the campesinos’ (30 Años 2000). The inclusion of efficiency in these
principles emphasized the importance of economic development and quantifiable results.
The remaining principles in the list open the mission to other social aspects of
development: human dignity, solidarity, and respect for nature. The first two principles address
values inspired by the founders’ Catholic background. Yet the mission statement develops the
concept of human dignity to mean that ‘each must be the author of his/her1 own development’
(30 Años 2000). Once again, the emphasis is placed on private initiative and responsibility, in
keeping with the neoliberal turn in development. Finally, following the international shift to
sustainable development, the FMDR has included sustainability as its last principle in 1990
(Gordon 1998). However, it merely reproduces the exact terms of the Brundtland Commission
Report: ‘that the necessities of the present population may not be resolved at the expense of
natural resources that future generations would need to subsist’ (30 Años 2000). All in all, the
principles reflect compliance with the current requirements of the field of rural development, so

1

The Spanish grammatical construction, which cannot be translated in English, is genderneutral.
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that the FMDR may increase its legitimacy at the international level. None of the projects that I
observed in San Luis Potosí focused on ecological sustainability.
The FMDR itself is legally classified as a foundation, not an asociación civil. Its main
function is to channel funds from various donors. The donations it receives from Mexican and
international donors are tax-deductible, which attracts corporate philanthropists. The main
founder of the initial group, and first president of the FMDR, was Lorenzo Servitje Sendra, head
of Bimbo, a large Mexican agribusiness corporation. Since the NGO was created by a group of
business leaders, it has enjoyed support from prominent Mexican companies, as well as several
multinational corporations operating in Mexico, including Microsoft and Nissan. Corporate
support initially represented the main financial resource of the FMDR, and it still provides about
a quarter of its funding. Bimbo remains the number one donor, mostly thanks to the personal
influence of Servitje Sendra. The FMDR is worried about institutionalizing personal ties, so that
it does not lose the support of this corporation in the future.
Although the FMDR had set out to fill up the space left by government agencies in the
country, government funding from the federal, state, and local government agencies is now its
main source of funds at the national level. The shift occurred in the 1990s, when the Mexican
government started to diminish its presence in the countryside, as part of a liberalization of the
Mexican economy and in preparation for the signing of NAFTA. Several government agencies,
including the national extension service, were dismantled or downsized. The farming community
was divided between high-potential units, which conserved access to credit, and marginal
agriculture which received subsidies (Martínez Abundiz 1994). Until then the nationalized banks
were obligated to allocate part of their funds to credit for farmers. With the privatization of the
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banking sector this obligation was removed and financing for small farmers disappeared. The
FMDR, using the connections of its board members with national politicians, established a
partnership with the government to manage credits for the fraction of the peasantry that no
longer had access to the banking system. Since then, the NGO has maintained its close
connection with the successive governments.
7.1.2. Development Strategy
In an attempt to scale up its development efforts, the FMDR has modified its activities,
organizational structure, and geographical distribution. As entrepreneurs, the founders
considered the lack of access to capital as the primary obstacle that farmers had to face in the
1960s, and they had the financial resources to remedy the situation. Thus, credit provision has
always been a fundamental component of their rural development strategy. In recent years, this
activity has gained new legitimacy in the wake of the New Policy Agenda. In Mexico, the
privatization of the banking system and agricultural policy in the 1990s reinforced the necessity
of credit provision by the non-profit sector. Until then banks were mandated to guarantee access
to credit to all farmers. Now, they can exclude the poorest farmers, who do not meet their
requirements. The FMDR stepped in to administer credit for farmers who have lost access to the
banking system.
Originally, the foundation administered loans from its headquarters in Mexico City.
Quickly, however, it adopted a decentralized structure in order to offer both technical assistance
and financial capital. The centrales implement micro-projects that use the funding channeled by
the FMDR, offering a wide array of services from technical training to market studies and local
institution building. New government guidelines restricting the funding to groups of
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beneficiaries instead of individual farmers, has reinforced the role of FMDR technicians as group
supervisors.
The FMDR strategy for creating new centrales determines the geographical
implementation of the NGO, and its ability to extend its geographical reach in the future. At its
heart is the reliance on the local business community to start up the new organization. In order to
receive the ‘label FMDR,’ a new organization must rely on a board of members who are part of
the local business community, as explained by a board member in San Luis Potosí:
The FMDR has a body of entrepreneurs, with relations in many states. One knows
someone in a state, who is dynamic. He talks to him, they form a group, and the
FMDR decides to create a central... Each central has an initial nucleus of people
who support the organization in its financing, above all at the beginning.
Someone is contacted, he is enthusiastic... The person has to have a certain
profile, knowledge of the rural environment, businesses in rural areas. After that a
group of people is contacted, who define the work area, the type of projects, the
first contacts with rural areas, the reconnaissance of the area. At first, the costs are
absorbed by the group... The initial group donates money from their personal
funds. Multiples of minimum wages, and each gives what he can. But there is a
fiscal plan behind. The FMDR, as an asociación civil, gets deductibility for the
businesses that give. Therefore the initial group speaks with businesses to have
them give, until they form a critical mass.
The move to a decentralized structure originated with some entrepreneurs’ desire to be
involved in rural development at the local level in their region of origin (30 Años 2000). Now,
the creation of centrales may come from the foundation itself, or from local initiative. In all
cases, it depends on the good will of the business community, and on informal social network in
the Mexican business community. If the headquarters deem that an area needs a central, the
board members look among their acquaintances for a motivated entrepreneur in the area, and ask
him to start the central. A central cannot be created without fruitful business contacts, no matter
how interested other individuals, such as agriculturalists and social activists, might be. The
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reason for this is the necessity to raise the initial sum of money that will finance the creation of
the central until it can rely on government projects and service fees to cover its operating costs.
San Luis Potosí offers a good illustration of the constraints that arise from dependence on
the business community. The first central was founded in the Zona Centro in 1977, as a result of
personal contacts between local entrepreneurs and FMDR board members. One of its founders, a
respected ecclesiastic involved in rural development policies since the early 1970s, in charge of
the rural pastoral for the bishop of San Luis Potosí, was from Rioverde, the main city of the Zona
Media. He was eager to start a central there too, and started talking to local businessmen.
However, a first attempt failed in 1977. A second attempt, three years later, involved
representatives of the headquarters who helped the second central take off. In 1985, the third
central was founded in the Altiplano region. Here too, the initiative came from the FMDR in
Mexico City, which called on a local entrepreneur in the mining industry to support the central
of the Zona Centro. This was intended to cover the whole semi-desertic area of the state of San
Luis Potosí. This entrepreneur, however, since he was from the Northern part of the state, offered
instead support for a new office in Matehuala, which would operate in his native region. The
FMDR, after conducting a feasibility study, agreed to the creation of the third central.
In the FMDR mission statement, the board members vouch to alleviate rural poverty.
However, looking at the location of the centrales in San Luis Potosí, and the distribution of
centrales around the country, it does not seem that the NGO concentrates its activities in the
poorest areas. A staff member confesses:
The opening of the centrales responds much to the initiative of local
entrepreneurs. It does not respond to a logic of necessity. If we followed this
logic, we should not be where we are. We should be in Guerrero, Tabasco, more
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in Chiapas, in the Southern part, but this is where the entrepreneurial strength is
the weakest...
The FMDR is now present in Chiapas, the lowest state for many social indicators, and in one
central in Tabasco. Guerrero exhibits comparable levels of poverty, and is a predominantly rural
state, but few NGOs are active there. The whole state is in a mountainous area, which makes
most communities difficult to access, and dangerous, as it provides shelter to several guerrilla
groups. In contrast, states with high general levels of social and economic development, such as
Jalisco, Chihuahua, or the state of Mexico, count several FMDR-affiliated centrales. The NGO
is also present in some of the most developed states, including Nuevo León and Campeche. The
goal of reaching the poor does not translate into a concentration of activity in the poorest states,
where it could theoretically reach a larger portion of its target population.
At the regional level, the same observation stands. In San Luis Potosí, the FMDR is
absent from the Huasteca, despite the high levels of rural poverty recorded. The FMDR is aware
of the need for work in the area, but efforts to promote the idea among local entrepreneurs have
failed. Respondents blame this failure on two factors. First, the economic divide in the Huasteca
roughly follows ethnic lines. The economic elite is mostly composed of criollos, or descendent
of Spanish conquerors, while indigenous people form a large proportion of the poor peasant
group. Ethnic and political conflict are latent, and caciques still rule over the campesinos.
Second, some argue that the business community in the Huasteca has developed more recently
than in the rest of the state. Business owners are still in the process of consolidating their
companies, and are not yet ready to dedicate some of their resources to charitable enterprises.
These two factors are actually linked. Businesses in the Huasteca are often linked to agricultural
production, and the community of entrepreneurs overlaps with the rural landowning elite that has
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controlled the Huasteca since the Spanish conquest. Class and ethnic interests combine to hinder
rural development.
The geographical distribution of FMDR offices at the state and regional level shows that
despite the board members’ altruistic intentions, the dependency on a local business community
leads to the elimination of many of locations with a large proportion of poor campesinos who
would benefit from the presence of a well-structured rural development NGO. However, in the
regions where it is active, the FMDR may still be able to reach the poorer segment of the local
population. A look at the strategy used by the three centrales in San Luis Potosí to recruit
beneficiaries will illuminate this point.
7.1.3. Project Locations in San Luis Potosí
The FMDR strategy for geographical location can be decomposed into three levels. First,
at the national level, the board and staff select potential regions for implementation of new
centrales. Second, at the central level, the local board decides which projects to carry out, and
the staff defines the region of operation. Third, at the grassroots level, each technician adapts the
methods used to promote the projects to local conditions. At the level of the centrales, the
development strategy centers around the implementation of micro-projects, involving organized
groups of beneficiaries.
The type of project to be implemented is decided by the local board, after a regional
diagnosis that assesses the agricultural potential of the community, and an evaluation of
beneficiaries’ requests. The FMDR, however, is currently moving away from this participatory
approach where beneficiaries are involved in deciding the type of project. In an effort to scale up
the impact of the micro-projects, the headquarters recently decided to focus on replicating a few

162

successful projects in vast areas of the country, instead of developing projects that are specific to
a micro-region. The FMDR could thus gain and transmit greater expertise to the centrales, and
then to the beneficiaries, and also improve the bargaining power of the farmers by bringing
purchasers greater quantities of agricultural goods.
In San Luis Potosí, the evolution of activities and project locations reflect this strategy.
The Altiplano, the Zona Centro, and a large part of the Zona Media endure a semi-arid climate.
As such, the three centrales have now turned to the development of goat farming. When
describing the decision process, staff members usually explain that when the central was created,
a diagnosis was made, the potential for goat production was established, the best area for
implementation was delimited, and the technicians began to promote the project to the
campesinos. The NGO, in their view, is a rational, goal-oriented actor. In reality, however, the
road leading to the goat farming model was sometimes tortuous, and the activities of the
centrales in the three zones present some variety, guided by other concerns than agricultural
potential. In addition, their assessment excludes socio-economic criteria from the choice of
location, suggesting that, even at the micro-level, the NGO does not reach its target.
The centrales have been in place at least since the mid-1980s, but the groups for which
they presently work date back, at best, to the early 1990s. In the Altiplano and the Zona Media,
goat farming was not the initial focus for different reasons. In the Altiplano, the diagnosis
indicated three possible directions for development based on the existing productions of the
region: crops, goat farming, and irrigated agriculture, to produce alfalfa. Irrigation was chosen
because of its potential to generate an income in the short term. However, irrigated systems
require substantial investments, which put many in debts. In addition, water in the Altiplano, and
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in most of Mexico, is a scarce resource and a cause of conflict. The central found itself in the
delicate position of having to negotiate campesino debt at a time when the government was
privatizing the banking system, and trying not to antagonize local politicians and latifundistas
who were trying to protect their political or economic advantage. In the Zona Media, the central
initially emphasized social development over economic development, with projects on
healthcare education or water and sewage infrastructure.
In both areas, change came with the intervention of the government. SEDARH contracted
the three centrales to develop goat farming at the state level. In the Zona Media, the central was
involved in a nationally negotiated contract between the FMDR and SAGARPA where the
centrales were responsible for the implementation of income-generating projects intended to be
economically sustainable in a 5-year term (see Gordon 1998). In both cases the government
provided funding and the FMDR the technical expertise. The agreement was part of the
reduction of the public sector, where the government does not provide agricultural extension
directly, but contracts it out to the nonprofit sector. The current development strategy has as
much to do with resource-dependence as with internal strategy. The centrales developed the goat
farming program, but the availability of government funds accelerated its implementation.
Both internal strategy and resource-dependence dictates diversification of activities. In
the Zona Centro and the Zona Media, where cattle farming is a traditional activity, the FMDR
works with groups of cattle farmers. The NGO responds to local demand, rather than turning
down the producers who solicit assistance. Even though the technical potential of the area is low,
owing to its harsh climate, the country’s deficit in dairy production makes it a viable option. As
some technicians mention, working with what beneficiaries know is also easier than to try and
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convert them to new activities. Finally, in the three regions, the centrales work with women’s
groups. In this fashion, they continue the work initiated in social development, but also channel
funds from PROEM and other government programs destined specially to women. In the Zona
Media, for instance, some funds come from Mujeres en Desarrollo Rural (Women in Rural
Development), a branch of PROCAMPO.
How do these strategic and financial constraints translate into locational impacts for
FMDR projects? The strategy of implementation does not focus on locating the beneficiaries
with the lowest incomes, but on cost-benefit analyses and quantitative targets set at the national
level. Inspired by business-minded board members, sensitive to catchy slogans and quantitative
measures of productivity, the FMDR announced that it aims to organize 10,000 cooperatives by
the year 2010 (30 Años 2000). For each technician in San Luis Potosí this translates into
attending 100 campesinos, gathering a total of 8,000 goats. The centrales are thus adapting their
promotion strategy to this organizational imperative. The decisive factor in the choice of sites is
now the concentration of goats in an area, not the situation of the producers. Technicians are
usually assigned one municipio, where they work with several communities or ejidos. Moreover,
in the Zona Centro, the operations are limited to a 100-km radius around the office in San Luis
Potosí, based on a cost-benefit analysis. Outside this perimeter, the investment in technician time
and transportation it deemed prohibitive.
Figure 7 shows how these normative and economic constraints translate into an uneven
geographical distribution at the municipio level. While the centrales of Matehuala and Rioverde
work in the municipios around their main office, the central in San Luis Potosí works in
dispersed locations. It even covers two municipios that are administratively part of the Altiplano
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region, Venado and Moctezuma (on the map, the two municipios in the Southwestern Altiplano).
In the Zona Media, because of the focus on goat farming, the activities are concentrated in more
arid areas, and for the most part, outside the Pame area. In the Altiplano, the Western region is
left unattended. This part of the state is the most arid and least populated, and experiences higher
than average rates of migration.
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Figure 7: Number of FMDR Groups in San Luis Potosí, by Municipio
How does the spatial distribution of the FMDR compare to the level of poverty at the
municipio level? Of the seventeen municipios where the centrales work, three have a low level
of marginality, three a medium level, and eleven (nearly two-thirds) a high level. The FMDR is
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absent from municipios at both ends of the classification, i.e. those with a very high or a very
low level of marginality. At the municipio level, the FMDR appears to be present in areas that
are considered disadvantaged, but not the most disadvantaged ones. It is also present in areas that
have achieved acceptable levels of integration, which arguably do not justify the help of a
development NGO. The pattern described at the national and regional level is reproduced at the
municipal level.
To get a more exact picture of FMDR project location, we need to examine the
community level. Unfortunately, some localities are not officially recognized, or have only been
added to the census recently, so they are not inventoried. Geographical data are not available at
this detailed level in a format that can be included here. Relying on technicians’ accounts, the
pattern that emerges is that of clusters of communities in micro-regions of the state. Above all in
the Altiplano, it is frequent for technicians to work in several communities that are only a few
kilometers apart. The areas that have been identified as having a high potential correspond to
these clusters, where goat farmers have more livestock, and are present in greater numbers.
The criteria above do not include characteristics of the beneficiaries. However, based on
community-level indicators, the centrales are reaching a segment of the population that is poorer
than the average population. Table 10 shows the distribution of communities according to their
marginality by municipio, and the proportion reached by the FMDR. On average, the proportion
of highly marginal communities with which FMDR technicians work is higher than the
proportion they represent for the whole municipio. In addition, FMDR technicians rarely work
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Table 10: Comparison between the Proportion of Communities in Each Level of Marginality, for
the whole Municipio, and for the Communities Where the FMDR Works.
Level of Marginality

Very Low

Low

Medium

High

Very High

Municipioa
Catorce (73)
Cedral (44)
Cerritos (38)
Ciudad del Maíz (7)
Ciudad Fernández (47)
Matehuala (94)
Mexquitic de Carmona (106)
Moctezuma (100)
Rayon (52)
Rioverde (171)
Vanegas (26)
Venado (85)
Villa de Guadalupe (53)
Villa de la Paz (10)
Villa de Reyes (74)
Villa Juárez (21)
Zaragoza (86)

1.4%
0.0%
2.6%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
0.9%
1.0%
0.0%
1.2%
0.0%
1.2%
0.0%
10.0%
2.7%
0.0%
0.0%

2.7%
2.3%
2.6%
1,4%
2.1%
2.1%
11.3%
0.0%
1.9%
0.0%
3.9%
1.2%
0.0%
20.0%
8.1%
4.8%
2.3%

8.2%
18.2%
15.8%
1.4%
19.2%
16.0%
33.0%
5.0%
9.7%
5.9%
3.9%
4.7%
24.6%
40.0%
29.8%
4.8%
15.1%

23.3%
61.4%
29.0%
29.6%
40.4%
42.6%
34.0%
12.0%
27.0%
19.9%
27.0%
17.7%
37.8%
20.0%
28.4%
42.9%
39.6%

64.4%
18.2%
50.0%
67.6%
38.3%
38.3%
20.8%
82.0%
61.5%
73.1%
65.4%
75.3%
37.8%
10.0%
31.1%
47.6%
43.0%

1.0%

3.0%

13.7%

29.5%

52.9%

Catorce (9)
Cedral (9)
Cerritos (6)
Ciudad del Maíz (5)
Ciudad Fernández (1)
Matehuala (10)
Mexquitic de Carmona (1)
Moctezuma (14)
Rayon (5)
Rioverde (15)
Vanegas (12)
Venado (5)
Villa de Guadalupe (12)
Villa de la Paz (6)
Villa de Reyes (7)
Villa Juárez (3)
Zaragoza (1)

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
6.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%

0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%
10.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
33.3%
8.3%
0.0%
8.3%
50.0%
85.7%
0.0%
0.0%

33.3%
44.4%
0.0%
60.0%
0.0%
60.0%
0.0%
14.3%
60.0%
26.7%
25.0%
20.0%
58.3%
33.3%
14.3%
33.3%
100.0%

66.7%
22.2%
100.0%
20.0%
0.0%
30.0%
100.0%
85.7%
20.0%
33.3%
66.7%
80.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%

Mean

0.8%

2.5%

18.2%

33.9%

Mean
FMDR Communitiesb

a
b

In parentheses: total number of communities in the municipio.
In parentheses: number of communities where the FMDR is working.
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44.63%

with non-marginal communities.2 However, highly marginal communities are under-represented
as locations for FMDR projects, and communities with a medium level of marginality are overrepresented. The FMDR fits the profile of an NGO that reaches a disadvantaged segment of the
population, but not the poorest.
One reason why the FMDR in San Luis Potosí targets a poor segment of the rural
population, even though it is not part of its selection criteria, may be its focus on goat
production. On the Mexican Altiplano, which represents the area of activity of the three
centrales, goat farming is traditionally considered a low-skill, degrading activity, that is often
left to the elderly or the children. Goats are considered detrimental to the pastures, and little
effort is made to improve their productivity. Farmers who have a higher economic status invest
in activities that are considered more prestigious, such as cattle farming, grain, or dairy
production. As a result, goat farmers are often poorer than average, and communities where goat
farming is a predominant activity exhibit high levels of marginality.
This can be confirmed by looking at the marginality of the communities where the
FMDR does not focus on goat farming. Of the 31 projects that fall in this category, fourteen, or
nearly half, are in communities with a medium, low, or very low level of marginality. For the
total number of projects, the proportion falls to just over a fifth (21.5%). Ten of these projects
(32.3%) are in marginal communities, and seven (22.6%) in highly marginal communities. The
distribution is skewed toward more favored communities, which are not the most in need of
development projects. This shows that the choice of productive activities influences the level of

2

Non-marginal communities are those that fall in the categories ‘low’ or ‘very low’ of the index
of marginality classification.
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poverty of the beneficiaries, and of the communities where they live. In other parts of Mexico,
the choice of a production that is too costly for poor campesinos, such as irrigated crops or dairy
farming, explains in part that it does not work where it is needed the most.
In addition, the FMDR does not work in all its target communities because it sometimes
fails to create a viable group. To promote the projects, the technicians usually follow official
channels. They ask local authorities to participate in a community assembly, where they briefly
expose the project, and invite interested campesinos to an information meeting. Most insist that
people’s motivation- their willingness to work or invest in the project- are crucial to the success
of a group. Yet, while some focus exclusively on individual characteristics of the campesinos in
explaining the success or failure of a group, or blame themselves for not being able to generate
interest, it appears that structural characteristics of the communities also have an impact, though
they were not part of the initial selection criteria.
When asked what factors make their work easier, or promote the success of a project,
FMDR technicians provide a set of explanations that illuminate the location of their projects.
They deem the project to have better chances of success in communities that present some signs
of marginality, but not too many. This justified work in poor communities, but not the poorest.
Non-marginal communities show higher levels of education, and are closer to large cities
(Matehuala, San Luis Potosí, Rioverde), which act as economic magnets. People there only farm
part-time, and rely on urban activities to complement their revenue. They are not interested in
agricultural projects because they are looking for more lucrative opportunities in town.
At the other extreme, communities that exhibit the highest levels of marginality have
given up hope and rely on migration, mostly to ‘el Norte’ (the United States), to survive. In some

170

cases projects were started but failed after a majority or the totality of a community migrated
permanently. Geographically isolated communities are viable project sites where people have
minimal levels of economic assets derived from agriculture. In that case, since they are neglected
by government agencies because they are more difficult to access, they appreciate the interest of
the NGO, and show greater willingness to work. Likewise, a community that has a higher than
average level of education, or is closer to the cabecera municipal,3 far away enough from a main
city, is viewed as showing potential.
The FMDR represents an ideal case in the population of NGOs in San Luis Potosí. Its
well-defined strategy shows how several factors combine in the choice of project location, and
also that geographical factors influence the final implementation of a project. I will now use the
criteria established here, mainly the choice of NGO activity, and geographical characteristics of
the community (geographical isolation, marginality), to show how the rest of the NGOs of San
Luis Potosí justify (of fail to analyze) their location.
7.2.

Classification of NGOs According to Their Expansion Strategy
The literature on NGOs views the location of NGO projects as the result of a strategy

elaborated by an organization before it enters an area. This supposes that the NGO members
either know the area well, or will take time to gather information and establish a diagnosis of the
area before they proceed. The FMDR follows more or less this profile, but even then, other
considerations interfere. As I will show, external factors are even more important for the
majority of the other NGOs in the sample. In this part, I will focus on the explanations that

3

The cabecera municipal is the urban center of a municipio. In addition to being the
administrative center, where most government agencies are based, it is also usually the largest
community in the municipio, and the center of its economic and cultural activity.
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NGOs give for their choice of location, that is, how they describe their strategy, as well as the
factors they consider important for the success of a group.
As a rule NGOs adopt different recruitment strategies depending on whether they are
local initiatives, local branches of a regional or national organization, or were created by a
government agency. In the sample, fifteen NGOs qualify as local, eighteen are local branches of
national NGOs (including the four international NGOs), and fifteen were created by government
initiative. Since the majority of the NGOs in the sample are young, they are still heavily
influenced by the circumstances of their founding.
Local NGOs are typically created at the initiative of one individual, or a group of related
individuals, who react to the problems they encounter in the area where they live and work. They
are usually professionals with altruistic or opportunistic interests. In the first case, they want to
improve the lives of others. In the second, less frequent case, they want to start a new career as
‘nonprofit entrepreneurs.’ In many cases, their geographic scope is limited to their community,
or their municipio. Ecological groups all fall in this category. In Xilitla, for instance, a group of
professionals who had spent most of their life in the municipio got together to address the
problem of deforestation, which has increased dramatically in this area over the past twenty
years. They defined their area as the municipio of Xilitla because they lived there, rather than
trying to identify the areas where deforestation was most intense.
In this case the organization is more likely to depend on a charismatic leader, without a
planned strategy to grow geographically. The strategy is activity-driven: the organization has a
clear goal, and the size of the membership roll is not a concern. If they are successful and
develop a reputation, they will try to respond to new demands, but they are usually limited by
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their lack of funds. Since they do not focus on income-generating projects, they do not manage
to get the attention of rural populations, and to secure funding. Many of these NGOs do not have
a clear organizational structure, or representation at the community level.
The questions on geographic patterns usually did not generate articulate answers from
these organizations, with the exception of more opportunistic professionals, who benefit from
their professional skills in the management of the organization and have included incomegeneration in the NGO activity. Generally, respondents indicated that they worked close to their
base (usually their home), because they lacked the resources to travel. They also let people come
and see them, rather than go and reach them where they live. As a result, they usually do not
reach the marginal communities. Few even state a focus on the poorest as a goal for the
organization.
NGOs that have the support of regional or national organizations have clearer strategies,
but evolve differently. Of the fifteen NGOs that were created by the government, ten originated
with the INI, four with the federal government through SAGARPA, and only one with the local
government, a Presidencia Municipal. These reflect the government’s intention to control
potential unrest in the country, and the recent neoliberal turn to the private sector for operation of
agricultural services. The organizations created by the government include the CNC, the Unión
Ganadera Regional (Regional Union of Stock Breeders), La Forestal, and Fundación Produce
(Produce Foundation), a national network of NGOs that has taken over agricultural
experimentation and information. This last NGO is a true example of a GONGO, or government
NGO. Its agenda is heavily influenced by SAGARPA. At present, it does not have any funding
outside the government.
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The NGOs created through government initiative are all intended to become financially
independent. However, they benefitted from substantial financial aid from the government to get
started, which influenced their geographical expansion. A strategy was defined from the top
down before the organization was created. First, the geographic territory where the organization
would operate was clearly defined, usually matching the jurisdiction of the government agency,
and at times included criteria related to the activities of the NGO. For example, the regional
offices of the INI created a Fondo Regional (Regional Fund) for each ethnic group present in the
state, and these funds operate in all the municipios covered by the local INI office. There are four
funds in San Luis Potosí, the Pame, Teenek, Nahua, and Pupal-Coy funds. The latter is the only
non-ethnic fund, located in the Panicle area, where several ethnic groups are present.
Second, the professional duties of the technicians included the promotion of the NGO,
also had greater financial resources than the local NGOs to saturate their designated area. The
promotion was carried out in all the communities. Most of these NGOs operate in the Huasteca,
which possesses an indigenous radio station.4 The government-generated NGOs also used the
radio to promote their organization. In addition, since the work was done by professional
technicians, they had more resources in terms of time and skills to address potential
beneficiaries. Even if not all the contacted communities wanted to participate, they could be

4

This radio station, XEANT, is part of a national network of indigenous radio stations created by
the INI. The stations are autonomous public organizations. In San Luis Potosí, XEANT
broadcasts in Teenek, Nahua, and Pame. It aims to have one correspondant in each community,
and is training indigenous people in using the equipment and producing their own show.
Ultimately, the management of the station should be transferred entirely to indigenous
communities.
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confident that most people received the information. Local NGOs do not reach this level of
saturation, so that the people who are attracted to it may not be the ones who need it most.
Finally, once the information has been disseminated, government NGOs rely on the selfselection of beneficiaries: only those who are highly motivated will participate in the project.
However, they do not cater to individuals, but to groups, due to the new structure of government
funding. Thus, the NGO needs a minimum number of participants in a community. The
participants receive training in local institution building, and should be self-managing. The NGO
itself has elected representatives in the participating communities. These representatives elect a
council or board, which governs the NGO. The government agency provides the professional
assistance of its technicians. Eventually, the NGO is supposed to become financially
independent, and pay these assessors itself, becoming totally independent of the government.
The decentralized structure of representation is a striking difference between local and
government-generated NGOs. Implementing a bureaucratic structure ensures more direct
participation of the beneficiaries in the decision-making process, and avoids problems of
charismatic leadership, such as leadership transitions or authoritarian personal leadership.
However, it presents two important drawbacks. First, the NGO enters the local communities
from the outside, in a top-down manner. Its creation does not stem from an articulated local
demand, which implies a massive investment in promotion, with low results in terms of
motivation and participation. Second, since the Mexican government has a long history of coopting social movements and grassroots leaders, and of helping campesinos simply to secure
their political support, some potential beneficiaries will choose to stay away from these NGOs.
They distrust the government’s motives. This further limits participation in the organizations.
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The last group of NGOs was created by other NGOs. It combines some of the
characteristics of the two previous groups. As in case of the FMDR, these are the most clearly
guided by an expansion strategy in their choice of location. Yet depending on their activities,
they were attracted to San Luis Potosí for different reasons. A first group of eight NGOs are
professional NGOs focusing on income-generating projects, such as the FMDR. All the
international NGOs fall in this category. They usually do not actively promote their organization
in an area, but respond to a local demand that was generated by their past action in a neighboring
state, or through personal contacts. At the national level, they are usually present in the poorest
states, such as Chiapas or Oaxaca. They agreed to work in San Luis Potosí, in the Altiplano or
most commonly the Huasteca, because of the high levels of poverty. Like government agencies,
they define a work area based on their activities and then promote the projects in all the
communities of the area.
The second group of ten NGOs is composed of the social movement organizations. Their
number at the national level increased rapidly in the 1980s with the beginning of the political
liberalization. Before this, the CNC and the CCI5 had a monopoly on the representation of
campesinos. Now, organizations affiliated to other political parties, or independent from party
politics, exist. Their ultimate goal is to influence public policy, but they use income-generating
projects to attract new members and to secure funds. The local representation was created in
response to a perceived political opportunity. Sometimes, as for the branch of El Barzón, a local
leader sought to join the national organization to increase his/her legitimacy. El Barzón is a
grassroots organizations born in Zacatecas in reaction to the economic crash of 1994. Citizens

5

Two farmers unions created and controlled by the PRI.
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found themselves unable to pay their debts because of the devaluation of the peso, and organized
to pressure the government to restructure their debts with the banks. The Potosino branch, based
in Ciudad Valles, was created by a small businessman who needed this service. He joined El
Barzón because ‘Since we are a strong organization nationally, the authorities respect us... We
have learned to defend ourselves.’ El Barzón now represents Potosinos in urban as well as rural
areas all over the state.
In other cases, the national headquarters of an SMO sent an envoy to evaluate the
potential of the area, based on the political opportunity. Rural areas with high levels of poverty
and a large indigenous population show potential for social unrest that the organization wants to
utilize. They can have a clear goal of geographical expansion because they want to maximize
their membership. They organize meetings in as many municipios as possible to promote their
agenda, and organize demonstrations to pressure the government. Since head count and visibility
are their primary concerns, they have expanded beyond the representation of campesinos.
Several of them, like the UNORCA or Coordinación Plan de Alaya, represent taxi drivers or
urban colonia6 residents.
Focusing on meetings in the cabeceras municipales is a strategy to try and reach the
greatest possible number of potential members, in the most efficient way. However, meetings are
usually limited to the few municipios close to the local headquarters. Since they plan to grow and
cover the entire state, the SMOs try to increase their general visibility, by making extensive use

6

A colonia is a settlement in an urban or rural area, on a private or public property that does not
have a designated use. In some cases they are illegal, while in others the residents try to buy the
land before building their houses. They are a private initiative to address the Mexican housing
crisis. Once they have built their homes, the colonios need to pressure the government for
infrastructure, such as electricity, water, and sewage.
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of the media (radio, television, and newspapers). They are the only type of NGO to do so. In
addition, they use their personal networks to try and start new local branches in the regions that
are farthest away from their headquarters.
NGOs focusing on income-generating projects carry out detailed community-level
diagnoses to assess the needs of the local populations, and the potential of the community. They
define projects at the smallest geographical scale, the community. SMOs, on the contrary, define
their strategy at the regional or national level. Many saw the Huasteca as a region with high
potential for social movements. They targeted the region as a whole, rather than specific groups
of beneficiaries or communities. They do not discriminate in their recruitment based on microlevel location. Their strategy for geographic expansion is to increase membership as quickly as
possible, at the regional level, regardless of the context of each individual community. They rely
on word-of-mouth and media attention to gain support in new communities, rather than
promoting their action at the micro-level.
In the current neoliberal model, the field of development operates under the assumption
that development is a state that all countries can eventually achieve, after they have received
basic help to overcome obstacles such as lack of infrastructure or education (Rist 1996). The
beneficiaries of development projects are thus expected to become self-sufficient after they have
received some external assistance and training to begin on a given activity. The financing
institutions thus grant funding for projects with a set calendar, where an organization enters a
community, sets up the development package, and then leaves the beneficiaries to fend for
themselves. As much as geographical expansion (scaling-up) should be a concern for NGOs,
exiting the community is also expected to be part of their strategy.
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In the sample, however, the only NGO that designed its projects with an end date was
World Vision, an INGO based in Washington, DC. The strategy involves building autonomous
local institutions that have the structure and training necessary to manage the project. Its
calendar indicated that a project consists of three phases of five years each, after which the NGO
is supposed to move on to other communities. Other Mexican-born NGOs, including the FMDR,
did not even understand my question asking them how they were planning to leave a community.
The professional NGOs see themselves as replacing the agricultural extension service. Since
technology and market conditions evolve constantly, they assume that campesinos will always
need some assistance and information, even after they have institutionalized their own grassroots
organizations. The FMDR has already reached a level of loose consulting with some of the
groups it generated, but it never completely ends its relationship with a group. In fact, such
groups are also a financial resource, because their projects have achieved a higher level of
financial sustainability. The SMOs and local NGOs see themselves as intermediaries between
the political authorities and the population. As such, they believe that for each problem they
solve, another will emerge, and they want to keep contact with the community in order to be able
to address it. This difference in strategy shows a fundamental difference between international
and Southern NGOs.
Not all the NGOs in the sample were in a phase of geographical expansion. Some had
reached a point where they considered it more important to consolidate existing groups, or to
diversify their activities. Nevertheless, most were able to analyze the factors that helped or
hindered their actions in communities. In keeping with the focus on NGO analysis on internal
factors, such as leadership or organizational structure, many NGOs attributed success to the

179

structure of the grassroots group. Expressions such as ‘the organization of the group’ or ‘that
they feel like it’ (“que tengan ganas”) came back frequently. In this case, individual
characteristics are perceived to be more important than structural factors.
Yet, structural factors also influence the level of interest in a community. First,
organizations in the Altiplano, but also in the Huasteca, mentioned that communities with high
levels of migration are more difficult to reach. Men who migrate are not interested in investing
in long-term development projects, or in organizations in which they will not be able to
participate directly. Their interest is no longer in agriculture. Only the elderly have left, and they
are not interested in income-generating activities either. The only type of activity for which they
show a higher level of interest than young people are cultural activities to revive indigenous
traditions. Thus, it is probable that the negative correlation between international migration and
NGO presence at the municipio level, would hold at the community level.
Often, the limiting factor that conditioned the geographical location was limited funding,
which pushed NGOs to monitor their traveling costs. Even though the government agencies that
support them face repeated budget cuts, which limit the activity of their technicians,
government-generated NGOs are the least likely to be limited by funding in their geographical
coverage. Compared to the majority of NGOs, they have more equipment, vehicles, and
promotion skills. The bureaucratic organization of the agency will ultimately define the
boundaries of the NGO territory. As a result, the INI has a significant impact on the geography
of NGOs, because it helped to create a number of NGOs that cater specifically to indigenous
populations, thus raising the proportion of NGOs in the Huasteca and the Pame area. No
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government agency had a similar effect in other areas, contributing to the imbalance in the NGO
population between the Huasteca and the rest of the state.
The smaller (and poorer) NGOs confine themselves to the locations closer to the home of
the leaders because they cannot afford to travel. Even a prominent NGO like World Vision
recently restructured its Mexican operations to reduce costs. Initially, World Vision worked in
individual communities that contacted it, all over the country. Since 1995, the NGO has been
working in clusters of between eight and fifteen communities within municipios, divided in five
regions of the country. The regions can be no more than ten hours away from the headquarters in
Mexico City. Inside each region World Vision has a central office instead of having an office in
each of the isolated communities with which it used to work. The logic of this restructuring is to
intensify the work within each region, to scale-up the impact, and to reduce traveling costs to and
from the headquarters, and within each zone. A representative of the Axtla office in the Huasteca
concedes, however, that this strategy means that the most isolated communities in each cluster
are visited less often by the NGO staff.
Like the FMDR and World Vision, other professional NGOs recognize that isolated
communities are more difficult to attend. This is so even though the beneficiaries there may be
more motivated, because they are usually neglected by government organizations. Some of them
rationalize their traveling costs by letting the beneficiaries come and see them in their
headquarters in the cabecera municipal, rather than visit them in the communities. They consider
this a process of natural selection of the most motivated individuals, but in many cases, distance,
not psychological disposition, will select out beneficiaries. In the Huasteca, the residents of the
most remote communities have to travel a couple of hours by foot to reach the cabecera
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municipal on dangerous mountains paths. The same is true of the Altiplano. One of the most
successful NGOs of San Luis Potosí, the Comité Regional del Altiplano (Regional Committee of
the Altiplano) started in two areas, in the Northern and Southern parts of the region. When the
train stopped coming to the Northern area, members could no longer travel easily to the
headquarter, and the groups gradually disintegrated.
The data show that most NGOs operate only in one of the four administrative regions of
the state, and within these regions, tend to focus on a limited number of municipios with similar
characteristics, it does not mean that they will work only with clusters of communities. For
instance, NGOs in the Huasteca will concentrate on the Zona Panicle or the Zona Serrana, but
rarely both, or they will concentrate on the territory of one particular ethnic group. They try to
concentrate in one area, rather than spread their efforts over distant locations, but the temptation
to expand may lead to dispersion within a region. Within municipios, they may have contacts
with dispersed communities. NGO members feel a responsibility to attend to all the people who
contact them. It takes a pro-active change of strategy, as in the case of World Vision, to avoid
dispersion. In the case of SMOs, the goal of regional saturation is often coupled with a desire to
expand the organization throughout the state. The two goals are somewhat contradictory and
may result in a waste of organizational resources, because they are not accompanied by clear
strategies.
Even though it is difficult to assess whether or not NGOs have greater presence than state
agencies in remote areas, it is clear that they are not present in the most remote areas at the
community level, due to the limitation of financial resources. NGO location is more influenced
by the available infrastructure to access to the community, than by the local human resources,
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such as the residents’ level of education, or their financial situation. In fact, several NGOs
commented that it is easier to work with the poorest, because they have fewer development
alternatives, since the government neglects the most resource-poor areas, and people are not able
to gather a minimal level of assets to start a project by themselves. They are thus more dependent
on the NGO’s support.
This does not mean, however, that NGOs will explicitly target the poorest individuals, or
the poorest communities. Contrary to what the discourse on NGOs as rational actors would lead
us to expect, NGOs do not, in most of the cases examined here, plan in advance their expansion.
They respond to local demand and try to make an efficient use of limited resources. Most of
them are present in the Huasteca because it is known to be a poor area of the country, with a
potential for political action that attracts SMOs. However, few of them, generally the best
organized or government-generated NGOs, gather information at the micro-regional level to
prioritize their destinations. Most are not even aware of indicators of poverty. It is thus not
surprising that their presence is not correlated with the index of marginality.
The most important finding about the examination of NGO strategies regarding their
geographic distribution is the lack of a clear strategy, and opportunistic behavior. This may be a
difference between international and Southern NGOs. The literature refers mostly to
international NGOs, but the NGOs in this sample, as in Mexico as a whole, are mostly of
national origin. In any case, NGOs are not in the most marginal areas. Their internal strategies
offer limited explanations for their location, and these strategies are themselves the product of
environmental factors. The limited impact of internal strategy on location is coupled with a
strong emphasis on resource dependency on the part of NGO members.

183

CHAPTER 8: NGOS AND THE STATE:
IS LOCATION THE PRODUCT OF RESOURCE-DEPENDENCE?
According to NGO respondents, their geographic location depends mainly on
communication infrastructure to reach the communities and on their available funds. This
argument fits resource-dependency theory, according to which the survival of individual
organizations depends on their ability to secure vital resources in an uncertain environment. If
this is the case, the date should show that NGOs design their strategy to fit their donors’ agendas
and structure their networks around the acquisition of resources. In this chapter, I will assess the
extent to which this model fits the sample of Potosino NGOs. First, I will describe the
relationship between the geographic distribution of NGOs and two of their main resources,
namely grassroots organizations, which provide a favorable institutional basis at the local level,
and NGO funding sources.
Second, I will analyze the social networks of NGOs, looking at the type of organizations
with which they have contact and the nature of these contacts. According to resourcedependency theory, NGOs should have more contacts with donor organizations than with
organizations that do not provide them with financial resources. Also, their networks should be
shaped by attempts to generate as much information as possible about relevant aspects of their
environment from other organizations. Thus, I will look successively at the contacts NGOs have
with government agencies, from which they derive substantial funding, and at the contacts NGOs
have with each other, including data on the respondents’ evaluation of other NGOs. Finally, I
will present a comparison of two NGOs with different access to resources and networks,
analyzing the consequences of these factors for their activity.
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8.1.

The Structure of Institutional and Financial Resources
The presence of other organizations can be an asset or a disadvantage for NGOs. In

Mexico, government agencies- as donors and regulators- and grassroots organizations, are the
most important types. The presence of grassroots organizations reveals the existence of
organizational skills and motivation among the beneficiaries, and represents available
institutional resources. It reduces the need for local institution-building, and saves time in the
implementation of a project. On the other hand, the presence of other NGOs, or government
agencies, is an asset only if cooperation is possible. If the organizations perceive themselves as
competing against each other, they are likely to interfere in each other’s work, or at best, be
indifferent to each other.
In Table 11, I present the correlations between the number of NGO projects, and the
number of grassroots organizations by municipio. The level of activity at the grassroots is
measured by the number of uniones de ejidos, SSS, and SPR. Other types of grassroots
organizations do exist, such as UAIMs, savings groups, but data on their distribution were not
available. In addition, data did not exist at the community level, and was aggregated at the
municipio level. As a result, the conclusions of this section are suggestive rather than definitive.
Table 11: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Organizational Development and Number of
rural NGOs in the Municipios of San Luis Potosí.a
Organizational Development

Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient

0.091
Number of uniones de ejidosb
Number of SSS
0.437
Number of SPR
-0.239
Number of all grassroots organizations
-0.059
a
Results available for 49 rural NGOs in the sample.
b
Uniones de ejidos exist only in 9 municipios.
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The presence of a large number of grassroots organizations should facilitate the
establishment of an NGO project in a community, because they represent a resources. If the local
population is highly organized, and used to collective action, it may be more attractive for
NGOs, because they will not have to do the groundwork of organizing their beneficiaries.
Grassroots organizations may be more informed regarding the existence of development
organizations, and solicit their help more readily than individuals. The data, however, do not
support this argument. The lack of correlation with the presence of uniones de ejidos is not
surprising, since there are very few of them , and they are notoriously inactive. The fact that the
number of Triple S or SPRs was not significant is more telling. The diversity of the NGO
population itself may be the reason for this lack of correlation. The sample includes a group of
NGOs that do not work with income-generating projects, and thus do not have a reason to
interact primarily with grassroots organizations. The fact remains that the level of organization
of the grassroots communities does not relate to NGO activity, meaning that areas of intense
grassroots activity are not the same as areas of great NGO activity. No synergy occurs between
the two sectors to create pockets of intense rural development.
The other main resource that NGOs depend upon is funding. In Table 12, I describe the
source of funding for the NGOs in the sample for the year 2000.1 For some NGOs, I was given
complete financial reports, but for others I relied on informants. Data on funding is by far the
least reliable. Above all for government funding, the reported figures give a minimum value, as
some respondents were unwilling to detail their funding sources. Only one respondent, however,

1

Since the data were collected in 2001, the most recent year of funding information refers to
2000.
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Table 12: Source of Funding of the Sample of Rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí, 2000 (N=49)
Number of NGOs a

Source of Funding
No source of income

8

Internal sources
Including:
Services charged to beneficiariesb
Voluntary contributions by members or beneficiaries
Membership dues

30

Federal Government
Including:
INI
SAGARPA
SEDESOL
FONAES
SEMARNAT
CIMO
FIRA
PACMIC

21

State government
Including:
SEDARH
PROEM
CEDUCOP
Servicio Estatal de Empleo

12

Donations
Including:
Individuals
Businesses

11

Local government

7

Foundations
Including:
International
Mexican

2

Bank loans

3

Political parties

2

14
11
10

8
7
4
3
1
1
1
1

7
3
2
2

9
5

2
1

a

The totals by category differ from the sum of all the subcategories. Respondents could select
more than one answer, and some mentioned a category without specifying the exact source.
b
This subcategory includes NGOs that charge service fees, and the ones who mentioned that
they accept gifts from beneficiaries, in exchange for their services.
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completely eluded the question. The funding sources are separated into internal sources, which
the NGO generates from its staff, members, and beneficiaries, government sources at the local
(municipio), state, and federal level, donations, and foundations. The table mixes funds available
to finance projects and operating costs, because most respondents did not distinguish between
the two.
In 2000, eight NGOs reported no source of income. They include the NGOs that are
currently inactive-the lack of funds being in some cases the main reason for their inactivity.
Internal funding sources are the most often cited, by 30 NGOs (60% of the sample). The need to
resort to membership dues, and reliance on voluntary contributions reflects the lack of security in
the funding some NGOs, particularly the local ones, who are unable to get funding from other
sources. Usually NGOs that rely primarily on their members and beneficiaries to sustain
themselves have a very limited pool of resources. The NGOs that charge for their services
include professionalized NGOs, such as the centrales of the FMDR, as well as more
opportunistic NGOs, whose leaders take advantage of their beneficiaries’s gratitude to increase
their personal income.
Federal and state government agencies were cited by 21 and twelve NGOs respectively.
Of these, eight actually received funds both from the state and federal governments. The
agencies channeling these funds represent only a fraction of the number of government agencies
present in rural areas, but reflect somewhat the activities of the NGOs. The agencies involved in
agriculture, SEDARH, SAGARPA, and FIRA, are high on the list, as well as the INI, which
finances all activities benefitting indigenous populations. With government agencies providing a
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substantial part of NGO funding, it is important to understand the territorial organization of
government agencies. As we shall see, it impacts NGO activity.
A variety of government agencies are present in the rural areas of Mexico, and provide
different kinds of services, from agricultural subsidies to micro-credit, education, healthcare, or
food banks. The main agencies are SEDARH and SAGARPA for agriculture (product subsidies,
micro-credit for income-generating projects, transfer of technology), FONAES (Fondo Nacional
de Apoyo para las Empresas de Solidaridad), SEDESOL, and SEDESORE for micro-credit,
PROEM for women’s activities, DIF (Comprehensive Development of the Family) for social
services oriented to the family, and the INI for indigenous affairs. Some government agencies,
such as DIF, SEDESOL, SEDESORE, and FONAES, are represented at the municipal level, but
others are only present in a few select urban centers, or the regional capitals. SAGARPA has
representatives in seven districts. SEMARNAT has a branch in each region. PROEM used to
have an office in every region, but due to budget cuts these offices were closed, and the program
is presently administered from the city of San Luis Potosí. Since the offices of these agencies are
always located in the larger towns of an area, or in the cabecera municipal if they are present at
the municipio level, it is logical that NGOs that depend on their funding would also locate their
main office in the same localities.
The presence of the INI is guided by the ethnic composition of the state. It has state
representation in San Luis Potosí, and three local offices in the Zona Media and the Huasteca,
one for each of the three indigenous group present in the state. The ‘Russian doll’ structure of
some of the government agencies results from a change in the allocation of funds from the
federal government, since the federal government began decentralizing its activities at the end of
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the 1980s. The same type of services, and sometimes the same organization, exist in federal,
state, and municipal agencies.
Obtaining data from government agencies about their projects proved as difficult as
getting an NGO directory. The same agencies that were not willing to share information about
NGOs did not share it about their projects. In addition, reports at the state level were not always
available. For non-agricultural projects, SEDESOL is the most important source of funding but I
was not able to obtain detailed data on its activities. PROEM was able to give me a count of the
proposals they had gathered by region, but not a report on existing projects at the municipio
level. Since only a fraction of the proposals are approved, their distribution does not reflect the
actual impact of PROEM. The number of proposals, however, varies by region, in the same way
as NGO activity. In 2001, almost four out of five (78%) were in the Huasteca, followed by the
Altiplano (9%), the Zona Media (7%), and the Zona Centro (6%).
The INI stated that the state agencies are not allowed to give away reports, other than a
brief summary for each local office, and referred me to the federal report of activities. This only
provides financial information about the micro-credit funds that it gives to the Fondos
Regionales. The data show that San Luis Potosí ranks eleventh of the 24 states where the INI
distributed funds in the 1995-2000 period and received 2.3% of the total investment (INI 2000).
No state-level data were given for other areas of activity such as legal assistance or culture. The
state data indicates that in 2000, the Teenek office received over 12 million pesos, far more than
the Pame office (7.4 millions), and nearly twice as much as the Nahua office (6.4 million pesos).
If we relate these figures to the total population of each ethnic group in the state, the distribution
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becomes even more unequal. The Pame receive 345 pesos/person, the Teenek, 154 pesos/person,
and the Nahua, only 51 pesos/person.
The emphasis on the Pame population may be motivated by a desire to preserve the
heritage of a particularly small group, consisting of only 21,500 members. The difference
between the Teenek and Nahua, however, reflect the ways the government tries to use financial
resources to control the indigenous populations. The funds reported here area channeled to the
Regional Funds, INI-generated NGOs that relay them to grassroots groups. In the mid-1990s, the
INI in the Nahua area of the Huasteca began to note about the growing influence of the local
Regional Fund, which had recently gained greater independence and resources. The Nahua have
a reputation of being a combative, well organized, and outspoken indigenous group.2 The local
director was concerned that their popularity might lead them to organize political action and
make greater demands on her agency. Since she did not want to see her jurisdiction turn into
another Chiapas, she started cutting their funding with the approval of the state director of the
INI.
As a consequence, the economic impact of the Nahua Regional Fund has declined, but
the group has become more radicalized politically. The INI also moved from Tamazunchale, the
main urban center of the Nahua area, where the Regional Fund is located, to stop its leaders from
occupying its building as they had done several times to attract media attention. The INI is now

2

Several respondents mentioned a cultural difference between the Teenek and Nahua, where the
Nahua were always portrayed as dynamic and aggressive, while the Teenek are said to be
passive, shy, and obedient. As a result of these cultural differences, Nahua organizations are
described as more effective than Teenek organizations, even in academic publications (Ariel de
Vidas and Barthas 1996). It is difficult to assess, however, if these differences are real, or a result
of differential treatment of the groups based on ethnic prejudice.
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planning to open a second Regional Fund in another cabecera municipal. This fund would
compete against the existing one, create confusion among the Nahua population, and may
threaten its legitimacy.
To get a sense of the relation between government funding and NGO presence, I use the
number of projects initiated by SEDARH in each municipio, and the relative financial
participation of the local government and national government in these projects. SEDARH
channels resources from SAGARPA, and is the main generator of agricultural projects. Table 13
shows the correlation between government projects and NGO presence.
Table 13: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for the Number of Rural NGOs and the Incidence of
SEDARH Projects in the Municipios of San Luis Potosía, b
Incidence of SEDARH Projects
Number of projects initiated by SEDARH
Financial contribution of SEDARH
Financial contribution of the Presidencia Municipal
*: p<.05; **: p<.01.
a
Results available for 47 rural NGOs in the sample.
b
Excludes the municipio of San Luis Potosí, which is an outlier.

Number of projects
0.201
-0.044
0.057

The table also includes the financial contribution of the Presidencia Municipal, the
equivalent of the city hall. This local level of government has recently gained in importance in
socioeconomic development, owing to a change in the allocation of funds from the federal
government. Rather than channeling the municipal funds through the state administrations,
which could then decide how much each municipio would receive, the federal government now
gives each municipio a lump sum , in what is known as Ramo 33 (Branch 33) of the budget. The
Presidencia Municipal may allocate the funds as it sees fit. Since state and federal development
projects require the financial participation of the municipality, the Presidente Municipal can
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ultimately influence local development on a large scale, and has thus become an important
political figure.
Table 13 shows that the number of rural NGO projects, for the NGOs of the sample, does
not correlate with the presence of SEDARH projects, or the size of the contribution of the
Presidencia Municipal for these projects. The lack of correlation between NGO projects and
SEDARH projects is understandable, because the NGOs in the sample represent a wide range of
activities that goes well beyond agricultural, or even income-generating projects, while
SEDARH limits its activities to agriculture. The lack of correlation with the level of financing by
the Presidencia Municipal is more informative. It shows that NGOs do not necessarily locate
their projects in municipios where the local government is willing to spend more on economic
activities.3
This reveals one limitation of the resource-dependency argument as applied to the issue
of NGO project locations, at least in the case of Southern NGOs. This theory is the basis of
arguments in the NGO literature that see NGOs as passively following the prescriptions of their
donors. It implies NGOs in San Luis Potosí should concentrate their projects in areas where the
Presidencia Municipal is more likely to fund them. However, the location of the NGO projects
and the cycle of political elections do not coincide. The Presidencia Municipal changes every
three years, a shorter cycle than that necessary for the completion of a development project. The
groups the FMDR works with, for instance, need to work on a project for a minimum of three
years before it begins to show results. With every new President, the local policies will change,
sometimes jeopardizing prior commitments. Yet the NGOs, despite their reputation for

3

Agriculture is still the main economic activity in most of them.
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flexibility, cannot just leave an area to follow funding opportunities. In Matehuala, for instance,
the Fundación Ecológica del Altiplano (Ecological Foundation of the Altiplano) explained that
they have not been able to obtain any credits from the new PAN President. The projects that they
had started have dwindled, and they have not been able to begin new ones. Yet, since members
live and work in the area, they will not move to another location to get funds from a more
cooperative municipal President. The inertia of development projects is inscribed in the local
geography.
Municipal funds are only one variety of the funds available to NGO projects. They also
rely on funds from the state and the federal government. Since these governments work on sixyear political cycles, the funds offer a somewhat greater stability, barring unannounced budget
cuts. NGOs then have to negotiate their presence with state organizations, leading to patterns of
competition and cooperation. According to resource-dependency theory, the structure of the
NGOs’ social network is important for understanding acquisition of valued resources. We can
expect that NGOs will have regular relations with donors, in this case mostly state agencies, and
hypothetically with other NGOs in an attempt to reduce the sector’s dependency on donors. In
this respect, the role of the Consejo Estatal de ONGs should be fundamental, since this NGO is
intended to federate all Potosino NGOs. In the next two sections, I will describe the structure of
social contacts for the sample of NGOs. After examining their relations with state agencies, I
turn to their relations within the sector.
8.2.

Characteristics of NGOs Social Networks
The questionnaire included items on the organizations with which NGOs were in contact,

specifying the nature of the contacts, and the organizations that they knew worked in their work
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territory, including their perception of the work of these organizations (see Appendix A). The
following sections are based on the answers to these questions. On average, the rural NGOs in
the sample reported contacts with 16.31 organizations (see Table 14). Only two NGOs, inactive
at the time of the survey, claimed not to have contact with any organizations. The three centrales
of the FMDR reported the highest numbers of contact organizations, with 47 contacts in the
Zona Centro, 48 in the Altiplano, and 54 in the Zona Media. Half of the surveyed NGOs,
however, had only five contacts or fewer, showing a positively skewed distribution of the
number of contacts. Only a minority of NGOs have a wide range of contact organizations.
The break-down by sector, organizational scale, and types of contacts, all show the same
positive skewness, and large standard deviations. The majority of NGOs have a small number of
contact organizations, while a few enjoy large networks. Most contacts take place with
government agencies, with an average of 7.42 contact organizations, and NGOs, with an average
of 5 contact NGOs. On average, the rural NGOs in the sample have around one contact in
businesses (1.35 contacts), grassroots organizations (1.1 contacts), and schools or universities
(1.02 contacts), but in each case, the majority do not have contacts with these sectors.
The least involved sectors are foundations and multilateral organizations. Only one
NGOs in five (20.8%) has contacts with multilateral organizations, and one in six (14.6%) with
foundations. In addition, these contacts tend to be sporadic. Staff members of the FMDR
centrales, for instance, sometimes go to Mexico City to attend brief seminars provided by the
FAO. A few NGOs have sporadic contacts with the World Bank when it makes short visits to
evaluate the local portion of its Mexican program for sustainable development, represented in the
Huasteca, the Altiplano, and the Pame area. Contacts with foundations involve mostly foreign

195

Table 14: Rural NGOs’ Contacts with Other Organizations, by Sector, Organizational Scale, and
Type of Contact (N=48)
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Total Number of Contacts

16.31

5

13.35

4.2%

Sectoral Distribution
Government Agencies
NGOs
Businesses
Grassroots Organizations
Schools and Universities
Foundations
Multilateral Organizations

7.42
5.00
1.35
1.10
1.02
0.38
0.29

6
4
0
0
0
0
0

5.48
4.41
2.77
1.63
1.59
1.06
0.65

8.3%
14.6%
60.4%
58.3%
56.3%
85.4%
79.2%

Distribution by Organizational Scale
National Organizationsa
Local Organizationsb
Potosino State-level Organizations
Foreign Organizationsc
State-level Organizations in Other States

5.98
4.69
3.85
0.92
0.42

5
3.5
3
0
0

4.98
4.42
3.52
1.54
0.85

12.5%
16.7%
20.8%
56.3%
75.0%

Types of Contactsd
Average number of types of contacts
Gives the contact information
Gets information from the contact
Attend meetings together
Request resources of the contact
Receives/makes occasional letter or visit
Cooperation on development projects
Friendship ties
Attend the contact’s seminars
Fulfill legal requirements
Organizes seminars that the contact attends
Executes work contracts for the contact
Provides resources to the contact
Share individual memberse
Commercial contracte,f

3.11
8.29
8.21
7.48
6.25
6.04
5.96
4.67
4.25
2.81
2.73
1.54
1.50
0.48
0.23

3
5
4.5
5.5
4.5
3
3
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
0

1.77
9.94
9.98
7.85
6.41
6.63
7.45
7.22
6.99
3.98
6.11
3.37
2.99
0.82
0.72

4.2%
20.8%
16.7%
14.6%
10.4%
8.3%
25.0%
33.3%
31.3%
37.5%
62.5%
70.8%
54.2%
64.6%
89.6%

a

Percentage of NGOs
Reporting None

National organizations are Mexican organizations operating in more than one state.
A local organization covers a portion of a state, from a community to a region.
c
Excluding multilateral organizations.
d
See Appendix A for the exact questionnaire labels.
e
Additional type of contact, spontaneously mentioned by respondents.
f
Contract that the NGO negotiated with a business on behalf of beneficiaries.
b
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organizations. In most cases, the contacts take place primarily with the headquarters of a
nationally-represented NGO rather than a local Potosino NGO.
The organizational scale of the contact organizations also reveals a clear dichotomy
between contacts with organizations in San Luis Potosí and out-of-state contacts. Most contacts,
5.98 on average, are with federal organizations, that is, the Potosino branch of a federal
government agency. Local organizations and state-level organizations follow, with an average of
4.69 and 3.85 contacts respectively. A minority of NGOs do not report contacts at these three
levels. A majority, however, have no contact with foreign organizations (56.3% of the NGOs), or
even Mexican organizations that operate in other states (75% of the NGOs). This focus on the
local environment, as opposed to a cosmopolitan orientation, fits the description of the Mexican
NGO sector as endogenous, rather than resulting from the influence of INGOS in the country.
Types of contacts (e.g. meetings, legal requirements) were included as a way of
measuring the intensity of interaction between NGOs and their partners and the purpose of the
interaction. On average, NGOs had 3.11 different types of contacts with an organization. Having
multiple relations with the same organization increases the opportunity for meetings, and the
knowledge each organization has of the other. The most common types were sending
information, receiving information, and attending meetings together, with an average of
respectively 8.29, 8.21, and 7.48 organizations contacted for this purpose. While attendance at
meetings, which offers only limited contact with other organizations, is quite equally distributed
in the sample, the distribution is markedly skewed for information gathering. One out of six
NGOs (16.7%) do not report getting information from any organization, and only one quarter
have more than nine sources, with a maximum of 38 for the Unión Ganadera Regional, one of
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the largest and oldest NGOs in the state. The sample can be roughly divided in three groups.
First, a group of fourteen NGOs (29.2% of the sample) report only one or no information
sources. These NGOs are isolated, with very poor access to information. About half the sample
(45.8%), or 22 NGOs, utilize between two and nine sources for information. The remaining
quarter (twelve NGOs) have diversified access to information, utilizing over ten organizations as
sources.
The examination of the general characteristics of the NGO population in San Luis Potosí
showed that their organizational scale made a difference in their development. Likewise, Table
15, presented below, shows that scale makes a difference in the scope of their professional
network. On average, national NGOs mention nearly twice as many contact organizations as
local NGOs (22.21 versus 12.52). This difference also appears in the distribution of contacts by
sector and organizational scale.
Sectoral differences reveal that NGOs that operate in more than one state have more
diversified networks than Potosino NGOs. They have significantly more contacts with grassroots
organizations, businesses, schools and universities, foundations, and multilateral organizations.
Contacts with grassroots organizations often come from the NGO’s activity in local-institution
building, which is more common among national than local NGOs (see Table 8). FMDR
centrales, for instance, usually initiate the grassroots groups with which they work. Since
government programs are their primary source of development funding, they work with legally
established grassroots organizations. Other NGOs, such as COCIHP in the Huasteca, the
Federation of UAIMs, or La Forestal in the Altiplano, were created specifically as intermediary
organizations that assist a specific set of member grassroots organizations. This means, however,
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Table 15: T-test for NGO Relations by Organizational Scale (N=48)
Variable

Local NGOs

All organizations*

National NGOs

12.52

22.21

Sectoral Distribution
Government agencies
NGOs
Schools and Universities*
Grassroots Organizations***
Businesses**
Foundations*
Multilateral Organizations**

6.55
4.34
0.59
0.45
0.45
0.07
0.07

8.74
6.00
1.68
2.11
2.74
0.84
0.63

Distribution by Organizational Scale
National Organizations**
Local Organizationsa
Potosino State-level Organizations
Foreign Organizationsb**

4.41
3.76
3.38
0.41

8.37
6.11
4.58
1.68

Types of Contactsc
Average number of types of contacts
3.07
Gives the contact information
6.69
Gets information from the contact
6.62
Attend meetings together
6.17
Request resources of the contact*
4.59
Receives/makes occasional letter or visit*
4.52
Cooperation on development projects
4.28
Friendship ties*
2.86
Attend the contact’s seminars
2.90
Fulfill legal requirements
2.34
Organizes seminars that the contact attends
2.48
Executes work contracts for the contact
1.17
Provides resources to the contact**
0.59
d
Share individual members
0.34
Commercial contractd
0.10
*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001.
a
A local organization covers a portion of a state, from a community to a region.
b
Excluding multilateral organizations.
c
See Appendix A for the exact questionnaire labels.
d
Additional type of contact, spontaneously offered by respondents.
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3.16
10.74
10.63
9.47
8.79
8.37
8.53
7.42
6.32
3.52
8.95
2.11
2.89
0.68
0.42

that NGOs have few contacts with grassroots organizations which they do not work with
directly.
Ties with other types of organizations, such as businesses or universities, are an asset for
NGOs, because they provide access to a more diversified pool of information, thus possibly to
more diversified funding sources, as well as training opportunities. Table 15 shows that national
NGOs request funding from more organizations than local NGOs (an average of 8.79 against
4.59 contact organizations). These ties are also useful for the promotion of the organization,
leading to invitations to seminars, and offers of cooperation. National NGOs have more contacts
in these sectors because of their organizational structure. The staff or members of these NGOs
have opportunities, through their national headquarters, to attend events where they can come in
contact with these organizations, such as training seminars in Mexico City. For instance, several
of the campesino NGOs present in the Huasteca, the CIOAC, CODUC, UNORCA, are part of a
national council on agricultural development, the Consejo Agrario Permanente (Permanent
Agrarian Council), that lobbies the government to promote campesino’s interests. The Potosino
leaders attend national meetings where they meet with sister organizations, and have an incentive
to organize cooperation, and contacts at the local level.
The distribution of contacts according to organizational scale is again in keeping with
this pattern. National NGOs, have significantly more contacts with national and foreign
organizations than local NGOs. Respondents explain that these contacts are mostly organized by
the headquarters in Mexico City, still, local branches benefit by successfully applying for funds
with foreign foundations, or using the national reputation to establish ties with a university or
private business in their area.
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To complement the network data, the questionnaire included a question on the
organizations that the respondent knew, that worked in the same geographical area as they did,
and addressed similar issues. The aim of this question was to get a sense of the NGOs’ perceived
environment, the competition they faced, or their isolation. A follow-up question asked them to
evaluate the work of these organizations. Table 16 summarizes the answers to this question, by
sector and organizational scale.
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics on the Organizations Which Rural NGOs Are Aware of (N=46)
Variable
All organizations
Organizations with which the NGO has
contacts
Perceived negativelya
Sectoral Distribution
Government agencies
NGOs
Grassroots Organizations
Businesses
Schools and Universities
Multilateral Organizations

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Percentage of NGOs
Reporting None

7.17

6

6.8

15.2%

2.76
2.65

1
2

3.27
2.93

32.6%
27.3%%

3.3
2.39
1.09
0.22
0.15
0.02

1
2
0
0
0
0

4.53
2.34
1.56
0.76
0.76
0.15

32.6%
32.6%
52.2%
82.6%
93.5%
97.8%

Distribution by Organizational Scale
National Organizations
2.83
1
3.29
Local Organizationsb
2.70
2.76
2
Potosino State-level Organizations
1
2.23
1.37
Foreign Organizationsc
0.76
0
0.15
a
For the 39 NGOs which listed at least one known organization.
b
A local organization covers a portion of a state, from a community to a region.
c
Excluding multilateral organizations.

26.1%
17.4%
47.8%
89.1%

On average, the NGO respondents mentioned 7.17 organizations in their area. As a rule,
NGOs do not work in isolation, even though one in six reports that no other organization works
in their area. These NGOs either work in one or a small number of communities, or in activities
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that are not addressed by other organizations. As in the sectoral distribution of contact
organizations, government agencies and NGOs are the most common types of organizations,
with respectively 3.3 and 2.39 organizations named, but the average number of grassroots
organizations (1.09) is higher than the number of businesses (0.22). The poor representation of
businesses in rural areas reflects a reality often lamented by developers. Businesses are attracted
to large urban settlements, where they can find employees, suppliers, and, more important, a
market for their product. NGOs that have contacts with businesses are either based in urban
centers, or find them outside their work territory.
The distribution by geographic scale, too, matches the distribution of contacts in Table
14. National and local organizations are mentioned in greater numbers, with averages of 2.83
and 2.76 organizations respectively. The lower presence of state organizations is partly
explained by regular budget cuts that affect the state programs, which reduce staff presence in
the field. Shortly before I came to San Luis Potosí, as a result of such a cut, the budget of
SEDARH had been cut so drastically that 40% of the staff was laid off. That same year, during
my stay, the budget of PROEM was also slashed, and all its subsidiary offices shut down. The
presence of these programs in rural, isolated areas is disproportionately affected, since the
remaining staff is concentrated in the city of San Luis Potosí, close to state government.
The average number of known organizations mentioned is smaller than the average
number of contact organizations, and the percentage of NGOs reporting not knowing any
organizations is higher in all categories except grassroots organizations, than the percentage of
NGOs reporting no contact organization. The number of grassroots organizations has increased
substantially in Mexico with the new laws granting development aid to groups rather than
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individuals. In addition, campesinos were traditionally organized by the corporatist state, so that
at least one grassroots organization is now present in most communities. The fact that over half
of the rural NGOs in the sample still do not mention them reflects the lack of contacts between
NGOs and GROs, as well as the perception that GROs are inactive, or nothing more than
political pawns.
Though Table 15 suggests that several organizations generally share a territory, since
NGO respondents usually know of several other organizations working on their territory, it is
worth noting that on average, they have contact with fewer than three (2.76) of these known
organizations. Nearly a third of the surveyed NGOs (32.6%) do not have any contacts with them.
While they may not always have an accurate knowledge of the activities of these organizations,
they cast negative judgments on a significant portion of them, which- in their eyes- justifies their
lack of contacts. Three quarters of the NGO respondents express negative opinions on at least
one of the organizations they knew about, and half of them do so for more than two
organizations.4 These figures do not include the organizations on which the respondents gave a
balanced opinion, including good and bad elements. On average, the respondents have a negative
opinion of over a third of the organizations they mention (35.3%).
The opinions respondents expressed reflected their perception of their environment as
more cooperative or more competitive, rather than accurate knowledge of other organizations’

4

Initially, the questionnaire asked respondents to evaluate the impact of known organizations on
a Likert scale, from very positive to very negative. It quickly turned out that the intrusion of
structured response categories in the midst of a loosely structured interview confused the
respondents. In addition, Mexicans value politeness and diplomacy, and were uncomfortable
with the clinical assessment of the scale. In the end, the detailed qualitative accounts yielded
more valuable data.
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activities. In their accounts, respondents were eager to present their own organization in a
positive light, and to explain to me why their approach was better, even when they were willing
to recognize their own shortcomings. Saying that an organization was not doing anything, or was
only political, or corrupted, and exploiting the beneficiaries, were all ways of portraying the
respondent’s NGO in a more favorable light. Respondents understandably had higher opinions of
the organizations they worked with. At the other extreme, some respondents would evaluate all
organizations positively, arguing that ‘anything that is done for the country is good.’
Overall, this analysis establishes government agencies and NGOs as the main contact
sectors of rural NGOs, showing little sectoral diversity in their social networks. The networks
are also mostly national rather than international, thus reinforcing the importance of the Mexican
public sector as a resource provider. Analysis of the known organizations shows that NGOs
generally do not work in isolation, even though they have few contacts with the organizations in
their geographic area. To understand the patterns of competition and cooperation between NGOs
and these other organizations, I now examine in more detail the structure of NGOs relations with
government agencies, and then with other NGOs.
8.3.

NGO-State Relations
Table 14 confirms the picture of the Mexican public sector as a major partner for NGOs.

With an average of 7.42 contact organizations, government organizations are the most common
type of organizations with which NGOs have contacts. In fact, close to half the organizations
with which the NGOs in the sample communicate are government agencies. Only four NGOs
(including the two NGOs reporting no contacts) have no contact with the government, but five
have contacts only with government agencies. Table 17 shows the nature of NGO contacts with
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government organizations by organizational scale and type of contact. It also shows the extent of
NGOs’ knowledge of government agencies working in their area.
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics on the Relations Reported Between Rural NGOs and
Government Agencies
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Percentage of NGOs
Reporting None

Number of Contacts (N=48)
All government agencies
Federal government
State government
Local governmenta

7.42
3.90
2.71
0.48

6
3
2
0

5.48
3.01
2.47
0.92

8.3%
12.5%
22.9%
68.8%

Type of Contactb (N=48)
Request resources of the contact
Including local government
Gets information from the contact
Gives the contact information
Attend meetings together
Receives/makes occasional letter or visit
Cooperation on development projects
Fulfill legal requirements
Attend the contact’s seminars
Friendship ties
Organizes seminars that the contact attends
Executes work contracts for the contactc
Provides resources to the contactc

3.85
0.29
3.79
3.50
3.10
2.75
2.29
2.17
1.71
1.60
0.98
0.71
0.27

3
2
2
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

3.42
0.82
4.62
4.27
3.56
2.76
3.23
3.10
3.04
3.04
2.27
1.80
0.92

14.6%
80.4%
29.2%
33.3%
25.0%
20.8%
45.8%
39.6%
52.1%
60.4%
75.0%
77.1%
89.6%

Number of Government Agencies Known in
the Area (N=46)
All government agencies
Local government
Federal government
State government

3.30
2.76
1.89
0.96

1
2
1
0

4.53
2.70
2.64
1.85

32.6%
63.0%
43.5%
63.0%

a

A local organization covers a portion of a state, from a community to a region.
See Appendix A for the exact questionnaire labels.
c
Additional type of contact, spontaneously offered by respondents.
b

The distribution of contacts among local, state, and federal levels of government shows a
strong bias towards ties at the state and federal levels. NGOs in the sample mention, on average,
contacts with 3.9 federal organizations, 2.71 state organizations, but only 0.48 local government
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agencies. This is so even though the local government, in the form of the Presidencia Municipal,
now holds most of the available government funds. This discrepancy reflects the different
structure of the local government, compared to state and federal governments. While the higher
levels of government are divided among many agencies, the Presidencia Municipal gathers all
socio- economic activities at the local level. As a result, most NGOs mention contacts with the
Presidencia Municipal in their area of activity, in addition to contacts with several specialized
agencies at the state and federal level. In fact, only 16.7% of the NGOs in the sample did not
have any contacts with the local government, a percentage slightly higher than for state
government agencies (12.5%), but lower than for federal government agencies (22.9%).
In keeping with resource-dependency theory, the ranking of types of contacts reflects the
importance of Mexican government organizations as sources of funding. The data show that
fewer than one in six NGOs (14.6%) does not request funding from any government agencies,
while half contact three or more government agencies for funding. Government agencies are also
important sources of information. The organizations that have contact with government
organizations to obtain resources contact, on average, a comparable number of organizations to
get funds (3.85 organizations) and information (3.69 organizations). Far fewer government
agencies provide training. Nearly 30% of the sample do not request information from them, and
the majority (52.1%) do not assist any seminars or training events that they organize. Requests
for material resources are the primary reason for contacting Mexican government agencies,
generating the highest average number of contacts with the government.
What is surprising, however, is that only a minority of the NGOs in the sample request
resources from local government, despite the abundance of the municipal funds. Eighty percent
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of rural NGOs do not seek municipal funding and over two-thirds of the NGOs (68;8%) have no
contact with the municipal government. Several factors explain this situation. First, even though
substantial funds are channeled to local government, programs of socio-economic development
are still generally administered by state and federal agencies such as SEDESOL, SAGARPA,
and SEDARH. The Presidencia Municipal does not make decisions regarding these programs,
even though they sometimes complement the funds a group of beneficiaries gets from a state or
federal agency. NGOs are thus more likely to request funds from state or federal agencies than
local agencies.
Second, the distribution of funds among various levels of government must be
understood in the context of globally shrinking public funds, designed to limit the role of the
state in the economy. In many areas, the public sector of Latin American countries, including
Mexico, should be reinforced rather than restricted (Castañeda 1993) The budget share allocated
to the Presidencias Municipales is still often too small to cover the requirements of local
governments. Thus, the municipal administration, like other government agencies, must
prioritize, and transfer responsibilities to other organizations. Infrastructure, including electricity
and water management, receive most of the attention, since they have immediate, direct effects
on most residents, who provide political support. All Presidencias have departments of
agricultural and/or economic development, but these are usually understaffed and underfunded,
since local government officials can reasonably expect the state and federal agencies already in
place to fill this niche.
Third, respondents mentioned political factors as a reason not to contact local officials.
While NGOs were not as much affected by politics at the state and national level, the
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Presidente’s party identification affected the ability of an NGO to work in a given municipio.
The personal, centralized nature of political power in Mexico, often lamented at the national
level, trickles down to state and municipal administrations. Corruption, nepotism, and
clientelism plague many municipios in San Luis Potosí. A change of Presidente means a
wholesale change in staff and program, sometimes even in the same party. Some NGOs saw their
funding cut with a change of party in the Presidencia, either because their project did not fit the
new priorities, or because they were labeled as belonging to an opposition party.
The Fundación Ecológica del Altiplano experienced such problems. This NGO was
founded in 1993 by a group of residents of Matehuala to fight problems of erosion and
deforestation in the Altiplano. One of the founders was working in the Presidencia Municipal,
held by the PRI at the time. She was able to secure funding for family greenhouses and
reforestation programs in rural communities, with the help of the local administration. Even
though the NGO had no political activities, the Presidencia saw it as a friendly organization,
since its members openly supported the PRI. In 2000, however, the PAN won the municipal
election in Matehuala. The NGO founder resigned and its municipal funding dried up.
Repercussions are felt widely, because in order to get funding from a federal or state agency an
NGO needs a letter from the local authorities attesting its official existence. The Presidencia
denied the Foundation any such letter, so its proposals for more reforestation were denied funds
from SEDESOL. The Foundación Ecológica del Altiplano currently limits its activities to the
diffusion of information, which reduces its impact on the well-being of rural dwellers, as it waits
for a more favorable municipal administration before it can hope to resume its larger projects.
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In other instances, the municipal team tried to take over community groups set by an
NGO, in a manner similar to the co-optation strategy of the PRI. The NGO might then abandon
the area, to return after when a new administration was voted in. This happened to the central of
the FMDR in the Zona Media, as related by one of its technicians:
This was a group that had fifteen people in it. They left because of political
issues. The municipio put a technician who was not charging [for his services]. I
charge for my work.5 Therefore they went with him, but he was not working well,
and people came back with me. I don’t know why [the municipal officials] did it,
because I had gone to talk to the Presidencia Municipal to make an agreement, so
that they would leave me the area free. It was a PAN President. I think they
wanted to control my work and control the people for the matter of the elections,
and some people did not allow it... In September 2000 a new Presidente
Municipal from the PRI came into office. It looks like we are going to work better
[with him].
Although respondents were reluctant to blame one party more than others for such
practices, problems were generally attributed to municipios recently won by the PAN. At the
municipal level, the democratic process of party succession through elections has not yet brought
changes in political culture.
The relations with state and federal agencies vary at different levels of the hierarchy, and
thus among geographic regions. NGO staff and members may not relate favorably with the
central hierarchy, but might still have friendly contacts with some government technicians. In
section 8.1, I already described how the director of the INI influenced policy concerning the
Regional Development Funds at the state level. In Tancanhuitz, Tamuín, and Ciudad Cárdenas,
where the local offices of the Teenek, Planicie, and Pame areas are located, relations between
NGOs and the INI are friendly, promoting a climate of cooperation. The Regional Funds have

5

The FMDR is one of the NGOs that charges for its services to the campesinos.
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access to resources beyond financial support. For instance, the Fondo Regional Teenek, in
Tancanhuitz, has no phones or vehicles, but the INI provides these facilities. They also exchange
information about meetings, as well as data on particular groups or communities. In
Tamazunchale, on the contrary, the Fondo Regional Nahua has been left with obsolete computer
technology, and receives nothing in response to its requests for information, often including
official texts and brochures that the INI is nationally mandated to distribute. Now that the INI
has moved to another municipio, the Fund has virtually no contact with the local INI office.
The variation in relations with the INI does not reflect a variation in government policy,
which generally disapproves of political action by the indigenous population. Various directors
simply react to the local political climate, but the overall approach is coherent within the state. In
other cases, however, the relations that NGOs maintain with state and federal agencies vary
across regions, depending on the personality and methods of the local director. While NGOs in
one region may have cordial relations with a government agency, these relations may be hostile
in another, regardless of the federal or state policies. Once again, the three centrales of the
FMDR provide an example of this situation, in their relations with the SAGARPA local offices.
In the Zona Centro and the Altiplano, relations are cordial. FMDR technicians may doubt
the SAGARPA technicians’ competence, or have a negative assessment of their impact because
the agency lacks funding. Yet all technicians, as well as the directors of the central and the
SAGARPA office, have frequent contacts with each others and freely exchange information. In
the Zona Media, on the contrary, the FMDR central has little or no contact with SAGARPA, and
openly expresses hostility towards its staff. FMDR technicians claim that SAGARPA technicians
lack funds to visit all the communities for which they are responsible, so they become corrupt,
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charging campesinos for services that should be free. Some technicians also claim as their own
the groups of beneficiaries that the central technicians create and supervise. The two
organizations do not confront each other openly, but neither do they collaborate. The atmosphere
is more conducive to competition than cooperation.
The relationship between SAGARPA and the FMDR in the Zona Media is an example of
organizational parasitism. Parasitism is a concept that has mistakenly been left out of ecological
studies of organizations, because it has been confused with mutualism and competition.6 Both
terms, as well as commensalism, describe the interaction between the elements of two
populations. Mutualism refers to an association that is beneficial for both entities involved. An
automobile company that subcontracts the production of some parts to a smaller firms enters into
a mutualistic relation. The larger firm can keep its organization simple, and transfers part of the
production costs, while the subcontracted firm operates in a more stable environment.7 Both
entities depend on the other for their survival. In commensalism, on the contrary, the association
is neutral, and more superficial. One entity, or sometimes both, benefit from the association, but
they do not use each other’s resources. For instance, drugstores are often located close to gas
stations at major intersections. They may increase each other’s business marginally, but do not
depend on each other for survival.

6

The ommission of parasitism in human ecology dates back to Robert E. Park (1952) and the
Chicago school. For a detailed definition of the concepts of mutualism, parasitism,
commensalism, and competition in bioecology, see Begon, Harper, and Townsend (1990).
7

The principle works if we assume a stable automobile market. If the market enters a recession,
the smaller firm is likely to disappear, as a result of the reduced activity of the larger firm.
Symbiosis is a beneficial association when both parties are ‘healthy’. They will both suffer if
external factors harm either one of them.
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Parasitism, on the contrary, describes the association of two entities of different type
where one lives off the other, called a host. Their association is closer than in the case of
competition. In extreme cases, the parasite kills its host. Cases of parasitism are abundantly
documented in bioecology. In human and organizational ecology, the only type of interaction
considered, other than mutualism, is competition, where one entity appropriates resources that
may have been used by the other type. The case of the relation between one FMDR central and
the SAGARPA in San Luis Potosí provides an avenue to conceptualize organizational
parasitism.
The SAGARPA is associated with the central in a series of training programs, as well as
the regional goat production project. The SAGARPA technicians, rather than fulfilling their
function as builders of local institutions, let the central do the ground work, and then list the
grassroots groups created by the central as their own in their activity reports. In this case, we
cannot speak strictly of competition, because the SAGARPA claims as its own the result of the
activity of the central, not the resources it uses. It does not deplete the resource supply for the
central. In a way, by not being involved at the grassroots level, the SAGARPA technicians
actually preserve the human resources that the central draws on. The central, however, is
negatively affected, because it bears the responsibility of the whole project rather than sharing it
with SAGARPA. It must dedicate more resources to creating groups to compensate for the
inaction of SAGARPA technicians. Since one organization is positively affected, and the other
negatively affected, in the context of an association between the two, we can say that
SAGARPA, in the Zona Media, lives off the FMDR central in a parasitic way.
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One may object that parasitism involves a high degree of intimacy of association between
host and parasite, that is not present in this case. SAGARPA and the FMDR central are indeed
not associated to the point that one cannot live without the other. For parasitism to occur,
however, the host does not have to be ultimately destroyed. It is enough that one organization
takes advantage of the functioning of another for its survival, and affects its activities negatively.
Parasitism does exist in the organizational world, and should be studied in its own right, because
it is qualitatively different from competition. Competition describes the relations of two
organizations or two populations to a common pool of limited resources. Parasitism, figuratively,
describes an organization ‘piggybacking’ on another’s shoulders. It may occur more frequently
in public and nonprofit organizations than in businesses, because of a lower level of economic
competition in these sectors.
Researchers and development practitioners are often concerned with the possible
transformation of NGOs into nothing more than service contractors that replace the public sector
(Hulme and Edwards 1997). The data collected here, however, show that over two-thirds of the
participating NGOs (70.8%) do not have contacts based on the execution of a contract for
another organization. The proportion climbs to over three-quarters (77.1%) for government
contracts. The number of intermediary organizations (created by outsiders) that hold work
contracts with a government organization is significantly higher than the number of popular
organizations, whose members gathered on the basis of common necessity or interest (table not
shown).8

8

Results of a chi-square test was performed on a 2x2 table. The variables were the
organizational scale of the NGO, and a dummy variable which distinguishes between NGOs that
have government contracts from those who do not.
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CEEDIGMAG (Center for Educational Studies and the Integral Development of
Marginal Groups), offers a good example of an intermediary NGO operating under government
contract. It illustrates the advantages and drawbacks that this situation entails. This NGO was
created in 1991 by a group of professionals. The main founder was working with the INI at the
time, where he became aware of a national bid to be launch by this government agency, for
organizations willing to promote human rights in indigenous communities. He contacted
acquaintances with expertise in the area, and their proposal to work in two municipios of the
Huasteca, Xilitla and Aquismón, where problems of human right abuses were particularly severe,
was accepted. For this NGO, the dependence on a particular type of funding guided the choice of
project location.
For ten years, CEEDIGMAG was able to organize and train human rights promoters in
the communities and pay themselves comfortable salaries. Recently, however, the INI grew wary
of the high operating costs presented by intermediary NGOs. In 2000, the state director in San
Luis Potosí decided that channeling the funds directly to indigenous communities, rather than to
intermediary organizations, would be more efficient. Funding to CEEDIGMAG stopped,
bringing most of its activities to a halt. The dependence on a single contract made this NGO
extremely vulnerable to government policy changes, and thus financially unsustainable.
Some popular organizations specifically mention that they do not wish to receive funding
from government organizations, or sign work contracts, in order to remain independent. Since
popular organizations are more often formed on ideological grounds than intermediary
organizations, they are more likely to see cooperation with the government as a risk for cooptation. This is particularly true in Mexico, where the government has a long history of using
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such a strategy. Rather than seeing all NGOs as facing the same risk of turning into government
contractors preoccupied with service provision, it is important to consider the diversity of the
NGO sector. In the future, the divergence in attitude between intermediary and popular
organizations with respect to government contracts is likely to grow stronger, not disappear.
Overall, the NGO attitude toward government funding is often ambiguous, sometimes
contradictory. On the one hand, popular NGOs are aware of the strings attached to government
contracts. In the absence of alternative sources, however, they must still apply for government
funds. On the other hand, the corporatist tradition that prevailed in Mexico for the past 70 years
leads many to expect solutions from government. NGO members are affected by the very
paternalism which they denounce in the government’s dealings with campesinos. A PROEM
technician enjoyed telling this story in his meetings with grassroots groups, to illustrate the evils
of paternalism:
There was a group of women who wanted to make cheese. They received a grant
to buy cows, but the cows died. When I visited them again recently, they were not
doing anything, so I asked them what their plans were. And they told me, we have
it all figured out. We sent a letter to Mr. Zedillo,9 asking him for some new cows,
and we are waiting for his answer. And I told them, but ladies, Zedillo is gone!
Now it’s another president! And there they were, waiting for an answer from
Zedillo!
Fighting paternalism is the new slogan of many technicians, in government agencies or
NGOs. The story above describes the attitude of campesinos, but when I asked them how they
were trying to finance their projects, some respondents told me that if their proposals were
rejected, they were thinking of writing to Vicente Fox, or to the governor of San Luis Potosí.
People do not believe that the Mexican public sector works in a truly bureaucratic manner,

9

Former Mexican president, in office from 1994 to 2000.
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basing funding decisions on the same criteria for all. Their actual experience, as told by the story
of the Ecological Foundation of the Altiplano, tells them otherwise. Thus, if formal proposals are
rejected, they suspect foul play and may try to call in a personal favor from a high official.
The last section of Table 17 shows the level of awareness by NGOs of government
organizations active in their territory. As in the case of organizational contacts, government
organizations are the most frequently cited. The ranking in terms of their geographic scale,
however, differs from the overall pattern for contacts and for known organizations (Tables 14
and 16). NGOs are aware of about three local government agencies, more than federal or state
agencies. Nearly two-thirds of the NGOs (63%), however, do not mention any municipal agency.
There is a somewhat bimodal distribution between organizations that are highly aware of local
organizations, and those that are completely unaware of them. Differences between national and
local NGOs, or between popular and intermediary organizations, however, are not significant.10
Lack of awareness of local government agencies is more a result of the lack of contact
between NGOs and municipal administrations than an accurate reflection of the their presence in
the communities. The activities of the Presidencia generally have a larger impact on the rural
dwellers’ lives than the work of other government agencies. Its employees are more visible,
owing to the variety of tasks they address. In addition, campesinos are more likely to go to the
offices of the Presidencia than any other government agency to sort out paperwork (e.g.,

10

Chi-square test, not shown. The chi-square was performed on 2x2 tables that included a
dummy variable distinguishing between NGOs who knew local government agencies in their
area from those who did not, and respectively the organizational scale and the support-base of
the NGO.
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property tax forms or voter’s registration). NGOs may simply need more time to adapt their
social networks, giving municipal government a position reflecting its new predominance.
The structure of relations of NGOs with state organizations generally supports the
hypothesis of resource-dependency theory. They are largely motivated by the quest for
resources, mostly material resources, but also information, and to a lesser extent, training. The
local context, however, still influences the nature of these relations. First, NGOs deal with
decentralized offices that may differ from one another even though the resources they can
provide are theoretically identical. In some cases, rather than providing resources, government
agencies become parasites that try to live off the work of NGOs, such as the FMDR central in
the Zona Media of San Luis Potosí.
The Mexican federal government and the Potosino state government provide most of the
NGO funding. The Mexican government is more apathetic and indifferent than openly hostile to
NGOs. Open repression is no longer acceptable in a country that seeks entry into the group of
industrialized nations. The Mexican government generally attempts to present the profile of a
democratic, neoliberal country where civil society thrives. Indirect approaches to silence
politically incorrect NGOs, usually by denying their requests for funding, are now favored. The
data available on the attitude of local government, however, suggests that political factors play a
significant role in the work of Mexican NGOs. Party affiliation, either real or perceived, can
serve as a reason to grant and deny access to government funds. Before examining the role of
politics more thoroughly, I will finalize the analysis of NGO social networks by looking at their
relations with each other.
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8.4.

Relations Between NGOs
While the government is an obvious source of financial and material resources, the

structure of NGOs’ social networks reveals that they rely on other NGOs to provide them with
other resources, particularly information. Table 18 shows that there are numerous contacts
between NGOs. On average, NGOs contact with five other NGOs (5.40 if non-local grassroots
organizations are added).11 Fewer than one fifth (14.6%) of the NGOs in the sample have no
contacts with other NGOs. Half have contacts with at least four. NGO contacts with government
agencies are often mandated by legal or administrative considerations, but NGOs are under no
obligation to interact with other NGOs, so these contacts are more likely to reflect strategic
choices. Numerous contacts may signal cooperation between NGOs. In order to determine how
real this potential cooperation is, it is necessary to examine contacts with NGOs in detail.
The distribution of NGO contacts by organizational scale differs markedly from the
distribution of contacts with government organizations. The local network of NGOs is a lot more
developed than the local network of government organizations. On average, NGOs report
contacts with 2.23 local NGOs, but less than one state or national NGO (respectively 0.94 and
0.46 contacts organizations on average). In addition, while over half the surveyed NGOs do not
have contacts with state or national NGOs, only a quarter have no contacts with local NGOs.
Local NGOs are easier to access, and face the same environment as the respondent’s NGO. On
the other hand, the local branches of national NGOs all included their national headquarters
among their NGO contacts, accounting for a significant proportion of the national NGO contacts.

11

The national and international headquarters of grassroots organizations are qualitatively
similar to NGOs, since they are not groups of beneficiaries (like local grassroots organizations).
It is thus pertinent to include them among NGO contacts.
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics on the Relations Rural NGOs Report with Other NGOs
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Percentage of NGOs
Reporting None

Number of Contacts (N=48)
All NGOs
All NGOs and non-local GROs
Local NGOsa
State NGOs
National NGOs
Foreign NGOs
Mexican NGOs in other states

5.00
5.40
2.23
0.94
0.46
0.33
0.08

4
4
1.5
0
0
0
0

4.41
4.66
2.30
1.29
0.66
0.60
0.35

14.6%
14.6%
27.1%
58.3%
50.0%
72.9%
93.8%

Type of Contactb (N=48)
Gets information from the contact
Attend meetings together
Gives the contact information
Friendship ties
Receives/makes occasional letter or visit
Cooperation on development projects
Attend the contact’s seminars
Request resources of the contact
Organizes seminars that the contact attends
Provides resources to the contactc
Share members
Executes work contracts for the contactc

3.79
3.19
3.13
2.13
2.10
2.10
1.69
1.00
0.92
0.67
0.44
0.38

2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

4.62
3.14
3.29
2.95
2.59
2.44
2.24
1.79
1.81
1.06
0.80
0.87

25.0%
27.1%
27.1%
39.6%
33.3%
35.4%
43.8%
58.3%
66.7%
60.4%
66.7%
79.2%

Number of NGOs Known in the Area (N=46)
All NGOs
Local NGOs
National NGOs
State NGOs
Contact NGOs

2.39
1.43
0.46
0.35
0.85

2
1
0
0
0

2.34
1.71
0.66
0.60
1.26

32.6%
41.3%
63.0%
71.7%
54.3%

a

A local organization covers a portion of a state, from a community to a region.
See Appendix A for the exact questionnaire labels.
c
Additional type of contact, spontaneously offered by respondents.
b

NGOs also have limited contacts with foreign NGOs and Mexican NGOs in other states.
Nearly three quarters of the NGOs in the sample (72.8%) have no relations with foreign NGOs.
This is due to the low presence of international NGOs in Mexico in general, and in the state of
San Luis Potosí in particular. Those who do generally contact the international NGOs active in
San Luis Potosí, such as Caritas or World Vision. Only three NGOs reported contacts with
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Mexican NGOs in other states. Overall, the network of NGO contacts is primarily confined to
local organizations.
The content structure of ties is also different from government contacts. Information
gathering is the most common purpose of contacts with other NGOs, with an average of 3.79
contact NGOs.12 In addition, 80% of the 160 contacts involving information were reciprocal, that
is, respondents report giving and getting information from the same NGO. The fact that in most
cases, there is an exchange of information rather than a unidirectional flow indicates cooperation
rather than competition between NGOs.
The provision of other resources, as expected, ranks very low. The majority of NGOs
neither request nor provide resources. Since Potosino NGOs generally lack resources, it is not
surprising that they do not often share them. The cooperation that exists for the exchange of
information does not exist for other resources. When NGOs mention that they get or provide
help with material resources- such as vehicle, phone, or training material- they usually have
close ties with them. For instance, the NGOs created by the INI in Tancanhuitz pool resources.
Requests for resources from another NGO commonly come from the local branches of national
or international organizations, which get some of their funding from their national structure.
These national NGOs also provide the bulk of the seminars that 56.2% of the NGOs reportedly
attended at other NGOs. The national headquarters of the FMDR, World Vision, or SEDEPAC
(Service, Development, and Peace), among others, encourage the staff of the local office to keep
training regularly.

12

Only a quarter of the NGOs did not mention any NGO as a source of information.
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Project collaboration with NGOs is cited by 31 NGOs, more than project collaboration
with government agencies, which was cited by 26 NGOs. This collaboration, however, is
typically not as structured as collaboration with government agencies. In 20% of the cases, the
cooperation takes place between ‘sister NGOs.’ This means that NGOs are tied because one has
created the other, or because they are both linked to the same third organizations, be it an NGO
or a government agency. For instance, the MOCACO (Movement of Peasants and Colonias) was
created by the CNC. It relies on local leaders of the CNC to promote its projects. The rest of
these cases do not involve long-term collaboration, project design, and evaluation done in
common, but rather sporadic participation in training sessions or information meetings. In
another instance, the Regional Union of Stock Breeders provides vaccines to the FMDR
technicians. While it considers it to be project collaboration, the FMDR simply views it as
provision of resources. The work collaboration has a different meaning for different
organizations. Some, like the Regional Union of Stock Breeders, consider that any participation
in the same project qualifies as collaboration. Others, like the FMDR, reserve the term for
actions where both organizations design and implement a project jointly.
As a rule the most common forms of contacts that NGOs report with other NGOs are less
formal and less structured than their contacts with government agencies. They exchange
information, attend meetings together, receive or make occasional visits, have friends in these
NGOs, or collaborate on a project on a superficial level. Contacts with government involve
writing proposals to get resources, or fulfilling legal requirements; contacts with NGOs are more
likely to take the form of casual conversations. To borrow Putnam’s (2000) terminology, NGOs
act more like ‘machers’ in their dealings with the government, and like ‘schmoozers’ among
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themselves. ‘Machers’ are people who ‘make things happen in a community’, while
‘schmoozers’ spend time in ‘informal conversation’ (Putnam 2000, p. 93). Transposed to the
NGO field, this dichotomy distinguished between contacts that help NGOs get their work done,
and those that merely give them the warm feeling of belonging to a community of organizations,
but do not generate concrete benefits for the completion of their projects.
In addition, contacts reported with other NGOs represent only a portion of the total
number of NGOs in the state, and even in their immediate geographic environment. Many
respondents do identify their organization as part of the NGO community, the ‘sector social (a
Mexican term referring to nonprofit organizations), or the community of asociaciones civiles.
However, the contacts they have with an average of five other NGOs, some of them outside the
state of San Luis Potosí or outside the subcategory of rural NGOs, is small in comparison to the
population of 89 rural NGOs I was able to identify. The perception of individual NGOs as
members of a community is not at all a reality in terms of a dense social network.
Even more telling is the discrepancy between NGOs that respondents list as part of their
social network, and the ones they are aware of in their area. On average, NGOs know about 2.39
other NGOs, but almost a third do not mention any. Of course, part of this is due to the fact that
respondents were asked to cite the organizations that had similar activities. In some cases, no
other NGO fits this profile, above all in the regions where the population of NGO is small, and
for NGOs working on a small territory. One would expect that when NGOs are aware of other
NGOs sharing roughly the same territory, and the same activities, they would try and get in
touch with each other, if the environment is one of cooperation rather than competition. Yet
NGOs are in touch with fewer than a single NGO that is most similar in terms of activities and
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territory- and over half the surveyed NGOs do not have any contacts with them. Overall, only
one third of the NGOs that respondents know are part of their professional social network.
The data indicate that NGOs that engage in similar activities in the same territory, even if
not exactly in the same communities, are more likely to compete than to cooperate. This
contradicts the picture of NGOs cooperating with each other given by their pattern of exchange
of information, visits and letters, and friendship ties. If they do exchange information, it is with
those NGOs that share affiliation ties, or operate in other areas, and thus do not present a threat
as competitors.
Since NGOs do not communicate much with the NGOs active in their area, they often
lack accurate knowledge about their activities, their goals, and their strategies. Few respondents
actually give a positive opinion of the NGOs in their area, or of the Potosino NGO sector in
general, though half of them (52.2%) do not judge any known NGO negatively. The reserve on
negative comments may be due to lack of knowledge, but it also derives from Mexican norms
that emphasize politeness and diplomacy (Riding 1986). In my general dealing with Mexicans, I
found that they refrained from strong opinions or even direct statements in many occasions.
Some also preferred to be cautious rather than give compromising statements to a foreigner and a
stranger whose motives remained questionable.
Other NGOs, however, provided negative assessments of NGOs articulated around
several themes. First, when asked to evaluate the work of a known organization, some would say
that it is not doing anything. Of the organizations characterized as apathetic, 60% are NGOs. As
a rule the accusation of ‘not doing anything’ comes in a context of competition, that is from one
SMO to another, or in a few cases, from one professional NGOs to another. With this statement,
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respondents show their disapproval for competitor’s strategy and methodology. Since their
projects do not show visible positive results, they might as well not be doing anything. Implied is
an affirmation on the superiority of the respondent’s organization.
The CNC, the oldest official farmers union in Mexico, is the only NGO that is viewed
negatively opinions from all kinds of NGOs, intermediary or popular, local or national. Of the
ten respondents who mentioned it, eight gave a negative opinion, one a mixed one, and one, who
is in an NGO affiliated with it, did not give any opinion at all. The following comments sum up
the major criticisms that this official union is facing with the relative decline of the PRI in
national politics: ‘They are present only in times of elections, and to legalize cars13’, ‘It is a
matter of proselytism for a party,’ or ‘They are people organized for the government. They serve
the government, they don’t serve the people of the country. The proposals come from the
government, they are not decisions of the campesinos, they are decisions that attack the
campesino.’ Historically, the PRI used the CNC to secure the farmers’ vote, known in Mexico as
the ‘green vote’. It is seen as an instrument of the government to control the farmers. One
respondent articulates the political nature of the organization as the cause of its decline: ‘The
organization has deteriorated because the government used it to do its dirty work. It lost
credibility. People are leaving [it].’

13

This refers to the legalization of illegally imported US cars. It is possible to drive a car
registered in the US for a maximum of six months in Mexico, after which one has to pay
extremely high import taxes. Since cars are a lot cheaper in the US than in Mexico, many
migrants break this law, or use personal favors to legalize cars without paying the import taxes.
Some politically-connected organizations have specialized in lobbying local officials for this
purpose, particularly in the Zona Media.
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Another common reason to express a negative opinion of an NGO is not necessarily its
lack of impact, or its compromising ties with the PRI, but the corruption of leaders who divert
organizational resources for personal use. Accusations of corruption are hard to substantiate,
since NGOs are notoriously poor at keeping financial records and the government seldom
evaluates the projects it funds. Respondents based their claims on the lifestyle that some NGO
leaders, who vouch to be nothing more than ejidatarios, display for all to see. Some have enough
money to afford a car and several cellular phones, while their peers can barely afford a cheap
collective taxi in town. The corruption that plagues public and business sectors in Mexico does
not spare NGOs.
The Alianza de Productores de la Huasteca (Producers’ Alliance of the Huasteca) is one
of the most notorious case of embezzlement in San Luis Potosí. This NGO started in the early
1990s as an ambitious project of the INI and SEDESOL to federate farmers’ organizations in all
the municipios of the Huasteca. The idea was to centralize the commercialization of the major
local agricultural products,14 and to secure profitable commercial contracts for the farmers
instead of relying on intermediaries. A network of small grocery stores was created in isolated
communities, along with a supply center. Problems arose early because many members could not
afford to travel to the headquarters in Ciudad Valles to attend meetings. Little by little, member
grassroots organizations left the NGO. In 1996, it still received a substantial government loan to
finance income-generating agricultural projects. The councilmen in charge of the piloncillo and
orange projects simply took the money and vanished. The other projects never materialized

14

Sugar cane, tranformed into rough sugar cones called piloncillo, orange, coffee, cereals, honey,
and cattle, are currently the main agricultural goods produced in the Huasteca.
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either, and none of the benefitting GROs bothered to reimburse the loans. Today, the imposing
concrete edifice of the Alliance stands on the outskirts of Ciudad Valles, abandoned. Even
though the Alliance still exists formally it is no longer active. Its most dedicated members are
now in charge of the food supply center, which survives as an independent NGO.
Listening to NGOs talking about each other, what emerges is not a picture of a united
community but a set of distinct groups of NGOs. The NGOs created by the INI have privileged
ties with each other, as do the FMDR centrales, or SMOs of similar political tendencies. Many
are aware of this situation, and thus are pessimistic about the Potosino NGO community. They
do not see how they can overcome the indifference of the government, to obtain more resources
and influence on public policy, if they do not present a united front, and articulate coherent
demands. Each NGO perceives itself and its contact NGOs as worthwhile organizations, but sees
the other groups of NGOs adhering to different ideologies or methods as bad. Cooperation is
limited to the in-group.
In 1999 a government initiative created the State NGO Council, to bring the NGOs closer
together and foster the cooperation that does not seem to take place spontaneously.15 It is part of
a national network represented in each state. As part of this national network, the council has
access to information on a large directory of NGOs all over the country. It can interact with them
during regular national seminars and conferences and receives a wealth of information to

15

I was not able to determine exactly what role the governor’s office played in the creation of the
State NGO Council. The president of the NGO Council was reluctant to allude to any political
links, and outsiders based their accounts on rumors rather than facts. The most plausible story
holds that after repeated requests on the part of NGO activists to receive government support, the
governor simply approved the creation of the council. But it does not provide it with any
material resources.
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transmit to NGOs, including educational material. Its mission in San Luis Potosí, according to its
president, focuses on six themes, i.e., the integration of all Potosino NGOs in the Council, the
promotion of a law on NGOs, the training of NGO members, assistance with project design,
fund-raising, and diffusion of information. Its only financial resources come from association
dues of 1,000 pesos16 per year per member NGO. It relies on volunteers to carry out its activities,
from a small office in downtown San Luis Potosí.
The president of the Council regards as an achievement the membership of 70 NGOs,
which in reality represents less than one tenth of the total NGO population in the state. Only
eight of the rural NGOs in the survey mention it among their contacts, which suggests limited
impact. One respondent in Matehuala comments: ‘I have not seen that this network [the NGO
council] has much influence. They have a lot of weight in the capital, not in the rest of the state,
because there are few [NGOs].’ The reason why few NGOs outside of the city of San Luis Potosí
know and join the Council is not their small number, as this respondent believes, but lack of
promotion by the Council. With scarce resources, it is easier to concentrate efforts in the capital
city where the media and government agencies are geographically concentrated, and where the
majority of Potosino NGOs are based.
Yet, lack of resources is only part of the story. Not all those aware of the existence of the
NGO Council approve of its activities and plan to join. The handful of NGO members who
report clear links with the Council are all open supporters of the PRI. The Council president may
deny any involvement in political affairs, but it is difficult for others to avoid making the
connection. Even outside the NGO sector, its legitimacy is undermined by the fact that it was

16

About $100.
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created under the auspices of the PRI state governor. While claims that the NGO is under direct
government control are probably inaccurate, its president still relies on a network of
acquaintances among PRI supporters to promote it. Politically-neutral individuals are likely to be
left out, and those with other political ideologies harbor hostile feelings toward an organization
set up by ‘the enemy.’ Thus, rather than constituting a much needed federation of all NGOs, the
State NGO Council has generated its own clique.
The global picture of the NGO sector, at least as far as rural NGOs are concerned, is that
of a collection of such cliques. Cliques entertain superficial contacts with each other, but rarely
do these lead to productive cooperation. Even though they report limited presence of other
NGOs with similar activities on their territory- which indicates that competition is low- they
perceive themselves as competing against one another. This defiant attitude hurts their ability to
act as an effective lobby in their dealings with government agencies, and to secure more
resources. Resource dependency does explain some of the patterns of contacts among NGOs, and
between NGOs and government agencies. It does not explain, however, the regional differences
in the presence of NGOs, since most government funding programs are available uniformly
throughout the state. Rather, the cases of the State NGO Council and the various offices of the
INI suggest that political factors play as important a role as geographical variations in socioeconomic factors. In the next chapter, I discuss the social and political context influences the
development of the NGO sector in each regions.
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CHAPTER 9: EXPLAINING REGIONAL DIFFERENCES:
THE HUASTECA AS A NICHE FOR NGOS
The geographic distribution of NGOs showed that at the regional level, most NGOs
operate in the Huasteca. This area has high levels of poverty, but also abundant natural resources
that give it potential for income-generating development projects. Rather than government
funding, which is not location-specific, the limiting factor for the establishment of the NGO
population appears to be access to natural resources. The activities that are found
disproportionately in this region, however, are not income-generating projects, but development
education and advocacy. Thus, resource-dependency theory as it stands does not provide a
satisfying explanation for the proliferation of NGOs in the Huasteca. In this chapter, I will
explain the reason why the Huasteca has become a niche for Mexican NGOs. First, I will
describe the local NGO community in comparison with NGOs in the rest of the state. Second, I
will describe the historical factors that have made the Huasteca a geographic and organizational
niche for NGOs. Third, I will show how this specificity has increased the politicization of local
NGOs. Finally, I will use the case of the Program for Sustainable Development to show the
implications of the particular relations of Huasteca NGOs to politics for the rural development of
the region.
9.1.

The Specificity of the Huasteca NGO Population
In Chapter 6, I presented the geographical distribution of rural NGOs by type of activity.

Activities of advocacy and development education are over-represented in the Huasteca, but
income-generating projects are not as predominant as they are in the other regions of the state.
Huasteca NGOs appear more policy-oriented than other NGOs. Table 19 provides a comparison
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of the characteristics of the NGO in the sample, distinguishing between the NGOs that work in
the Huasteca, and these that work in other areas of San Luis Potosí.1
For this analysis the NGOs that claimed to operate in all the state are allocated to the
regions where they were most active. The Federation of UAIMs and El Barzón, which are based
in Ciudad Valles, carry out most of their work in the Huasteca, even though they also work with
the other parts of the state, so they were considered Huasteca NGOs. Other statewide rural
NGOs are based in San Luis Potosí, and do most of their work around the capital city. Because
traveling to the Huasteca is costly, they have less weight in this region, so they will be
considered non-Huasteca NGOs.
Table 19 shows that Huasteca NGOs differ from other Potosino NGOs in various ways.
First, they are significantly younger. The average age of Potosino NGOs is nearly eighteen
years, while in the Huasteca, it is less than eight. The large difference, however, is largely due to
the presence of two outliers outside the Huasteca, namely La Forestal and the CNC, both over 60
years old. If we consider the median, half of the NGOs in the Huasteca are eight years old or
younger, while in the rest of the state, half are nine years old or younger. The difference is
reduced, but NGOs in the Huasteca still tend to be younger. The recent Mexican boom in the
NGO population is more apparent in the Huasteca than in other regions of San Luis Potosí.
The circumstances of the creation do not vary significantly between Huasteca and other
Potosino NGOs. Neither do their goals for the most part. For the sample, despite the existence of
a sizeable group of INI-created NGOs in the Huasteca, nearly double the proportion of NGOs
were created by a government initiative outside this region. In the Huasteca, almost a quarter of

1

The table does not include information on budget because of missing data.
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Table 19: Comparison Between NGOs in the Huasteca and in Other Regions
Variablea

Huasteca

Other Regions

N

Average number of years of activity*

7.79

17.83

51

Circumstances of the creation
Created by a government agencyb
Created by another NGOb
Nationally based

21.2%
24.2%
33.3%

38.9%
16.7%
61.1%

51
51
51

Goalsc
Economic development
Social development
Sustainability
Environmental conservation
Local institution building
Land distribution
Cultural preservation
Promotion and defense of human rights*

69.7%
60.6%
15.2%
24.2%
33.3%
15.2%
18.2%
36.4%

72.2%
50.0%
5.6%
22.2%
44.4%
5.6%
11.1%
5.6%

51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51

45.5%
45.5%
4.10
4352.05
63.08

44.4%
50.0%
7.23
508.83
26.08

51
51
49
35
41

Financial resources
Include operational costs in their budget*
Receive funds from the government
Receive funds from businessesb*
Receive funds from international donorsb
Receive donations
Charge for their servicesb
Receive punctual contributions from members
Charge regular membership duesb

28.1%
56.3%
6.3%
21.9%
31.3%
15.2%
65.6%
13.3%

61.1%
50.0%
27.8%
22.2%
56.6%
33.2%
55.6%
23.5%

50
50
50
50
50
51
50
47

Material resources
Have an office
Have a vehicle**
Have a phoneb
Have a computer
Have access to the Internet*
Produce an annual report*

59.4%
9.1%
86.7%
51.9%
25.9%
30.3%

82.4%
43.8%
88.2%
66.7%
61.1%
61.1%

49
51
47
45
45
52

Human resources
Intermediary NGOs
Have paid staff
Average number of paid staff
Average number of membersd*
Average number of volunteersd

*: p<.05, **: p<.01.
a
For the means, a t-test was performed, and for the percentages, a chi-square.
b
Fisher’s exact test is reported.
c
Respondents could give several answers.
d
Excluding the CNC, which is an outlier, with 172848 members, and 2240 regular volunteers.
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the sample NGOs (24.2%) were created by another NGOs, against 16.7% in the other regions.
All in all, about half of the NGOs statewide were created by local initiative, showing no regional
difference for the Huasteca and the other Potosino NGOs. More noticeable is the difference in
the proportion of NGOs affiliated to a national NGO, which reaches almost two-thirds of the
surveyed NGOs (61.1%) outside the Huasteca, but only a third in the Huasteca (33.3%).2
In terms of organizational goals, most are quite similar. NGOs in the Huasteca are more
likely to take into account the theme of sustainability, with 15.6% of them mentioning it, against
only one NGO in the rest of the state. The tropical resources of the Huasteca make it more
attractive for groups concerned with environmental sustainability, while most NGOs are worried
about economic sustainability. The same proportions of NGOs in both groups mention land
distribution. The proportion of Huasteca NGOs concerned with this issue used to be higher but
has declined recently because of the government’s decision to formally end land reform in
Mexico with a few last-minute land grants by the governor of San Luis Potosí at the beginning of
the 1990s. Some NGOs, including the MOCACO, told me that now that the governor had given
them some land, they focus more on generating income than on asking for more land.
The only notable regional difference in NGO goals is for the promotion of human rights,
including women’s and indigenous rights. It is a goal for over a third of the Huasteca NGOs
(36.4%), but only one (5.6%) of the other Potosino rural NGOs. Human rights organizations
exist in urban areas, particularly in San Luis Potosí and in Matehuala. For instance, Mujer,
Igualdad y Lucha (Woman, Equality and Struggle) is a renowned women’s organization based in
San Luis Potosí, active almost exclusively in this urban area. In rural areas, the issue of human

2

The results of the chi-square is significant at the .10 level.
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rights is more salient in the Huasteca than in other regions of the state. As I explain later, the
social and ethnic context causes this difference. In Mexico, indigenous areas have greater human
rights violations, particularly by law enforcement, such as police brutality, lack of access to an
interpreter, or lack of legal representation. Rightly or wrongly, outsiders often perceive
indigenous communities are more patriarchal than mestizo communities, and thus include the
promotion of women’s rights in their activities.3
The two groups have unequal access to financial and material resources, but not to human
resources. The percentage of intermediary NGOs versus popular NGOs is comparable in each
category, with 45% of intermediary NGOs in the Huasteca, and 44% in the other areas.
Likewise, about half the NGOs in both groups employed paid staff. NGOs in the Huasteca have
on average fewer employees, but the difference is not statistically significant.4 The Huasteca
NGOs have a stronger popular base, with a significantly higher average membership, and a
higher number of volunteers. The average membership in the Huasteca is more than four times
higher than for other rural NGOs. This is due to the presence of a number of social movement
organizations in the Huasteca. Those try to gather large numerical support to organize public
demonstrations and pressure the government.

3

Of the 12 Huasteca NGOs to have human rights activities, only 3 were created by indigenous
people themselves. The preoccupation for indigenous or women’s rights more commonly comes
through the influence of national headquarters, non-indigenous professionals, or non-indigenous
local residents.
4

Removing La Forestal, which is an outlier with 70 employees, the average number of paid staff
for NGOs outside the Huasteca drops to 3.59, or lower than for Huasteca NGOs. The t-test is not
significant at the .05 level of confidence.
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NGOs outside the Huasteca, however, seem to have an advantage in terms of financial
and material resources. While a slightly higher proportion of Huasteca NGOs receive funds from
government agencies (56.3% of Huasteca NGOs against 50.0% of other NGOs) and
contributions from members (65.6% of the Huasteca NGOs against 55.6% of other NGOs), more
of the other Potosino NGOs receive funds from businesses, international donors, individuals
donations, regular membership dues, and fees they charge for their services.5 Overall, NGOs
outside the Huasteca gather financial resources from a broader pool of donors.
This unequal access to financial resources is reflected in access to material resources.
While the majority of all NGOs have access to a phone, a regional difference exists for all other
resources. Less than one out of ten Huasteca NGOs (9.1%) possesses a vehicle, but nearly half
the other NGOs (43.8%) do. A quarter of Huasteca NGOs (25.9%) have access to the Internet,
against nearly two-thirds of the other NGOs (61.1%). Even though the difference is not
statistically significant, the proportion of Huasteca NGOs in the sample that have an office or a
computer is also smaller. Huasteca NGOs are more limited in their ability to travel to access
their beneficiaries, to meet them in a central structure, and to communicate with other
organizations.
Significantly fewer Huasteca NGOs produce an annual report, or include operating costs
in their budget. As a group, Huasteca NGOs are less bureaucratized, more amateurish, than other
rural NGOs of San Luis Potosí. Even though they gather larger numbers of members, and are as
likely to receive government money, they do not charge for their services or for membership
dues, and do not have a formal organizational structure, such as an office and communication

5

The difference is statistically significant only for business contributions.
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equipment. The greater formalization of Potosino NGOs outside the Huasteca may be due to
their greater tendency to be part of a national NGO that provide an organizational blueprint for
local branches. The data, however, do not allow direct verification of this supposition. What
these elements show us more clearly is that Huasteca NGOs are not as transparent in their daily
operations and accounting procedures as the other Potosino NGOs. For some, such as Ecocultur
or the Unidad Cultural Nahua in Xilitla, the lack of accountability comes from a lack of
resources. For others, it may be part of a strategy to avoid government interference or a scheme
for corrupt leaders to use organizational resources for their own benefit.
Do the greater human but fewer material resources of Huasteca NGOs influence the
structure of their social network? Tables 20 and 21 provide part of the answer. Table 20
compares the perceived organizational environment for both groups. The t-test did not yield any
statistically significant difference, either for the sectoral distribution, or their organizational
scale. The average number of known organizations is very similar in both groups (seven in the
Huasteca, 7.4 for the other NGOs). NGOs in the Huasteca have contacts with, on average, 2.5 of
these organizations, against 3.3 for other NGOs, but they perceive more known organizations
negatively. In most cases, NGOs in the Huasteca mention fewer organizations in each sectoral or
scale category, except for grassroots organizations (1.2 known organizations in the Huasteca,
and 0.9 outside) and local organizations (2.9 and 2.4 known local organizations for each group).
Even though the population of NGOs is larger in the Huasteca, the NGOs there reported fewer
NGOs. It is possible, however, that given the large number of communities in the Huasteca, the
territorial overlap between NGOs in this region is not as marked as in other areas.
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Table 20: T-test on the Average Number of Known Organizations, for Huasteca NGOs and
Other Potosino NGOs (N=46)
Variable

Huasteca

Other Regions

All organizations
Organizations with which the NGO has contacts
Perceived negativelya

7.0
2.5
3.0

7.4
3.3
2.2

Sectoral Distribution
Government agencies
NGOs
Grassroots Organizations
Businesses
Schools and Universities
Multilateral Organizations

3.0
1.8
1.2
0.1
0.03
0.0

3.9
2.7
0.9
0.4
0.4
0.1

Distribution by Organizational Scale
Local Organizationsb
2.9
National Organizations
2.6
Potosino State-level Organizations
1.2
c
Foreign Organizations
0.2
a
For the 39 NGOs which listed at least one known organization.
b
A local organization covers a portion of a state, from a community to a region.
c
Excluding multilateral organizations.

2.4
3.3
1.6
0.0

Even though the perception of other organizations does not vary by region, the social
networks of NGOs do, as shown in Table 21. Fewer NGOs in the Huasteca are in touch with a
significantly smaller number of organizations than other NGOs. Differences also occur in the
distribution of contacts by sector and by organizational scale. The largest differences are for
contacts with businesses and schools and universities. Huasteca NGOs, on average, have
contacts with less than one school or university (0.6), and almost no businesses (0.3), while other
rural NGOs have contacts with respectively almost two schools (1.9) and over three businesses.
The lack of contacts with the business community may be one cause of the lack of financial
resources derived from this sector in the Huasteca.
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Table 21: T-test on the Average Number of Contacts of Huasteca NGOs and Other Potosino
NGOs (N=48)
Variable

Huasteca

Total Number of Contacts*

Other Regions

13.2

22.6

Sectoral Distribution
Government Agencies*
NGOs
Grassroots Organizations*
Schools and Universities**
Businesses***
Foundations
Multilateral Organizations*

6.3
5.0
0.8
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.2

9.8
5.0
1.8
1.9
3.4
0.7
0.6

Distribution by Organizational Scale of the Contact
Federal Organizations**
Local Organizationsa
Potosino State-level Organizations
Foreign Organizationsb*

4.6
3.9
3.4
0.6

8.8
6.3
4.8
1.6

Types of Contactsc
Gives the contact information*
6.3
Gets information from the contact*
6.0
Attend meetings together*
5.9
Request resources of the contact**
4.5
Receives/makes occasional letter or visit
4.8
Cooperation on development projects*
4.3
Friendship ties
3.3
Attend the contact’s seminars*
2.6
Fulfill legal requirements
2.2
Organizes seminars that the contact attends*
1.2
Executes work contracts for the contact
1.1
Provides resources to the contact**
0.7
d
Share individual members
0.4
Commercial contractd
0.1
*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001.
a
A local organization covers a portion of a state, from a community to a region.
b
Excluding multilateral organizations.
c
See Appendix A for the exact questionnaire labels.
d
Additional type of contact, spontaneously offered by respondents.
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12.3
12.7
10.7
9.7
8.6
9.3
7.5
7.6
4.1
5.8
2.4
3.2
0.6
0.5

Huasteca NGOs are also in touch with significantly fewer government agencies (6.3
versus 9.8), grassroots organizations (0.8 versus 1.8), and multilateral organizations (0.2 versus
0.6). Table 20 has shown that NGOs in all parts of the state are aware of the work of roughly the
same number of government organizations. Huasteca NGOs even mention slightly more
grassroots organizations in their immediate environment. Clearly, this knowledge of the local
environment does not translate into a larger social networks for NGOs in the Huasteca. The only
sector for which both groups do not differ is contacts with other NGOs. On average, five NGOs
are reported. However, bearing in mind again the larger population of NGOs in the Huasteca, we
could have expected Huasteca NGOs to have more NGO contacts than the other Potosino NGOs.
Examining the distribution by organizational scale, we see that Huasteca NGOs lag
behind other NGOs at all levels, but mostly for contacts with the levels most remote from the
local environment, that is, federal and foreign organizations. The fact that more NGOs outside
the Huasteca are linked to a national structure may help them reach these organizations, through
their central offices in Mexico City. The difference for local organizations is also notably high,
even though not statistically significant.
Finally, the distribution by type of contacts indicates that Huasteca NGOs lag behind for
all contacts, not a few specific ones. Looking simply at the significant differences, it appears that
Huasteca NGOs exchange information and other resources with less organizations, attend fewer
meetings with other organizations, cooperate with fewer organizations on development projects,
and attend or organize fewer seminars. A gap exist, but is not significant, in the number of visits,
friendship ties, legal requirements, work contracts, the sharing of members, and commercial
contracts. These two types are actually less consequential, because they are mentioned by only a
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handful of organizations. If we exclude work contracts, the contacts of Huasteca NGOs with
other organizations are mostly informal, sporadic, and yield few concrete benefits for NGO
activities, since the exchange of resources is limited. This structure is close to the structure of
NGO contacts with each other described in Chapter 8. This is understandable, since NGOs
occupy a larger place in the social network of Huasteca NGOs than other Potosino NGOs.
From the analysis in this section, we can conclude that the Huasteca constitutes a niche
that favors creation of NGOs, but these NGOs are not as organized as the other Potosino NGOs.
Huasteca NGOs tend to be younger, less bureaucratic, more informal in their daily operations.
They are less accountable than other rural NGOs in San Luis Potosí. The relative lack of
bureaucracy, rather than being the organizational advantage often praised in the NGO literature,
limits the activities of Huasteca NGOs. They have less access to material resources, particularly
for transportation and communication. Their social network is smaller and less diversified than
the network of other NGOs. Yet they can rely on a larger membership and pool of volunteers.
How can we explain these organizational differences? The history and social development of the
Huasteca, compared with the development of the rest of San Luis Potosí, can help us answer this
question.
9.2.

The Historical Development of the Huasteca
In contrast to the semi-arid climate and high altitude that make up three-quarters of the

state of San Luis Potosí, as well as most of Northern Mexico, the Huasteca seems to have been
transplanted from Southern Mexico to the Eastern corner of the state. Rather than mines, bare
hills, cacti, and herds of goats and donkeys, it exhibits the luxurious selva, cattle ranching,
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plantations of coffee, orange, or sugarcane, in addition to the traditional milpas.6 Rather than a
population of mestizos and criollos, it possesses a large indigenous population of Teenek and
Nahua. If these characteristics make the Huasteca the only tourist attraction of what is otherwise
considered the ugliest state of Mexico, they are the result of a differential process of economic,
social, and political development that began before the Spanish conquest.
While it took the Spanish Conquistadores only two years to take over the Aztec empire,
they encountered strong resistance when they tried to expand their new colonies to the North of
Mexico. For 50 years, they battled against the nomadic indigenous groups of hunters and
gatherers who populated the high plateaux in what is now Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, and the
surrounding areas, which the Spanish gathered under the common name of Chichimecs (Monroy
Castillo and Calvillo Unna 1997). The Chichimecs were known as fierce warriors, and the
Spanish only managed to pacify the vast Northern territory by negotiating with the local tribes.
These people agreed to settle down, in exchange for food, clothing, and lodging. In the state of
San Luis Potosí, the major settlements were established around Venado in the Altiplano, and in
Mexquitic de Carmona and the city of San Luis Potosí. To secure this scheme, the
Conquistadores also brought in caravans of indigenous people from around Mexico City,
particularly the Tlaxcatecs. These mixed with the native groups, to whom they gave tactics to
fight against the colonial caciques to preserve their rights to land in the Spanish courts (Sego
1997). The strategy was so effective that all populations eventually merged together, and is now
identified as mestizo. No trace remains of the Chichimecs, other than the Pames of the
Northeastern portion of the Zona Media.

6

Small corn fields cultivated for family consumption.
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In the Huasteca, the history of indigenous settlements and the Spanish conquest is utterly
different. The Huasteca region covers parts of five of the present day Mexican states (San Luis
Potosí, Hidalgo, Veracruz, Querétaro, and Tamaulipas). The Teenek originally populated the
Potosino area.7 The economy was based on agriculture, organized in a system of numerous small
estates, each administered by a cacique, whose title was hereditary. The abundant resources of
the area made it a center of commercial exchanges between various pre-Columbian groups in the
area. In the fifteenth century, the expansion of the Aztec empire brought a group of Nahua, who
ruled over the Teenek on behalf of the Aztec emperor. The two ethnic groups, however,
remained culturally separated. When the Spanish took control of the area, they granted land titles
to conquistadores, who started the tradition of cattle ranching in the area. The local population
was given as encomienda, but managed to preserve its traditional political organization.8 Since
they were needed to perform agricultural labor and were already sedentary, the Teenek and
Nahua of the Huasteca were not exterminated or incorporated into other ethnic groups like the
Chichimecs.
The myths created in part by the Spanish conquistadores to facilitate their war of
colonization still underlie ethnic prejudice that mestizo Potosinos have against the indígenas.
The Spanish portrayed the Chichimecs as violent warriors to justify their extermination, while

7

Until recently, the indigenous people of the Huasteca were referred to as Huastecos, a term
coined by the Spanish conquistadores. The indigínas, as part of the movement to reclaim their
ethnic identity, consider this name a remnant of colonialism. They prefer the term Teenek, which
is how they refer to themselves in their native language (also called Teenek).
8

Since the Spanish crown prohibited direct enslavement of indigenous population, other control
mechanisms were designed. Under the encomienda, the local population had to pay tribute, in
kind or in labor, to the landowner, who had full control over them. The system was supposed to
protect native populations from slavery, but it often led to brutal treatments (de Janvry 1981).
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the Catholic missionaries who first came to the Huasteca depicted the Huastecs as pacific in
nature, but immoral savages because of their cult of fertility (Monroy Castillo and Calvillo Unna
1997). They were already a conquered people at the time of the Spanish colonization. Today, the
Mexican state emphasizes its Aztec heritage, to claim for the modern mestizo nation the pride of
an imperial ancestry. The Nahua, as the direct descendants of the Aztec, are also somewhat
idealized. This combination of myths explains the difference that Mexicans perceive among
ethnic groups, which are best exemplified by this statement by an NGO leader who spent the
better part of his professional life in indigenous affairs:
[The] Pames... are descendants of the Chichimecs. They were never conqueredwell they were by the [Catholic] church. They were nomads. They have their
culture, their language... The Teenek are more lunar, as if more feminine, more
passive. The Nahua are solar, domineering... For instance, the Teenek man carries
his children the same way as the women do, the Nahua men don’t... The Pames
worship the lightning, the rain, their cosmology is more from the North [of
Mexico].
Symbols of light, like the sun and the lightning, are signs of vitality, associated with a
male principle in many religions. The groups perceived as warriors, who emphasize these
symbols are now admired, while the agrarian society of the Teenek is looked down upon.9
Politically, the Teenek are considered harmless, while the Nahua pose a threat. As a perfect
illustration of the self-fulfilling prophecy, these prejudices have very real consequences. The
decision of the INI office in Tamazunchale to cut funding for the Nahua Regional Fund
radicalized this NGO, making it more combative than its Teenek counterpart. Yet, at the height

9

Contrary to what this informant reports, the Teenek, like the Aztecs, worshiped both the sun
and the moon, among other natural elements (Monroy Castillo and Calvillo Unna 1997).
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of the congressional battle against the reform of the Mexican Constitution regarding indigenous
groups, both Teenek and Nahua displayed similar levels of ardor and political mobilization.
The presence of the INI in the Huasteca is itself a result of the historical presence of an
indigenous population that sets it apart from the rest of San Luis Potosí (except for the small
Pame area). With the INI come public funds that can foster cultural, economic, and social
activities. The INI had an important part to play in the development of the NGO sector over the
past 10 years, as part of its federal mandate. It directly orchestrated the creation of two types of
NGOs: the Regional Funds, and NGOs offering legal assistance, which are referred to as
promotion of justice (INI 2000). The Regional Funds are micro-credit organizations. They grant
small loans to groups for income-generating projects at low interest. These structures follow a
national framework but are administered at the local level, with technical assessment from INI
staff.
Throughout the centuries, as the mining resources of San Luis Potosí declined,
agricultural resources became more important. Most arable land was in the hands of rich mine
owners who were eager to expand their estates when profits from mineral resources plummeted.
They invaded the ejido land that the Spanish law granted indigenous populations. In addition to
the mistreatment they endured at the hands of their Spanish caciques, this spoliation caused a
struggle for land ownership that has not yet ended in the Huasteca. Rebellions occurred in all
regions of the state, but the landless peasants were more successful in securing their land in less
fertile areas. The Zona Media witnessed intensive land struggle in the nineteenth century, but the
intensification of economic ties with the capital, involving trade and industrialization, pacified
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the area. On the contrary, in the Huasteca the federal army was called to quell a strong
indigenous rebellion at the end of the nineteenth century.
After the Mexican revolution strong agrarian movements gained power in San Luis
Potosí under the control of General Saturnino Cedillo, a revolutionary hero who administered the
state as a cacique from his estate in the Zona Media until the end of the 1930s. He supervised an
extensive program of land distribution that reduced inequality in the Zona Media and the
Altiplano. The Huasteca, however, remained under control of a few families, who intermarried to
maintain their power, and gained political power at the state level in the 1940s and 1950s. For
this reason, the institutionalization of politics took place later in San Luis Potosí than in other
states (Monroy Castillo and Calvillo Unna 1997).
In recent decades industrialization has decreased the importance of land in the Altiplano
and the Zona Media. A sizeable portion of the population also chooses to migrate to el otro
lado10 rather than scraping a living from the land. The cacique system, however, endures in the
Huasteca. It perpetuates a highly unequal economic stratification system, based on latifundism,
where a ruling elite of landowners faces a mass of landless, indigenous campesinos. In addition
to controlling most of the land, latifundistas also control the trade of the main commodities.
They act as wholesalers, to whom the campesinos sell their oranges, coffee, or piloncillo. In
exchange for payment facilities and credit, they offer a very low price, and maintain the
campesinos’ economic dependence.
Land distribution has not been as widespread in the Huasteca owing to political
repression. San Luis Potosí had always been closely involved in national politics. In the 1960s,

10

‘The other side’, meaning the United States.
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the state intellectuals took an active part in an emerging democratic movement, incurring brutal
repression (Monroy Castillo and Calvillo Unna 1997). The caciques of the Huasteca were
subsequently successful in labeling local movements organized to claim land as political unrest,
thus making extensive use of the police and the army to quell them. The struggle for land was
particularly violent in the Huasteca in the 1970s and 1980s. A few leaders recall these difficult
times, and one of them relates his personal experience as follows:
We started because we saw that it was very deplorable, sad that there were paid
land lot, land to distribute to the compañeros... We had to take to the streets,
block government agencies, the Water Commission, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. We had to invade the land for them [the government] to give us the
land... This was not easy. We had many problems with the system, including
threats, beatings, imprisonments. We had to go and pay bail in jail because of this
situation. I did not think that helping people with limited economic means was
forbidden, and for this they put me in jail, they beat us up.
In the midst of the land struggle came the federal project of the Pánuco basin, involving
the Planicie area of the Huasteca. This Mexican white elephant was intended to become the
largest irrigation basin in Latin America. A basin of 720,000 hectares in the plain of the river
Pánuco was to become irrigated arable land, and cattle ranching would be replaced by cereals
and horticulture. It would cover parts of the Huasteca in Eastern San Luis Potosí (the Planicie),
Northern Veracruz, and Southern Tamaulipas. The ambitious project included razing the
rainforest, controlling the course of the river, installing vast irrigation infrastructure,
redistributing the land to campesinos, and creating new human settlements (Aguilar Robledo and
Muñoz Rodríguez 1992). The Potosino segment was named the Pujal-Coy project after the two
affluents of the river Pánuco that defined it.
The Pujal-Coy project was implemented in two phases, between 1973 and 1988, in a
process that is intertwined with the development of social movements in the area. It began in the
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midst of a strong campesino movement for land redistribution, centering around the organization
Campamento Tierra y Libertad (Camp Land and Freedom).11 The movements coveted the
Planicie, because it had higher agricultural potential than the steep slopes of the Sierra Madre at
the South of the Huasteca. The land, however, was in the hands of cattle ranchers who strongly
opposed the Pujal-Coy project, even though they would be compensated for expropriation. They
used their political power to repress of the movements and assassinate the leader of Campamento
Tierra y Libertad (Cervantes Rosales 1992).
Many suspect, however, that the federal government was eager to see the completion of
Pujal-Coy to weaken campesino movements on a national scale. Even though some of the land
was given to local residents, the project was so vast that it justified bringing groups from other
states. The new communities and the ejidos that were created as part of the project included
natives of the area, as well as Teenek and Nahua from the Sierra Madre, landless peasants from
the Altiplano, Veracruz or Guanajuato, and representatives of a multitude of indigenous groups
from Southern Mexico. Government agencies actively broke down the old social structure to
create heterogenous settlements (Muñoz Rodríguez 1992).
This strategy, however, not only weakened the social movements but the productive
structure as a whole. The ejido structure itself implies the existence of trust among its members,
since campesinos manage the land collectively. They may not all organize labor collectively, but
they enforce common rules for the management of the irrigation infrastructure. People who had
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Land and freedom was the slogan of Emiliano Zapata, one of the central figures of the
Mexican revolution. In contrast with the other revolutionary hero, the violent bandit Pancho
Villa, Emiliano Zapata was an indigenous landless peasant, with whom many campesinos can
still identify. Numerous ejidos and campesino organizations bear his name.
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no roots in the area, and even different cultural backgrounds, did not readily work together.
Moreover, many of the outsiders brought to the area were not familiar with the modern
agricultural technology required for irrigation. The system of extension and credit that the
government had promised quickly showed dysfunctions caused by lack of planning and lack of
funds. The campesinos were left with a working irrigation infrastructure, but no tools to work the
land, no schools or hospitals, and in some cases, no electricity or running water (Díaz Cisneros
and Valtierra Pacheco 1992).
All these factors contributed to the failure of the project. Some campesinos simply sold
their land back to the latifundistas, packed their bags, and left. Others now rent their lots. For the
most part, the area has reverted to cattle ranching, instead of the grain production envisioned by
the government. Many, like this activist, now lament the project as an ecological disaster:
...The most absurd of all absurdities in the history of the Huasteca, Luis
Echevarría’s12 decision, where they imagined building the largest reservoir in
Latin America, to have the largest granary in the world, they said. It was the
Pujal-Coy reservoir... Therefore, they deforested, they tore out the trees, then they
compacted the ground to make the roots disappear. One company made a fortune
with the wood. It stopped after the deforestation because there was no money. So
from 850,000 ha of selva, now we have less than 100,000... Since the area was
humid, it had much biodiversity. Production should have been according to a
biodiverse model, but we Mexicans, we have to do things head over heels!...
There was a lot of money, there was a lot of wealth, but first it ended the
biodiversity. We killed the goose that lays the golden eggs.
Pujal-Coy, however, put the Huasteca on the map for many national organizations. While
the nation-wide political repression of the 1970s left activists in the Huasteca to fend for
themselves, the beginning of democratization in the 1980s allowed several national peasant
movements to emerge. They quickly sent representatives to the Pujal-Coy area, or contacted
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Luis Echevarría was president of Mexico from 1970 to 1976.
247

existing local groups, to try and incorporate them in their national structure. In the Huasteca such
organizations include the CODUC, the CIOAC, the UNORCA, and the CCC,13 among others. By
the time the Huasteca structures started functioning, however, the fight for land distribution was
coming to an end. The organizations, rather than abandoning the area, adapted their strategy to
focus on other pressing issues. The Huasteca is still an attractive area for them, because
problems of economic inequality were not solved by the Pujal-Coy project. Now social
movement organizations demand the completion of the social infrastructure in the Pujal-Coy
area, and micro-credit for income-generating projects. They also try to organize the
commercialization of the local agricultural products, to bypass traditional intermediaries, and
guarantee the campesinos a fair price.
Recently these organizations have found another area to diversify their activities. With
the rebellion in Chiapas, the issue of indigenous rights has gained national attention. The
government itself, through the INI, has been active by creating NGOs focusing exclusively on
legal assistance for indigenous groups, who face regular discrimination by the Mexican justice
system. In the Huasteca, two such NGOs exist, one for the Teenek, and one for the Nahua. Local
groups have also emerged, such as the Consejo de Lucha Indígena de la Huasteca Potosina
(Indigenous Struggle Council of the Potosino Huasteca) or the Parlamento Indio Estatal
Campesino y Popular (State Indian [sic], Peasant and Popular Parliament).14 The local offices of
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The Huasteca representatives of the CCC broke away from the national office recently, due to
ideological disagreement. The branch is now known as the CCCP, or Potosino CCC.
14

Two NGOs now claim this name. Initially, this federation of NGOs gathered ten social
movement organizations. They organized a march of protest on San Luis Potosí, where the
governor offered to negotiate. The member organizations disagreed on what to do, and split. Five
started the negotiation process, and the other five went back to the Huasteca. Both still refer to
248

national organizations are minimally involved, by adding a paragraph on indigenous rights in
their mission statement so that their members do not leave them for another organization.
In sum, the history of the Huasteca explains the concentration of rural NGOs. First,
unlike the rest of the state, it has a large indigenous population and a high agricultural potential.
In this sense the Huasteca is more similar to the Southern states of Mexico, such as Chiapas or
Oaxaca, than to the Northern semi-arid states. While other areas, particularly in the Altiplano,
endure comparable levels of poverty, none has experienced such pronounced social stratification.
In the communities of the Altiplano, everyone has more or less similar standards of living, and
everyone thinks of migration as the easiest way out of poverty. In the Huasteca wealth and
political power are concentrated in the hands of a few families. In a municipio, one family may
own the vast majority of the land in the area, providing seasonal agricultural work for landless
peasants, purchase the production of the remaining small-holders, and control the Presidencia
Municipal.
The unique combination of natural resources and social inequality makes the Huasteca a
niche for rural NGOs, both endogenous and exogenous. Local leaders emerge, who organize
protests to improve their situation. National organizations come to gain support from the
disgruntled groups of campesinos or indígenas. For this reason, the state is divided between an
area of limited NGO activity and an area of relative NGO proliferation. As the next section will
show, the characteristics of these NGOs also differ. The Huasteca NGOs appear as more
improvised and more competitive because of their reliance on vast numbers of members, but
they are also more involved in the local politics.

themselves as the Indian Parliament, confusing many locals.
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9.3.

The Political Involvement of Huasteca NGOs
When I began to ask informants to describe the NGO community of the Huasteca, I

received answers along these lines: ‘The ones in the Huasteca are more politicized. The ones of
the Altiplano are more active, they have proposals’ or ‘In the Huasteca, I am telling you that
there are two [NGOs], but the political ones, there are about 20.’ Respondents clearly favored the
apolitical NGOs of the Altiplano that focused their activity on income-generating projects,
against the politically active, but supposedly inefficient NGOs of the Huasteca. When I asked
NGO respondents to evaluate other NGOs, their view that an NGO was affiliated with a given
political party, or simply that they were ‘political’, implied a negative assessment. Often, the
alleged ties were only imaginary, but were intended to discredit a rival NGO.
The relation between NGOs and politics is complex, but can be classified in four
categories according to the nature of their relation to political parties and their political ambition
(Table 22). Political ambition means that either the individual members, or the organization, is
trying to gain political control at the local or national level. Official NGOs have official and
open ties to a political party. Sometimes are created by the party, like the CNC, but they do not
try to gain political power since that is the role of their party. An opportunistic NGO also has ties
to a party, but it has been set up by a politically ambitious individual or group of individuals as a
tool to launch or maintain their political career. Third, some NGOs confine their political activity
to protest, with no open ties to a party and no plan to enter elections. Some of the NGOs
involved in the fight for land distribution fall in this category. Finally, some NGOs were born as
social movements or project-oriented NGOs, but organize some of their activities as a political
party, planning to win political power at least at the local level in order to implement their social
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agenda. I label these civil society organizations to highlight the fact that they were born out of a
grassroots movement, not a special interest group.
Table 22: Typology of NGO Political Involvement, with Examples from the Huasteca in San
Luis Potosí
Party Affiliation
Yes
Yes
Political Ambition
No

No

Opportunistic NGO
(DEMITAN, Comité de
Desarrollo Regional Xilitla)

Civil Society Organization
(Frente Ciudadano Salvador
Nava, UNORCA)

Official NGO (CNC, Consejo
de Lucha Indígena de la
Huasteca Potosina)

Protest Organization (PIECP,
Movimiento Huasteco
Democrático)

The classification in Table 22 addresses only the political activity of NGOs. Most of the
NGOs in the Huasteca combine several types of activity, such as income-generating projects or
human rights advocacy, which are not included here. The categories are also not meant to
comment on NGO efficiency or accountability. In each category some NGOs have successfully
implemented projects or lobbied for their members, while others are nothing more than ghost
NGOs. The premise of this typology is that political involvement is not good or bad per se, but
that, as Korten (1990) indicated, political advocacy is a valid endeavor for NGOs. Of course, not
all NGOs, even in the Huasteca, are politically active. But it is difficult, even for the neutral
ones, not to be dragged into a local political feud. Not declaring a preference or an allegiance
may be interpreted as a sign of opposition.
The varieties of political involvement of NGOs in the Huasteca discussed below depart
sharply from Korten’s (1990) vision of four generations of NGOs, but fit within a local cultural
tradition. According to Korten, the NGO community would gradually move from charity, to self251

reliance, then to policy advocacy, and finally to the strengthening of independent local social
movements, under a guiding vision of global development.15 Though he specifies that the four
stages are not necessarily chronological, he does see each as building on the previous one.
In Mexico, however, NGOs have conceived of political action as their main goal from the
start. One may argue that since the NGO community developed later than in most other
countries, they simply imported an external form. This argument ignores the pre-existing
tradition of social movements in Mexico, which combined political action and charity or selfreliance. Current political activity of Mexican NGOs is not the result of exogenous influence, but
of the corporatist ruling of the PRI after the Mexican revolution.16 Any community action that
people undertake to obtain material benefits has always been enmeshed with political activities
at some level. Either (1) the PRI itself set up the organization to lower potential protest or
distribute gifts before an election, or (2) the leaders were ultimately co-opted, or (3) the group
was protesting government action, which meant opposing the PRI. If anything, the political ties
of Huasteca NGOs are remnants from the past, rather than innovations.
The negative perception of political involvement may actually come from a deficient
democratic culture with its attendant inability to distinguish between the state and the party in
Mexico. NGOs created by the government, particularly peasant unions, are viewed as agents of
the PRI. The history of the CNC tends to reinforce their point, since this union was merely an
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This ultimate stage remains speculative. Existing NGOs belong to the first three categories.

16

The discrepancy between my observations in Mexico and Korten’s theory may reflect a focus
on two different sub-populations of NGOs. He analyzes the activities of many international
NGOs, while my population consists almost exclusively of Southern NGOs. Only the use of
comparative data, which are not available, would establish whether this pattern is specific to
Mexico, or can be generalized to other communities of Southern NGOs.
252

instrument for the party to control campesinos, granting them favors in exchange for their vote.
Usually, respondents would say that ‘it is more political than social.’ Today, however, even the
CNC is trying to change its approach, adapting to the democratization of the country. The
presence of a PAN government in Mexico City is only encouraging them, since it is trying to
weaken what it sees as an agent of the PRI. Unable to rely on federal support, local branches of
the CNC have become just another social movement organization among others, all competing
for members.
Though official NGOs are not created to gain political power, but rather to ensure
political support for the candidates of their party, opportunistic individuals may use them for
political motives. One CNC official describes the former president, who was from the Huasteca,
as such:
The person who was in charge was not from the organization, and he came
looking for political space. It was personal interest. He was a cattle rancher, and I
think that to be in an organization like this you have to love it, and this had
repercussions all around the state because the support committee was not good.
Many members of the CNC that I have met, like this member of its state committee, believe in
the social mission of the organization and do not view it as an instrument of the PRI. In the
Huasteca the CNC created another NGO, the MOCACO, for the sole purpose of addressing the
issue of land redistribution. Rather than being an instrument of the PRI government, this NGO
organized protests and invaded latifundistas’ property, as other organizations did in the 1980s.
The PRI is no longer the only party to create its own NGOs, even though it still
dominates the category of official NGOs. In the Huasteca the PRD has supported the creation of
the Consejo de Lucha Indígena de la Huasteca Potosina (Indigenous Struggle Council of the
Potosino Huasteca). This NGO acts as an intermediary between ordinary citizens and
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government agencies at the municipal level. It channels individual or collective demands for
housing infrastructure, health services in isolated communities, government programs of
subsidized food items for children and women, or equipment for income-generating projects.
With the backing of the PRD, this newly formed organization is starting to achieve recognized at
the regional level. Not only do PRD state deputies help the NGO financially, but its party
affiliation gives it a clear identity and appeal. The PRD is a leftist party that has traditionally
defended small-holders and indigenous communities. The Huasteca is understandably the only
part of San Luis Potosí where it carries some weight.
For outsiders it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between official NGOs, which act
as the social branches of a political organization, and opportunistic NGOs, which hide political
ambitions behind social activities. Official NGOs always run the risk of being diverted from
their original purpose, as happened with the state representation of the CNC, but a change of
leadership can correct the situation. Opportunistic NGOs, however, are primarily set up to
promote individuals, and are likely to dwindle after the electoral campaign is over. DEMITAN is
a good example of this scenario.
DEMITAN, or Development of the Indigenous Woman of Tancanhuitz, was formally
created in 1995 by a group of politically active professionals (supporters of the PRI), residents or
native to Tancanhuitz, in the heart of the Zona Serrana. It is one of the few organizations in San
Luis Potosí primarily dedicated to the promotion of women’s rights. Its activities have evolved
over the years from consciousness-raising to income-generating projects. This evolution took
place not only to answer the beneficiaries’ requests, but to secure some funds for the NGO
activities, after it lost a United Nations Development Program grant. The ups and downs of

254

DEMITAN over the past 10 years have somewhat reflected the political fortune of its founders.
One of the founders, a member of a prominent family of Tancanhuitz that has combined
economic and political power for generations, explains that she created DEMITAN after a first
unsuccessful run for the Presidencia Municipal. The NGO allowed her to keep in touch with all
the communities of the municipio, without answering to party directives, in order to build a
popular base before the next election. As the informant remembers the period: ‘All the time I
was preparing for the Presidencia, I was going around as if I was campaigning all the time.
When I ran for the second time, I had a lot of support from the people.’ The respondent claimed
the work of the NGO to secure a political victory.
As all the original founders got involved in local politics, however, they lost interest in
DEMITAN. The NGO remained temporarily in the hands of a corrupt manager, who caused it to
lose its international funding before being fired. The several founders who work in the
Presidencia have secured funding for the technicians’ salary, an office, and the maintenance of a
vehicle. Since they invest little time in it, DEMITAN has reduced its activities to a few
communities. One technician comments bitterly: ‘When there are elections, they remember the
NGO. Right now, since there are no elections, the NGO is switched off.’ Even one of the
founders admits that: ‘We created an NGO when we did not have a job, and if we have a job, we
leave it aside. I am sure that the day we lose the Presidencia Municipal, we are all going to go as
volunteers with DEMITAN.’ The real focus on the NGO is to promote political candidates, even
though its activities have had a positive impact on women in isolated rural communities. This
prevents it from having a continued positive impact in the area and lowers its legitimacy in the
eyes of opponents of the PRI.
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Today NGO activists are aware of the difference between party politics and policy
advocacy. As one respondent sums up, ‘Politics are part of the human life, the two cannot be
divided. But what it can be is non-partisan. This, yes. Me wanting to influence federal policy,
this is politics. Now I must not be with a party.’17 In the mind of such respondents, party politics
are a sign that the mission of an NGO has been corrupted, but policy-advocacy is an entirely
honorable pursuit. The co-optation of NGOs by political parties who try to appropriate their
legitimacy is denounced nationally (Crespo 1995). Organizations such as the Consejo de Lucha
Indígena de la Huasteca Potosina are frowned upon, even though their concrete action is
positive, because they can potentially require beneficiaries’ political allegiance. A more laudable
type of NGO, in this respect, is the civil society organization, which tries to bring the concerns of
its members and beneficiaries into the political arena.
The Frente Ciudadano Salvador Nava (Salvador Nava Citizen Front), based in
Tamazunchale, is the best regional example of a civil society organization. Though its name
clearly states a political goal,18 it started its activities by lobbying the local and state
governments on behalf of citizen groups, to improve housing, or start income-generating
projects. Now, the organization comprises both a political party and an NGO. Its candidates were

17

While English distinguishes between policy and politics, Spanish only uses one word, política.
This is why respondents felt the need to clarify what they meant, and distinguish between being
political and being partisan. The first implies a concern with the public good, while the second
implies an ideological bias and a corruptive appetite for power.
18

Dr. Salvador Nava is one of the national celebrities of San Luis Potosí. In the 1960s, he started
a movement demanding more democracy, which was severely repressed, but made the state
famous as a stronghold of liberalism. Navismo was rekindled in the 1980s when Mexico started
its slow process of democratization. Several members of the Nava family now head NGOs
involved in the promotion of human rights in San Luis Potosí. The Citizen Front bears his name,
but has no family ties with Dr. Nava.
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elected at the Presidencia Municipal in Tamazunchale and Matlapa. Even though the Front has
no open plan, and probably little hope of gaining power all over the state, in the Huasteca it is
now a legitimate political force. In this case, contrary to what happens in official or opportunistic
NGOs, the NGO was not created to promote the ideology of a pre-existing party or to satisfy the
political ambition of a few individuals. Its political agenda is more pragmatic. Being in power in
a municipio is simply a way to make sure that whatever projects the members ask for will be
carried out without opposition from the local government. The socio-economic activities have
not been left behind when some leaders ascended to political power.
Of course, even if the Citizen Front does represent real grassroots interests, it hardly
represents all interests, and is accused of favoritism by outsiders. I was not able to personally
assess the veracity of these accusations, but breaking away from the pervasive culture of
clientelism in Mexico is generally difficult and may corrupt the long-term beneficial impact of
civil society organizations. Above all in the Huasteca, political leaders from new organizations
are surrounded by a majority of PRI leaders, many of them local caciques. Even if they manage
to allocate municipal funds as they wish, other funds still depend on state and federal level
decisions, where local caciques can exercise pressure. The situation of PRD leaders described by
Glenhill (1992) applies to the Frente Ciudadano as well. In order to counteract the political
moves of the PRI, representatives of other political ideologies adopt the same tactics, and show
favoritism to their supporters, instead of applying democratic principles.
Finally, some NGOs try to limit their political activities to policy advocacy and remain
completely outside of electoral politics. Some of these NGOs, born in the time of demands for
land distribution, have a radical view towards influencing government policy. Convinced that
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legal action and negotiation will not lead to positive results, they have turned to illegal acts such
as land invasion or road blockades, and to spectacular actions, including mass marches to the
state Parliament, month-long sit-ins, and hunger strikes. The Movimiento Huasteco Democrático
(Huastec Democratic Movement), a semi-underground organization, is a regional specialist in
these kinds of events. Despite the official end of the national program of land distribution in
1992, this organization continues to invade land belonging to latifundistas. These actions get it a
lot of attention in the press, but representatives of other NGOs have doubts about the
effectiveness of the strategy. Some claim that the government tolerates them to keep protest
under control.
Other NGOs, usually the local branches of national peasant unions, favor peaceful
dialogue with the government. In the Huasteca, these include CIOAC, CODUC, and UNORCA,
among others. Since several of them have privileged links to a political party at the national
level, they try to preserve their independence at the local level by separating the political and
social branches of their organization. Some of the representatives I interviewed specified that all
political negotiation was done at the national level and that the local offices focused on socioeconomic projects. Their protests were usually part of national actions orchestrated by their
headquarters. The UNORCA went as far as creating two NGOs, one in charge of development
projects, and another, the Red de Acción Democrática (Network of Democratic Action),
responsible for political action. At the local level, however, the separation is more theoretical
than real. In the Huasteca, the same person is in charge of income-generating projects and the
political branch.
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Since the state is not as repressive now as in the 1980s, NGOs may work with municipios
that are not governed by the party which ideology they support. The Consejo de Lucha Indígena
de la Huasteca Potosina, for instance, works in municipios that are not governed by the PRD. In
Tanlajas, PRI supporters are sometimes reluctant to work with SEDEPAC, a national NGO that
the PRD Presidente contacted. This NGO does not have a political agenda, however, and does
not select beneficiaries according to their political ideology. In this case as in others, NGOs do
not necessarily choose people with similar political views, or try to avoid political repression.
Rather the campesinos are suspicious of political adversaries, or sometimes respond to the
pressure of a local authority in order not to associate with the opposition.
The history of the Huasteca has favored the development of political activities among the
local NGO community to an extent that does not exist in other rural parts of San Luis Potosí. The
official and opportunistic NGOs reflect past political culture, the dominance of the PRI and of
local caciques, who combine economic and political power. Protest organizations continue a
tradition of social movements, either by limiting themselves to violent, and inefficient,
opposition to the government, or seeking influence over public policy through negotiations. Civil
society organizations take advantage of the democratization of the country and bring their social
agenda into the local political arena. In all cases, political NGOs are able to develop in the
Huasteca because of the existence of social demands that they aim to satisfy.
Involvement in politics often brings NGOs into competition, instead of cooperation,
explaining why representatives of NGOs with different political agendas judge each other
negatively. This competition has repercussions for the way government reacts to NGOs in
various parts of the state. Political activity is theoretically meant to bring beneficiaries’ needs to
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the attention of government, but political NGOs are not necessarily favored by the government.
As the case of the Sustainable Development Program will show, the existence of many
competing political NGOs may not be an asset for rural development.
9.4.

Example of the Program for Sustainable Development
In 1995, the World Bank and the FAO, in partnership with SAGARPA, began to design

the Programa de Desarrollo Productivo Sostenible en Zonas Rurales Marginadas (Rural
Development in Marginal Areas Project, hereafter Sustainable Development Program), to
improve productivity on small-scale farms, and increase food security. The Huasteca, given its
marginality, was one of the first regions targeted for this program.19 After two years of regional
diagnoses, the Mexican government signed a contract to receive a five-year loan from the World
Bank. Given the success of the initial phase, a second phase, which began in 1999, expanded the
project geographically to eleven new areas, including the Pame area and the Altiplano in San
Luis Potosí. The fact that San Luis Potosí is one of the states benefitting most from this project is
a consequence of its similarities with the Mexican Southern states: large rural population and
marginality, above all in the regions inhabited by a high proportion of indígenas.20
The Sustainable Development Program, now in its second phase, comprises four
components, for $55 million (World Bank 1999b). Most of the resources ($46 million) are
dedicated to a vast micro-credit program, intended to modernize local production structures,
provide more work opportunities in rural communities, and integrate the campesinos into the
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The first phase of the project was implemented in the Huasteca of San Luis Potosí, Hidalgo,
and Veracruz, and in three areas of the state of Oaxaca.
20

The other regions are in the Southern states of Chiapas, Guerero, and the Central states of
Puebla, Veracruz, and Michoacán.
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market economy. Second, the project should promote participatory development, particularly by
building local institutions. Third, the program recommends the provision of technical support to
beneficiaries in the implementation of community development projects. Finally, the decisionprocess is designed to be decentralized. Each region sets up a Council of Sustainable
Development, which examines proposals, allocates funds, and evaluates projects. In San Luis
Potosí, there are now four regions implementing the program: the Altiplano, the Pame area, and
the Huasteca, divided in the Planicie and the Zona Serrana.
The program is directed primarily to marginal areas, usually characterized by small landholdings (minifundism), low levels of agricultural technology and productivity, severe
degradation of the natural environment, and lack of infrastructure. They have little technical
support for economic development, and underdeveloped markets for goods, services, and labor.
About 60% of the communities and families in these areas exhibit high levels of marginality
(Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Rural de la SAGARPA-Dirrección General de Programas
Regionales 2001). Many areas of high marginality, however, are still not covered, located mostly
in Northern Mexico. In 2001 in San Luis Potosí, the Sustainable Development Program was
working with 23 communities in the Altiplano and the Planicie, 19 in the Pame region, and 165
in the Zona Serrana. According to a local government technician, the emphasis on the Zona
Serrana is a result of its high population density and high levels of marginality.
In contrast with the programs financed by the Mexican government, the Sustainable
Development Program includes an evaluation phase. A sum representing 1.5% of the credits was
devoted to a national evaluation before the money was distributed, and another 2.5% can be
allocated to external audits at the state level in each region every year under the supervision of
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SAGARPA (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Rural de la SAGARPA-Dirrección General de
Programas Regionales 2001). One implicit objective of the evaluations is to avoid corruption,
but explicit goals focus on measuring project performance, including technical, institutional, and
financial sustainability, the participation of beneficiaries, and the efficiency of the administration
of the program. The World Bank itself has already conducted partial evaluations. Technicians
closely involved in the program boasted that the Huasteca and Altiplano had been singled out as
successful cases, to be presented at national conferences on sustainable development. They did
not dwell on the fact that most of the successful Huasteca projects which were selected were
located in the states of Hidalgo or Veracruz.
Each regional Council includes a variable number of representatives of the three levels of
government (Presidencias Municipales, state and federal government agencies), and of NGOs
and grassroots organizations. The Sustainable Development Program is designed to encourage
the strengthening of grassroots organizations and the participation of NGOs in project design and
implementation. The World Bank requests an equal representation of the public sector and civil
society, by which it meant grassroots organizations (World Bank 1999b). NGOs may be
members if they are recommended by the government or the grassroots organizations. The
Mexican transposition, however, mentions NGOs and grassroots organizations on an equal level
(Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Rural de la SAGARPA-Dirrección General de Programas
Regionales 2001). The World Bank wanted to guarantee a large participation of beneficiaries in
the program, rather than intermediaries who may promote their own interests, as representatives
of civil society. The modification in the Mexican text reflects the specificity of the Mexican
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NGO sector, in which few international NGOs are active. The distinction between popular and
intermediary NGOs is blurred.
The World Bank itself points out that political interference is a substantial risk to the
success of the program. They recommend consulting with local authorities for their approval,
and establishing clear procedures to ensure that the regional Councils function in a democratic
manner (World Bank 1999a). As such, the Sustainable Development Program offers an
interesting illustration of the consequences of the differences that exist between NGOs of the
Huasteca and other regions of San Luis Potosí, particularly with the Altiplano. Since this
program is quite recent, it has had little effect yet on the NGO sector in each region. The
comparison will reflect differences caused by the environment in the application of the program,
and not differences that the program itself created. In addition, since it channels considerable
resources, many NGOs are aware of it and seek to finance their projects through the Council of
Sustainable Development, making it an important aspect of the institutional and resource
environment for NGOs.
The regional Councils for Sustainable Development play a crucial role in the program
since they approve project proposals. Such decentralization of the decision-process is somewhat
new in a country with a corporatist tradition, where many decisions at the local level were made
directly by the President. Under World Bank guidelines each region is given latitude to organize
the Sustainable Development Council, and the provision of technical assistance, to match its
local context. The Mexican directive from SAGARPA, however, specifies that the state governor
remains the ultimate authority (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Rural de la SAGARPA-Dirrección
General de Programas Regionales 2001). In theory, grassroots groups elaborate a project after a
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community diagnosis, and with the help of a contracted consultant. They submit the proposal at
the monthly meeting of their regional Sustainable Development Council, where elected members
decide to fund it or not. Once the project is approved by the governor, the group is awarded
money to implement the project. The World Bank and the Mexican government then conduct
evaluations in each region. In San Luis Potosí, however, the implementation of the Program
reflects the political climate, particularly the nature of government-NGO relations. Differences
are most apparent between the Altiplano and the Planicie, respectively the least and most
politicized regions of the state.
In the Altiplano, observers and participant insist that the focus is on getting the job done,
and that relations with the government are productive. The Council consists of eight
representatives of civil society organizations, nine representatives of government agencies, and
twelve representatives of the municipios (one for each municipio where the program is currently
established). According to the program directive, the state government presides over the
Councils, or names a councillor as his representative (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Rural de la
SAGARPA-Dirrección General de Programas Regionales 2001). In the Altiplano, governmentNGO relations are cordial, so that the Council chose the FMDR central as its president. The
FMDR benefits from privileged ties with SAGARPA, but also from a solid reputation in the
area. Other NGOs know and respect their work, and they have few problems with Presidencias
Municipales.
In each council, an organization has been given a contract to realize community diagnosis
and provide technical assistance. The directive simply mentions that groups can get help with the
design of their project providing that the governor approves the contacted consultant. In San Luis
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Potosí the government took control of the contract on behalf of the beneficiaries. First, it
contracted out individual technicians, usually former state employees. After practice showed that
an organization would be more reliable, the four Councils sent out bids for the contract at the
onset of the second phase. In the Altiplano, the national NGO Instituto de Desarrollo Regional
(Regional Development Institute) won the bid.21 In the other regions, the technicians who
formerly conducted the work individually joined and created private consultant offices, one in
each region. Contracting an NGO is advantageous for beneficiaries because they do not have to
pay for the service. The Instituto de Desarrollo Regional gets funding directly through its
headquarters, which keeps operating costs for the Program low. The technicians conduct
community diagnoses, participate in the elaboration of community proposals, and report on the
progress of the projects, but do not have voting power.
The meetings of the Sustainable Development Council in the Altiplano follow the
national directives closely. SAGARPA informs the members of ongoing evaluations of the
Program in the state, and gives financial reports for the past and current year. In 2001, the loan
for the Altiplano region was substantially increased due to the positive results of the previous
year. Technicians of the Instituto de Desarrollo Regional then present the completed proposals.
The councillors enquire about details and see the best financial arrangement to support the
maximum number of projects. Since representatives of the municipal, state, and federal
government agencies assist the meetings, they try to work together to combine their resources.
The only projects that are rejected are those located outside the priority zone, which covers only
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The Institute is really an international NGO, based in Mexico. Apart from San Luis Potosí, it
conducts development projects in Chiapas, Morelos, the district of Mexico City, and Guatemala.
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communities with high or very high levels of marginality. Councillors relay requests from the
grassroots groups, and comment on the perception of the program in their area. Small changes in
the administrative procedures are suggested and usually approved. Occasionally an organization
(local government agency or NGO) sends a request to have a representative in the Council,
which is also usually approved. The meetings, though long, is cordial, in an atmosphere of
cooperation between the involved parties.
Government technicians see the absence of political bickering as a positive element. Civil
society organizations are outnumbered by government representatives in the Council, but this is
not a source of complaints. The government could potentially influence the outcome of the
meetings, and the nature of the projects that are financed, but NGO representatives are not
concerned. The fact that many of the government representatives are municipal officials limits
the influence of the central government. In addition, since projects are presented by two NGOs
with sufficient legitimacy at the regional level, grassroots groups are reassured that their fate is
not in the hands of the government.
In the Huasteca, and particularly the Planicie, by contrast, the emphasis is on the
antagonistic nature of the debates between government representatives and members of NGOs
and grassroots organizations. The government keeps closer control of the process.
Representatives of SAGARPA, assisted by SEDARH technicians, preside over the meetings.
The consultancy contract was designated for private offices. NGOs that wish to present projects
must contract these to finalize their proposals and present them to the Council. The composition
of the Council also varies. In the Planicie, it comprises ten representatives of civil society
organizations, seven of government agencies, and five of municipios. The terms that each
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councillor will serve are not specified in any directive. They will stay in place for the duration of
the loan, or five years. A context of political conflict, however, has motivated the government to
adopt another strategy, as this government technician explains:
It is difficult to work with the organizations22 of the Planicie, because they are all
political. They fight a lot, what they want is to fight, but this is not the goal of the
Councils. Therefore what the government did is to go directly to the farmers,
without going through the Councils. And the farmers do it too. They don’t feel
represented by the organizations... It is a power struggle. They fight for the
financial aid to go to the communities they represent, without caring whether it
will be useful to them or not. Only to get power. The other strategy of the
government is to rotate the people who are represented in the Councils. We are
going to say, well, you have been in this council for 4 years, now we are going to
change and put other representatives.
The government perceives the demands of politically active NGOs in the area as a
strategy to gather support from local campesinos. It is not clear, however, what kind of power
they might gain, since they are not interested in electoral politics but policy advocacy. The
choice to bypass Council representatives because they show bias in their allocation of funds, or
to rotate representatives, is in direct contradiction with the recommendations of the World Bank
for a democratic process in the administration of the program, where the regional Council is
supposed to determine its own regulations. The fact that no one initially thought to put a limit on
the term of councillors shows a lack of democratic culture. The government established such a
limit because of it could not control the Council, indicating that it never meant for the Councils
to be democratically run. It has difficulties relinquishing control over an area riddled with
political tensions, and could not act as a neutral arbitrator between competing factions. In the
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Mexicans use the term organization to refer to civil society organizations, be they NGOs or
grassroots organizations. Public sector organizations are called ‘dependencias’ (dependencies) or
institutions.
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Altiplano, the issue never arose, primarily because the government is not confronted with
organizations with strong political demands.
The Sustainable Development Program offered a new opportunity for regional
development in highly marginal areas. Unfortunately, the actors involved in its implementation
followed old patterns of competition and confrontation. The atmosphere of the meetings reflects
this tense situation. After the technicians of the private consultancy office give their report, or
when representatives of SAGARPA mention bureaucratic problems, NGO representatives
express their indignation. But frequently problems are unresolved. For instance, in response to a
technical problem with a greenhouse project that was pending since the previous meeting, the
councillors voted to have another meeting specifically to discuss the matter. In another instance,
the presentation of a video from the office of the World Bank on the Planicie project set a
councillor into a fury. For about twenty minutes, he shouted his indignation with national
agricultural policy, hitting the table repeatedly, while the audience listens impassively:
I want to know how much money there is, to what it will be allocated, how much
we have, because for us this happened like Fox’s campaign, there was a lot of
advertizing... We are statistics, but our situation does not change. We need to
know how much we can count on , so that the money is not lost. We have already
lost a lot in administrative matters... Sitting here and watching this stuff, we don’t
find that things are in order. [shouting] How much is there?... The situation is the
country is desperate. There is no trade policy for agricultural goods. The only
thing we have received are taxes, lack of respect from the government... This is
no good!
The speech focused more on national policy than the Sustainable Development Program
itself, but suggested that it might just be an empty electoral promise. This NGO representative
used the meeting to protest macro-level decisions, rather than discuss concrete projects. The
SAGARPA representatives answered his specific question about the budget, thus reassuring the
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audience that the money was there, but they insisted that projects were coming at the initiative of
grassroots groups. This way, they shifted the responsibility of using the money to the NGOs and
grassroots organizations. Several other civil society representatives, however, joined with the
first one in expressing negative opinions on the Program, though in softer tones. The participants
went quiet, but the two sides were hardly on friendly terms.
The Planicie Council meetings are not as open as the Altiplano one, though more people
attend it. A rule specifies that the meetings are open to the public, but only the councillors can
speak. In the Altiplano, permission to speak was granted freely, or new members were added to
the Council. In the Planicie, a presiding government representative mistakenly broke the rule by
granting permission to speak to a member of the audience without a vote, and was severely
reprimanded by NGO representatives. When the vote took place, permission was denied.
Requests for membership were also denied. The representatives of SAGARPA and SEDARH
may have had the best interest of the beneficiaries when deciding to modify the representation
process. The NGO councillors were obviously still acting out the difficult relations they had had
with the government during their years of protest for land distribution. However, they did so by
breaking the rules of the Council, thus making the failure of its democratic procedure obvious.
The decision to rely on a private office rather than an NGO was probably also a way to
keep political NGOs at bay. However, the beneficiaries are the ones who truly suffer from this
decision, since they have to pay more to propose projects. All in all, the antagonism between
government agencies and NGOs impedes the realization of development projects. Not all NGOs
in the Huasteca are outspoken politically, but these constitute the most visible part of the NGO
community and their behavior affects the work of all NGOs. In the case of the Sustainable
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Development Program they tend to discredit all NGOs. Rather than uniting with others to build
sustainable projects, drawing on all available experiences, they jealously guard their fiefs, and
compete for members. Rather than trying to turn the page on past government repression, and
taking advantage of the international funds it now makes available to them, they perpetuate old
quarrels and suspicious attitudes. The Altiplano has far fewer resources, but has used them more
efficiently than an area like the Planicie. Policy advocacy is indeed a noble pursuit for NGOs,
but not in the form of unarticulated protest.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION
The sample of rural Potosino NGOs reflects the recent development of the NGO sector in
Mexico. Rural NGOs are indeed non-bureaucratic, but it is a hindrance rather than an advantage.
Many organizations in the sample are young and inexperienced, do not possess stable financial
resources, and rely on limited human and material infrastructure. Despite recent diversification
in goals and activities, most NGOs are involved in income-generating projects. Local-institution
building has developed as an important annex to income-generating activities, since the Mexican
government now grants funds to groups rather than individuals. A growing number also include
indigenous and human rights, or environmental conservation, in their activities.
If NGOs were the purely rational actors that the literature on development depicts, they
would simply work where they are most needed, where living standards are at their worst. Rural
development NGOs would locate in the rural communities that have the lowest level of income,
education, and health coverage, and would not be found in areas that enjoy high levels of socioeconomic development. Data from San Luis Potosí, Mexico, confirm what is briefly evoked in
the literature, that such is not the case. Only by considering NGOs as organizations with a life of
their own may we understand what other factors are responsible for the uneven NGO landscape.
The findings here argue for the validity of organizational ecology as a framework for the social
study of organizations in general, and NGOs in particular. First, including a spatial dimension
brings to our attention the importance of scale in shaping NGO activity. Second, it reveals the
role of environmental factors in the generation of a process of regionalization. In the Huasteca,
regionalization is accompanied with the beginning of a process of differentiation, shaped by
responses to the political context. Third, the new institutionalism explains how space is socially
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constructed, used, and reproduced by organizations. Each of these findings demonstrates the
benefit of combining several organizational perspectives, rather than viewing them as
competitive.
10.1.

The Importance of Scale
Miller (2000) argues that social scientists should pay more attention to the concept of

scale when examining social movements. He conducted his study of the 1980s peace movement
at the local, state, and national level. In organizational ecology we can use two aspects of scale,
as included here in the spatial analysis of rural NGOs. First, neo-institutionalism, with its focus
on how organizational structure adapts to cultural values and norms, would suggest that NGOs
with different goals will operate at different scales. NGOs that are organized at the international,
national, or local level should act differently, because they live in distinct institutional and
technical environments. In San Luis Potosí, organizational scale was found to influence the level
of bureaucratization of the NGOs, but not their goals and activities. Such differences may have
appeared if the sample had included more international NGOs, since they are more sensitive to
the global environment than Mexican NGOs.
Second, the notion of scale has methodological implications. It can refer to the level at
which we aggregate the population and consider its distribution. Examining the community, the
municipio, or the region, will tell us a different story, even within one state. Data at the
community level are difficult to obtain, but in the case of the Mexican Foundation for Rural
Development, they indicate that even when an NGO has a clear strategy to target the
beneficiaries who need it most, it may not reach them. FMDR projects are located in
communities at all levels of marginality, not just the most marginal ones. What is more, in San
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Luis Potosí, they are less implemented in very marginal communities. At the municipio level,
more NGOs are found where a high proportion of the population is economically poor, and
fewer where the incidence of international migration is high.
Organizational strategy rarely explains this situation, since many NGOs do not have an
explicit strategy of geographical expansion, operate only in the area where they were created, or
follow criteria that have nothing to do with targeting the poor. Geographic expansion is often
more an opportunistic phenomenon than a planned development. In this respect, organizational
genesis makes a difference. The expansion strategy will differ depending on whether the NGO is
the result of a local initiative, the local branch of a national NGO, or a structure created by a
government agency. Local NGOs focus on their immediate surroundings, either because they
lack organizational resources, or because they wish to remain small. Government-generated
NGOs, on the contrary, have a clear expansion strategy, and more resources to promote their
operations. The campesinos’ negative perception of the government, and the lack of connections
at the grassroots level, however, prevent them from achieving their goals. Finally, local branches
of a national NGO may follow either of these patterns. More professional ones tend to locate
according to socio-economic indicators, but social movement organizations focus more on
gathering large numbers of members.
According to NGO staff and members, most of the explanation for NGO location has to
do with resource-dependence. They have difficulties reaching the most isolated communities,
because of poor infrastructure and lack of transportation. The structure of NGO social networks
supports resource-dependence theory. NGOs have more relations with government agencies,
their most stable source of funding and information, than with other types of organizations. They
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also interact with other NGOs. In both cases, NGOs structure their social network to reach other
organizations at the scale that will generate the most resources. First, the international network
of NGOs in San Luis Potosí is extremely small. The overwhelming majority of Potosino NGOs
are national or local. They have little or no direct affiliation with the international development
field. In addition, the structure of funding focuses their attention on Mexican donors. The lack of
communication equipment, and technical and language skills, reinforces their insularity.
Second, NGOs are mostly aware of, and interact primarily with, government agencies at
the federal level. This reflects the centralization of the Mexican state, despite recent efforts to
decentralize. NGOs interact most often with the government staff that are least likely to have an
in-depth knowledge of their local working conditions. While the Presidencias Municipales, at
the local level, now controls huge sums, NGOs have few ties with them, because of the culture
of clientelism that still prevails in Mexico. Municipal funds may prove unreliable over time if
members of an NGO and the Presidente Municipal do not favor the same political party. NGOs
that are tied to a national or international headquarters also have a more cosmopolitan network,
reaching federal and international organizations, while networks of local NGOs are confined to
the immediate organizational environment. As such, national NGOs have a larger resource base.
Looking at resource-dependence brings to the fore the issue of state-NGO relations, one
of the major themes of the literature on NGOs. In Mexico, the old PRI and new PAN regimes are
cautious about the nonprofit sector. Open repression is no longer widespread, but collaboration is
not yet the order of the day. The government only intervenes directly in certain areas that are
politically salient, such as indigenous affairs. The lack of a clear national or state policy gives
the head of each government agency at the local level more power to direct these relations. As a

274

result, cases of cooperation and competition coexist in the same space, involving different
organizations. Yet, since they have contacts primarily with state or federal organizations that are
not based in the communities where they work, the relationships are mostly shallow, and cases of
project cooperation are not common.
Third, relations with other NGOs follow the opposite, involving primarily local NGOs,
rather than national ones. Ties are more informal than with government agencies, but as was the
case with these, lack of cooperation prevails, based on a distorted perception of the NGO
environment. NGOs do not operate in a vacuum, despite the early state of development of their
population in San Luis Potosí. They are surrounded by other NGOs, but may not know about
them. If they do, they often have inaccurate information on their activities and motives. As a
result, they are organized in cliques, and do not form a cohesive NGO sector at the state level.
They do not have power to negotiate successfully with state authorities. Moreover, their identity
in the eyes of outsiders, particularly potential beneficiaries, is blurred, which reduces their
efficiency as actors in rural development.
10.2.

Regionalization and Regional Differentiation
Funding requirements do structure the networks of NGOs, as resource-dependence theory

predicts. Yet they do not explain the geographical distribution of NGOs, or the organization of
competition and cooperation among NGOs, because most of the funding is available statewide,
or in selected areas of the four administrative regions of the state. The most striking aspect of the
geographic distribution of NGOs in San Luis Potosí is precisely its regionalization. Excluding a
minority of statewide organizations, three-quarters of all the Potosino rural NGOs operate in the
Huasteca, which constitute a geographically circumscribed organizational niche. Not only are
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Huasteca NGOs more numerous, they are also qualitatively different from other Potosino NGOs.
Huasteca NGOs are younger, more often locally born, have less access to financial and material
resources, and have smaller and less diversified social networks than other rural NGOs. They are
more numerous, but less formally organized, and rely more on human than material resources.
The development of the NGO population in San Luis Potosí results from the history of
each region. Actors in the field of rural development actually differentiate between different
regional communities, particularly between Altiplano and Huasteca NGOs. The former are
portrayed as more pragmatic, the latter more politicized and less efficient. As it turns out, each
region offers a fertile ground for the spread of a certain type of NGOs, while the Zona Centro
and the Zona Media do not present rural NGOs with a favorable environment.
Table 23 summarizes the process of regionalization of the NGO population. It indicates
that the diversity of the local population, as well as the available economic and political
opportunities, have a particularly salient influence over the characteristics of the NGO
population in each region. They explain not only the size of the NGO population, but also
qualitative differences in its orientation. The Altiplano and the Zona Centro have similar profiles
for ethnic composition, the availability of natural resources, the extent of international migration,
and the openness of the political system. However, they differ in their level of industrial
development and marginality, which prevented the development of a substantial population of
rural NGOs in the Zona Centro. When the lack of economic opportunity is solved at the
individual level by migration, the NGOs often come too late to offer viable alternatives. Their
population remains small, even in very marginal areas such as the Altiplano.
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Table 23: Regional Differentiation of the Population of Rural NGOs in San Luis Potosía

Ethnic
composition

Marginality

Social
Stratification

Labor-market
orientation of the
workforce

Openness of the
political System

NGO population

Altiplano

Zona Centro

Zona Media

Huasteca

Homogenous

Homogenous

Slightly Diversified

Diversified

[

[

[

[

Very high

Medium to
High

Medium to High

Very High

[

[

[

[

Low

Low

Medium to High

High

[

[

[

[

External

External

External

Internal

[

[

[

[

Relatively
High

Relatively
High

Moderate to Low

Low

ù

ù

ù

ù

Mid-size
pragmatic

Small
incipient
differentiation
between pragmatics
and social advocates

Very Small
pragmatic

Large
common use of ideology
high political
involvement

a

The qualifiers in the cells indicate the relative position of each region, compared to the other
regions of San Luis Potosí. They do not refer to an absolute measure in the Mexican or
international context. For instance, saying that the population of NGOs in the Huasteca is large
means that it is larger than in the other parts of San Luis Potosí, not compared to other parts of
Mexico, or to other countries.
In both the Altiplano and the Zona Centro, NGOs can be characterized as pragmatic.
They do not engage in a debate over public policy with government agencies, but focus their
work on income-generating projects, usually with the approval of the government. In the Zona
Media, natural resources are more abundant, but have effectively been monopolized by a few
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latifundists. These have restricted economic opportunities for the remaining campesinos, who
have long resorted to migration to the United States. The NGO community is split between
pragmatic and political organizations, but in any event too small to make a significant impact in
regional development.
An economically or ethnically diverse population offers greater potential for social
conflict, above all in areas where the political system does not allow for representation of this
diversity, because it is controlled by a small elite. In the Huasteca, the ethnic heterogeneity of the
local population, high agricultural potential, and blatant social inequality, have fueled conflicts
over land distribution over the years. The NGO population has drawn on these characteristics to
grow. In some cases, the conflicts attract the attention of outside organizations. In others, they
provoke the emergence of local leaders who will create their own organization. The resulting
NGO population will make use of ideology to mobilize a large base, and seek to participate in
debates over public policy. It is far more involved in issues of public policy, or even electoral
politics, than other NGOs in the state. At present, Huasteca NGOs are undergoing a process of
differentiation, based on their approach to politics.
The political activities of Huasteca NGOs displease the government and explain some of
the difficult relations between state and NGOs in this area. Potentially, NGOs represent a threat
to the power elite if they articulate the demands of the population. In this respect, the process of
differentiation shows that NGOs do not have a unidimensional relation with politics. Older
NGOs follow traditional paths of co-optation, opportunism, or clientelism. There presence
justifies the state’s claims that they do not represent the campesinos, and cannot be included in
productive partnerships such as the ones put in place with Altiplano NGOs. With the slow
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democratization of the Mexican political system, however, a new breed of NGOs brings hope for
a more constructive involvement of NGOs in politics. These NGOs use electoral politics as a
means to secure social and economic agendas.
The list of factors in Table 23 is not meant to be exhaustive, or applicable to NGO
populations without modifications. Comparative studies at the national or regional level may
give some indication of other relevant environmental factors to consider. Anheier and Salomon
(1998), for instance, considered the impact of religion on the development of the third sector in
five Third-World countries.1 They found that religion plays a role in the creation of philanthropic
institutions, but that religious organizations are generally less supportive of the nonprofit sector
than in industrialized countries. Even so, Protestant denominations tend to favor it more than
other Christian and non-Christian denominations.
Their study, however, assumes that the population of a country is homogeneous in its
religious affiliation. It does not take into account the coexistence of several denominations at the
local level. In San Luis Potosí, while the influence of religion on rural NGOs is generally
marginal, it was mentioned by a few respondents in the Huasteca. The vast majority of Potosinos
are Catholic, but evangelical churches are now present in all parts of the state. In the Huasteca,
Catholicism has cohabited with indigenous religious practices since the Spanish Conquest. The
Catholic church is now trying to integrate indigenous customs in the service, for instance by
having mass said in Teenek or Nahua. Evangelical churches, on the contrary, are viewed as
denying native traditions. Members of NGOs involved in the cultural revival of indigenous

1

They included Brazil, Egypt, Thailand, Ghana, and India.
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customs claimed that evangelical groups discourage local residents from joining in the events
they organize.
The argument that Protestantism favors nongovernmental activities is based on studies of
the United States and Great Britain, where many denominations coexist, and have been the
dominant religion for generations. The evangelical churches that now flourish all over Latin
America represent only one type of Protestantism, more akin to Pentecostal than Episcopalian
beliefs. The situation in San Luis Potosí may indicate that their influence will not be favorable,
particularly when they constitute only a minority. Studies in areas where the evangelical
churches are stronger than in Mexico, such as Brazil and Guatemala, may reveal more about this
rising force.
Anheier and Salomon (1998) also mention that the size of the nongovernmental sector
increases with the size of the middle-class. In rural areas of San Luis Potosí, the middle-class is
irrelevant. The presence of professionals or entrepreneurs, however, did spark the creation of
several NGOs, particularly those concerned with environmental conservation. Also, the large
number of urban NGOs in the city of San Luis Potosí, compared to other areas of the state, could
be explained by the existence of an significant middle-class. The size of the middle-class has an
impact on the creation of certain types of NGOs, but not all. In rural areas of Third-World
countries, given its embryonic state, it plays a minor role at best.
Not only do the relevant factors vary with geographical location, they may also vary with
the type of NGO population at stake. In this study, the population included only a marginal
proportion of INGOs. Following the new institutionalism, presented in Chapter 3, we can expect
INGOs to be sensitive to other environmental components. They answer to international donors,
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rather than national governments, and may base their strategies on these agendas. Rather than
looking at the specificity of each area, they may rely on standard measures of development. We
may find a better correlation between income, education, unemployment, children mortality, and
project location for INGOs than for Southern NGOs. The influence of political context is also
likely to be different, but can only be checked in comparative studies.
Finally, the population consisted of rural NGOs only, because their spatial dispersion
allows for the observation of regionalization. The majority of NGOs, however, are urban, and
their importance will only increase with the ongoing urbanization of the world population. They
too can be examined with the ecological model. As Miller (2000) studied the spatial variation in
the peace movement in various urban centers around Boston, we can study the spatial
distribution of urban NGOs within a city, particularly the giant metropolises of Third-World
countries. The transportation and communication networks, the class and ethnic composition of
various districts, and the location of significant industries can all influence the development of
an NGO population, be it urban or rural. The model is not specific to rural NGOs.
10.3.

The Social Construction of Space
The focus on regions as the scale of NGO differentiation may mislead us in taking for

granted the division of space in San Luis Potosí as natural. The various regions of the state,
however, are not based on existing physical divisions of space, but are socially created. The
climatic and geographic changes between the Altiplano, the Zona Media, and the Huasteca are
gradual rather than abrupt. The geographic regions of the Huasteca and the Altiplano extend to
several other states. Pame, Teenek, and Nahua residents are found outside of the Zona Media or
the Huasteca. The division of San Luis Potosí in four administrative regions is somewhat
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arbitrary and results from political and social decisions. The division is not given by the natural
environment.2
In turn, the administrative division of space has guided the social organization of the
state. Government agencies, public funding, and the communication and transportation networks,
as well as patterns of interaction among migrants, businesses, and civil servants, all follow the
boundaries defined by the state. Actors in rural development have now internalized this artificial
division of space. By using it to define their territory, or characterize an NGO population, they
reinforce the differentiation of each region of San Luis Potosí. In each region, and in the state,
we can observe border effects that confine an NGO within an administrative territory. Most
notably, both the Altiplano and the Huasteca extend geographically to the neighboring states, but
few NGOs who seek to interact with these other states. Having to deal with a different state
government may prove a powerful deterrent. In the case of the Huasteca, respondents argue that
the region has developed differently in each state. Peasant organizations are described as more
combative in Hidalgo than in San Luis Potosí because caciquism and state repression were not as
strong there as in San Luis Potosí.
But even in San Luis Potosí the Huasteca is identified as a niche for politically active
NGOs. The label is not just the result of climatic, agricultural, or ethnic specificity, a past history
of conquests and political struggles. It is now actively created by the NGOs that work there, and
the beneficiaries and government representatives with which they interact. The social movement
organizations that came to organize the struggle for land redistribution are not leaving now that

2

The geographical region of the Altiplano, for instance, covers parts of several Northern states.
In San Luis Potosí, it is divided in two administrative regions, the Altiplano and the Zona
Centro.
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the fight is over. They are adapting their activities and discourse in order to survive. They still
perceive and portray the Huasteca as a region of social conflict and organizational opportunity.
The number of NGOs in an area, and even its orientation, are not indicators of success.
The involvement of Huasteca NGOs in public policy is perceived negatively by parts of the
government, and also by some of the campesinos. The pragmatic NGOs in the Altiplano that
focus on income-generating projects, receive more praise. A greater number of NGOs, however,
increases the visibility of the nongovernmental sector for the government and the public. In
addition, since the Huasteca NGOs are more vocal, they draw more public attention. Visibility
influences how the NGO sector is perceived in each region, and in turn reinforces the regional
differentiation of the NGO population.
Identifying the regional structure of the NGO population and the factors that explain it
does provide a general understanding of the unevenness of the NGO presence in other parts of
Mexico, thus vouching for the generalizability of the ecological model. The contrasting
situations of the Altiplano and the Huasteca resemble other regions of Mexico where the
development of the NGO population has apparently followed similar paths. The Altiplano
(including the Zona Centro) has characteristics that are found in other Northern and central states
of Mexico, such as Nuevo León, Coahuila, Guanajuato, or Jalisco. They include a semi-arid
climate, a mestizo population, a high rate of international migration, a relatively high level of
industrialization compared to the rest of the country, and a significant presence of the PAN in
local government. If they differ, it is in the lower industrialization of the Altiplano region of San
Luis Potosí compared to these other states. In this context, the population of rural NGOs is small,
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but an active population of NGOs may develop in large urban centers. The NGO population
caters more to the business community, or the urban population, than rural areas.3
On the other hand, informants compared the Huasteca to Southern Mexican states such as
Oaxaca, Chiapas, or Tabasco. The tropical climate, high proportion of indigenous groups,
predominance of agriculture over industrial activities, caste-like stratification system, and
existence of notable support for the PRD, are notable similarities between these areas. In the
early 1990s, the federal government was actually worried that the Huasteca might become
another Chiapas and experience a period of armed conflict. NGOs in the Southern states, as in
the Huasteca, are more involved in the public policy debate and in advocacy for peasant groups.
They work primarily in rural areas. They are more numerous than in Northern states and more
visible on the national scene.
Even if the outcome of NGO activity is not the same in all regions that present similar
characteristics, a pattern does emerge. Regional identities guide organizational strategies,
particularly state-NGO relations, at least as much as socio-economic indicators. The 1994
insurrection in Chiapas highlighted the similarities between this region and the Huasteca, and
obscured the differences between them. Government officials and social movement
organizations acted on their fears or hopes, not on the reality of the Huasteca. Likewise, the
perception of the Altiplano as akin to the industrious North leads actors to downplay the
incidence of social and political conflicts, for instance the present struggle between the UCD
(Peasant Democratic Union) and the CNC over La Forestal. Looking at the environment for
clues as to how an NGO population develops and differentiates into several sub-populations does

3

See Moguel (1996) for a study of the urban popular movement in Northern Mexico.
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not mean that we negate the role of agency. To the contrary, by including the new institutionalist
perspective, we can see that the social actors construct space and regional identity.
10.4.

The Case for Organizational Ecology
The use of concepts borrowed from the natural sciences damages the legitimacy of

organizational ecology in the eyes of many social scientists. Natural and social sciences,
however, have constantly borrowed from each other: the concept of niche itself was originally
born in the social sciences. Borrowing a concept does not mean simply transposing it, as if
objects of inquiry were identical in all disciplines. A concept is an idea, an abstraction, a
simplification that we use to make sense of a complex reality. The concept of ecology simply
implies considering an entity in relation with its surroundings. It is then up to each discipline to
explicate what entities and surroundings they are concerned with.
In addition, ecology presents the difficulty of being a synthetic discipline that draws on
several others. It does not easily fit into the traditional academic charts. By definition, adopting
an ecological view, be it to study insect populations or transnational corporations, means
combining perspectives, in order to paint as complete a picture as possible of how entities are
shaped by, and modify, their environment. All work on organizations in their environment is by
definition ecological. Omitting factors only truncates and weakens the analysis. The study of
NGOs in San Luis Potosí show that an ecological model using the new institutionalism,
population ecology, and resource-dependence theory, can increase our understanding of
organizational phenomena.
Critics of organizational ecology usually argue that by adopting the ecological
perspective we may easily fall into environmental determinism, overemphasizing the weight of
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external structure, and dismissing the role of human agency (Perrow 1986). Just as biological
ecologists recognize that organisms do influence their environment (humans being a particularly
devastating plague in many cases), organizational ecologists must account for individual agency,
and how it shapes organizational life. By focusing on selection processes as the main mechanism
of organizational change, the population ecology of organizations reinforced this criticism.
Organizational ecology, on the contrary, recognizes the importance of adaptation. SMOs did not
disappear from the Huasteca when the legal environment changed- they modified their activities.
Moreover, the inclusion of the new institutionalism in an ecological model helps us to keep in
mind that the environment itself is socially constructed. Organizations should not be seen as
passively submitting to external forces but as actors that manipulate their environment in order to
increase their chances of survival.
Organizational ecology, even if it is by nature a synthetic discipline, does not aim to
encompass all existing theories into one unifying global theory of organizations. An ecological
model is not adequate to analyze internal organizational processes, such as learning processes. It
tends to considers organizations as monolithic entities, and as such does not pay much attention
to the internal distribution of power. Theories that consider organizations as natural systems,
such as the human relations model, are then more adequate. They shed more light on internal
processes of decision-making and strategy elaboration.
Market analysts and economists consider the geographical dimension of organizations in
marketing and allocation studies, but they focus exclusively on the private sector, and on a
limited number of factors. Organizations are not a popular topic of investigation for geographers,
who would be in the best position to define an organizational ecology. To conceive of an
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ecological model that may apply to all types of organizations, we need to draw from several
disciplines, and no longer reduce organizational ecology to demography. Here, I have shown
how the ecological model enriches the concepts of organizational niche, regional differentiation,
or parasitism, and applies to the nongovernmental sector. Broadening the scope of organizational
ecology can offer a more comprehensive analysis of organizations.
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APPENDIX A:
QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED
TO NGO MEMBERS (TRANSLATED FROM SPANISH)
A.

The Respondent

1. When did you join [organization name]? ____________
2. What was your first position here? ______________________________________________
3. Could you describe for me the responsibilities involved with this job?
4. What is your current job title? __________________________________________________
5. When did you start your current position? _________________________________________
6. Could you describe for me the responsibilities involved with your job?
7. What work experience did you have before you joined [organization name] (if the respondent
is not paid by the organization: What paid job do you currently hold)?
8. What is the highest degree you have completed (or the last school year you completed if you
did not graduate)? ______________________________________
9. Where did you get it (or study it if you did not graduate)? ____________________________
10. When did you graduate (or stop studying if you did not graduate)? _________________
11. Where are you from? City ______________ State ________________ Country __________
12. What languages do you speak? _________________________________________________
B.

The Organization

13. When and how was [organization name] created? ________
14. What is its geographical scope?
1. International
15a. Where are the headquarters located?
City ______________________________ Country ______________________________
16a. In what countries does it operate? _________________________________
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2. National/regional
15b. Where are the headquarters located?
City _______________________________ State ________________________________
16b. In what states does it operate? ___________________________________
3. State
15c. Where are the headquarters located? City ___________________________
4. Local
15c. Where are the headquarters located? City ___________________________
17. Could you tell me what the mission statement of [organization name] is? Or: How would you
define its main goals, in general terms?
18. What are the activities of [organization name] today?
19. [If the respondent has only started working with the organization recently, start with: I know
you have not been here long, but] Have the goals and activities evolved since the creation (or
since you arrived here if the respondent was not present at the time of creation)? If yes, how?
20. What is the current budget of [organization name], or the funding it currently manages for
projects? ____________________________________
21. What are its sources of funding?
[Fill out table 21]
22. How many people work here now? _________
22a. paid staff members _______
22b. including from project communities _____________
22c. volunteers ________
22d. including from project communities _____________
23. Where (in what communities) do you currently operate within the state of San Luis Potosí?
[Fill out table 23]
C.

Project Locations

24. Please tell me how your organization started its involvement with each community.
25. Are there communities where it is easier to work than others? If yes, why? [probe for:
interest of the local population, availability of infrastructure, ease of access, requirements of a
funding institution, professional and personal contacts in the area, match between skills of staff
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and local needs, presence or absence of other development projects in the area, cultural, social
and political factors...]
26a. What factors do you think may contribute to the success of the project in each community?
26b. What factors may hinder it? Or what problems do you think might arise?
27. Have you had cases where your organization tried to work with a community and was not
able to? __________
If yes, what happened?
28. Does your organization plan to go to new locations in the future (Or: what are the plans of
the organization for the future)? ________
If yes, how do you go about finding new locations where to work?
If no, why not?
D.

Relations with Other Organizations

29. Are there any other organizations (public, non-profit, for-profit) involved in rural
development in the area(s) were [organization name] works? What are they? What kind of
relations do you have with them? What impact do they have in the area?
[Fill out table 29]
30. I am going to show you a list of organizations, please tell me if you have contacts with them,
and if you do, what types of contacts. How would you evaluate the impact of the activities of this
organization on your work in San Luis Potosí? If there are organizations that you have contacts
with and that are not mentioned on this list, please add them too.
[Fill out table 30]
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Table 21: Funding Sources.
Name of the Organization

Type*

Date when
funding started

% of the total budget
that it provides

1___________________________

______

______________

_________________

2___________________________

______

______________

_________________

3___________________________

______

______________

_________________

4___________________________

______

______________

_________________

5___________________________

______

______________

_________________

6___________________________

______

______________

_________________

7___________________________

______

______________

_________________

8___________________________

______

______________

_________________

9___________________________

______

______________

_________________

10__________________________
* See codes for organizational types

______

______________

_________________
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Table 23: List o the communities where the NGO works.
Name of the community

Date the project
started

Number of
beneficiaries
or members

Date the project is
scheduled to end

1_________________________

____________

___________

________________

2_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

3_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

4_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

5_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

6_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

7_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

8_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

9_________________________

_____________

___________

________________

10________________________

_____________

___________

________________

11________________________

_____________

___________

________________

12________________________

_____________

___________

________________

13________________________

_____________

___________

________________

14________________________

_____________

___________

________________

15________________________

_____________

___________

________________
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Table 29: List of other organizations known in the area.
Name of the
organization

Type
*

Localities where it
works

Activities

Types of
contact*

Impact

1_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

2_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

3_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

4_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

5_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

6_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

7_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

8_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

9_______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

10______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

11______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

12______________

____

________________

_________

_______

______

13______________ ____ ________________
* See codes for organizational types

_________

_______

______
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30. Organizations with which they have contacts
Name of the organization

Type*

Types of Contact**

1___________________________________________

_____

________

2___________________________________________

_____

________

3___________________________________________

_____

________

4___________________________________________

_____

________

5___________________________________________

_____

________

6___________________________________________

_____

________

7___________________________________________

_____

________

8___________________________________________

_____

________

9___________________________________________

_____

________

10__________________________________________

_____

________

11__________________________________________

_____

________

12__________________________________________

_____

________

13__________________________________________

_____

________

14__________________________________________

_____

________

15__________________________________________

_____

________

16__________________________________________

_____

________

17__________________________________________

_____

________

18__________________________________________

_____

________

19__________________________________________
* See codes for organizational types
** See codes for types of contacts

_____

________
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Codes for types of organizations and types of contacts
Type of organization:
1: Mexican NGO
2: foreign NGO
3: grassroots organization
4: federal government agency
5: state government agency
6: national foreign aid project
7: multilateral foreign aid project
8: Mexican business
9: foreign business
10: Mexican private foundation
11: foreign private foundation
Types of contacts:
1: cooperation on development projects
2: carries out work for them as contractor
3: go to work meetings with them
4: [organization name] goes to seminars there
5: come to seminar [organization name] organizes
6: gives them information
7: gets information from them
8: occasional letter or visit
9: friends work there
10: they request resources of [organization name] (equipment, staff, money,...)
11: [organization name] request resources of them (equipment, staff, money,...)
12: legal requirements (audits, evaluation, registration,...)
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List of organizations
NGOs in San Luis Potosí
Desarrollo Rural de San Luis Potosí, AC
Desarrollo Rural de la Zona Media AC
Desarrollo Rural del Norte Potosino, AC
Caritas, AC
Fundación Produce de San Luis Potosí, A.C.
Consejo Estatal de ONGs para el Estado de SLP, A.C.
DEMITAN, A.C.
Fondo Regional Nahuatl
Fondo Regional Teenek
Fondo Regional Pame
Proyecto Verde, A.C.
Luz Verde, S.C.
Asociación Civil Acuícola, Piscícola y Agropecuaria, A.C.
Grupo Agua, Tierra y Vida
Alianza de Productores de la Huasteca, A.C.
Consejo de Lucha Pame
COCIHP (Coordinadora de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas de la Huasteca Potosina)
Movimiento Huasteco Democrático
Federación de Sociedades de Solidaridad Social Agustín Landeras Briones
Fondo Regional de Pujal Coy, A.C.
MOCACO (Movimiento de Campesinos y Colonias)
Federación Estatal de Unidades Agrícolas de la Mujer, A.C.
Mano Amiga, A.C.
Huastecos de Tanlajas, A.C.
Parlamento Indio Estatal, Campesino y Popular
Agrocitri, A.C.
Consejo de Ancianos Indígenos de la Huasteca, A.C.
Unidad Cultural Nahuatl, A.C.
Justicia para la Defensa Indígena, A.C.
Mujer, Igualdad y Lucha, A.C.
Consejo de Lucha Indígena de la Huasteca Potosina, A.C.
Organización de Médicos tradicionales
Local Organizations
Asociación Ganadera de Ciudad del Maíz
Asociación Ganadera Local - Villa de Reyes
Asociación Ganadera Local - San Luis Potosí
Asociación Ganadera Local - Venado
Unión Ganadera Regional de SLP
Cámara Nacional de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo de San Luis Potosí
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Sociedad de Producción Rural
Unión de Ejidos
Sociedad de Solidaridad Social
Caja de Solidaridad
National NGOs
Fundación Mexicana para el Derarrollo Rural, A.C.
Instituto Nacional para la Modernización del Campo
Red de Alternativas Agroecológicas
SALDEBAS (Servicios de apoyo local al desarrollo de base en México)
CECCAM (Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano)
Consejo Civil de México para la Silvicultura Sostenible
Barzón del Agro (Barzón Unión)
PRESPA [antes: SINDER (Sistema Nacional de Capacitación y Extensión Rural)]
National Organizations
Cámara Mexicana de la Industria y Transformación
ANEC (Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productos del Campo)
AMUCSS (Asociación Mexicana de Uniones de Crédito del Sector Rural)
CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina)
UNORCA (Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Rurales y Campesinas)
CIOAC (Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos)
CODUC (Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas, Urbanas y Campesinas)
UCD (Unión Campesina Democrática)
CNOC (Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras)
Red Mexicana de Organizaciones Forestales Campesinas
Education
Colegio de San Luis
Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí
TEC de Monterrey - Campus de San Luis Potosí
Universidad Mesoamericana - Plantel de San Luis Potosí
Universidad Abierta
Universidad Champagnat
Universidad del Valle de México
Colegio de Estudios Superiores Rioverdense
Universidad Tangamanga
UASLP unidad Zona Media
Universidad Tecnológica de San Luis Potosí
El Colegio de México
El Colegio de Michoacan
Universidad de Chapingo
UNAM
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State Government
Secretaría de Desarrollo Pecuario y Recursos Hidraulicos
Comisión Estatal de Alimentos
Secretaría de Fomento Industrial y Servicio
Instituto Estatal de la Vivienda
Protección Social y Vialidad
Dirección General de Communicaciones y Transportes del Estado
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
Turismo del Estado
Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria
Secretaría de Ecología y Medio Ambiente
PROEM (Programa Estatal de la Mujer)
Procuradoría Agraria
Federal Government
SEDESOL (Secretaría para el Desarollo Social)
INI (Instituto Nacional Indigenista)
SEMARNAT (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales)
SAGARPA (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería y Recursos)
Secretaría de Salubridad Y Asistencia
SECOFI (Secretaría de Comercio Y Fomento Industrial)
SEDESORE (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social Y Regional)
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática)
FONAES (Fondo Nacional de Empresas Sociales)
Comisión Nacional del Agua
CONAZA (Comisión Nacional de Zonas Áridas)
Foreign NGOs
Habitat Internacional
World Neighbors
Visión Mundial
Greenpeace
Amnistia Internacional
Save the Children Fund
Club Rotario
Club de Leones
Foreign Government
USAID
AUSAID (Australian International Development Assistance Bureau)
CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency)
USDA (United States Department of Agriculture)
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Multilateral Agencies
Banco Mundial
UNDP (Programa de Desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas)
FAO (Organización de Agricultura y Alimentación)
UNESCO
UNICEF
OMS (Organización Mundial para la Salud)
OCDE (Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico)
IICA (Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación Agrícola)
Foreign Foundations
Ford Foundation
Kellog Foundation
Rockefeller Foundation
Wellcome Foundation
Fundación Inter-Americana
Mexican Businesses
Agromedia
Agrosierra de la Huasteca
Agroaltiplano
Interagro de la Huasteca en Ébano
Interagro del Peñón
Agroexport del Valle de Arista
Interagro del Centro
Foreign Businesses
Nestlé
Coca-Cola
Del Monte
Danone
General Motors
Ford
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ARIC
CCC
CCI
CEMEFI
CIMO
CIOAC
CNC
CNOP
COCIHP
CODUC
CONAZA
CRAC
CTM
DEMITAN
DIF
EZLN
FAO
FIRA
FMDR
FONAES
GATT
GDP
GONGO
GRO
GSO
IMEDER
INEGI
INGO
INI
MOCACO

Asociación Rural de Interés Colectivo [Rural Associations of Collective Interest]
Central Campesina Cardenista [Cardenist Peasant Union]
Central Campesina Independiente [Independent Peasant Central]
Centro Mexicano para la Filantropia [Mexican Center for Philanthropy]
Calidad Integral y Modernización [Complete Quality and Modernization]
Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos [Independent Central
of Farm Workers and Peasants]
Confederación Nacional Campesina [National Peasant Confederation]
Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones de Pueblos [National Confederation
of Peoples’ Organizations]
Coordinadora de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas de la Huasteca Potosina
[Coordination of Indigenous Peasant Organizations of the Potosino Huasteca]
Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas, Urbanas y Campesinas [Coalition of
Democratic, Urban and Peasant Organizations]
Arid Zones Commission [Comisión de Zonas Áridas]
Consejo Regional de Abasto y Comercialización [Regional Council of Supply and
Commercialization]
Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos [Confederation of Mexican Workers]
Desarrollo de la Mujer Indígena de Tancanhuitz [Development of the Indigenous
Woman of Tancanhuitz]
Desarrollo Integral de la Familia [Comprehensive Development of the Family]
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional [Zapatist National Liberation Army ]
Food and Agriculture Organization
Fideicomiso en Relación a la Agricultura [Trusteeship in Relation to Agriculture]
Fundación Mexicana para el Desarrollo Rural [Mexican Foundation for Rural
Development]
Fondo Nacional de Apoyo para las Empresas de Solidaridad [National Fund of
Support for Enterprises of Solidarity]
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gross Domestic Product
Government NGO
Grassroots Organization
Grassroots Support Organization
Instituto Mexicano de Educación para el Desarrollo Rural [Mexican Institute of
Rural Development Education]
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Geografía e Información [National Institute for
Statistics, Geography and Information]
International NGO
Instituto Nacional Indigenista [National Indigenous Institute]
Movimiento de Campesinos y Colonias [Movement of Peasants and Colonias]
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MSO
NAFTA
NGO
OECD
PACMIC

Membership Support Organization
North-American Free Trade Agreement
Non Governmental Organization
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Programa de Apoyo a las Culturas Municipales y Comunitarias [Program of
Support to Municipal and Community Cultures]
PAN
Partido de Acción Nacional [National Action Party]
PIECP
Parlamento Indio Estatal Campesino y Popular [State Indian, Peasant and Popular
Parliament]
PRD
Partido de la Revolución Democrática [Party of the Democratic Revolution]
PRI
Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional Revolutionary Party]
PROCAMPO Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo [National Program of Agricultural Direct
Support]
PROEM
Programa Estatal de la Mujer [State Program for Women]
SAGARPA Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación
[Federal Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Fishing, and Food]
SEDARH
Secretaría de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Recursos Hidraúlicos [Department of
Agricultural Development and Water Resources]
SEDEPAC
Servicio, Desarrollo y Paz [Service, Development and Peace]
SEDESOL
Secretaría de Desarrollo Social [Department of Social Development]
SEDESORE Secretaría de Desarrollo Social y Regional [Department of Social and Regional
Development]
SEDUCOP Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano, Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas [Department
of Urban Development, Communication, and Public Works]
SEMARNAT Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Naturaleza [Department of the Environment and
Nature]
SMO
Social Movement Organization
SNGO
Southern NGO
SPR
Sociedad de Producción Rural [Society for Rural Production]
SSS
Sociedad de Solidaridad Social [Society of Social Solidarity]
Triple S
See SSS
UAIM
Unidad Agrícola e Industrial de la Mujer [Women’s Agricultural and Industrial
Unit]
UCD
Unión Campesina Democrática [Democratic Peasant Union]
UNAM
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [Nacional Autonomous University of
Mexico]
UNORCA
Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Autónomas [National Union of
Autonomous Peasant Organizations]
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APPENDIX C:
LIST OF RURAL NGOS IN THE SAMPLE
Alianza de Productores de la Huasteca
Asociación Civil Acuícola, Piscícola y Agropecuaria, A.C.
Asociación Civil de la Muy Noble y Real Ciudad de Real de Catorce, A.C.
Barzón Estatal, A.C.
Beneficencia Juan H. Sánchez, A.C.
Central Campesina Cardenista Potosina, A.C.
CIOAC (Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos)
CEEDIGMAG (Centro de Estudios Educativos y Desarrollo Integral de Grupos Marginados),
A.C.
CODUC (Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas, Urbanas y Campesinas), A.C.
Comité Regional de Derechos Humanos-Zona Altiplano, A.C.
Comité Regional del Altiplano Potosino, A.C.
CNC (Condeferación Nacional Campesina)
Consejo de Ancianos Indígenas de la Huasteca, A.C.
Consejo Estatal de ONGs del Estado de SLP, A.C.
Consejo Indígena Potosino
Consejo de Lucha Indígena de la Huasteca Potosina, A.C.
Consejo Regional de Abasto y Comercialización
Coordinación Nacional Plan de Alaya
COCIHP (Coordinadora de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas de la Huasteca Potosina),
A.C.
DEMITAN (Desarrollo de la Mujer Indígena de Tancanhuitz), A.C.
Desarrollo Rural de San Luis Potosí, A.C.
Desarrollo Rural de la Zona Media, A.C.
Desarrollo Rural del Norte Potosino, A.C.
Ecocultur, A.C.
Federación Nacional de Uniones de UAIMs y Organizaciones Económicas de Campesinas, A.C.
Fondo Regional Nahuatl
Fondo Regional Pame
Fondo Regional Tamuín, S.L.P., S.C.
Fondo Regional Teenek, S.C.
La Forestal F.C.L.
Fundación Ecológica del Altiplano Potosino, A.C.
Fundación Produce de San Luis Potosí, A.C.
Fundación Realidad, A.C.
Grupo Agua Tierra y Vida, A.C.
Habitat Internacional
Hermandad Internacional Mexicana, A.C.
Instituto de Desarrollo Regional, A.C.
Justicia para la Defensa Indígena, A.C.
316

Luz Verde al Desarrollo Sustentable, S.C.
Madres Solteras, A.C.
MOCACO (Movimiento de Campesinos y Colonias), A.C.
Mujeres Ecologistas de la Centinela, A.C.
PIECP (Parlamento Indio Estatal Campesino y Popular) independiente
Proyecto Verde, A.C.
SEDEPAC (Servicio, Desarrollo y Paz), A.C.
Unidad Agrícola de la Mujer Campesina de Vanegas de Abajo, A.C.
Unidad Cultural Nahuatl, A.C.
Unión de Cooperativas DEAGROMIT, S.C.S.
Unión Ganadera Regional de San Luis Potosí
UNORCA (Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Autónomas), A.C.
Visión Mundial
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